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1.1. ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
In an essay on the progress of economic thought, Joan Robinson calls the 
attention of her reader to the satire by Bernard Mandeville, written 
about 1700, called 'The Fable of the Bees'. The bees were prodigal, 
luxurious and vain, and all these vices made their society fiourish, fully 
employed and wealthy. One day, she notes, the bees were `smitten with 
virtue and began to lead a sober life, eschewing pomp and pride, and 
adopting frugal, modest ways. The result was a dreadful slump' (1962, 
p. 14). The paradox that private vices can be public benefits has intrigued 
many economists, from Adam Smith on. This inspires Mrs. Robinson 
to describe the task of the economist as follows: 'D is the business of the 
economists, not to tell us what to do, but to show why what we are 
doing anyway is in accord with proper principles' (p. 21). This state-
ment indicates quite clearly the intertwinement of economie theory 
and ideological environment. Any economie system, according to 
Mrs. Robinson, requires a set of rules, an ideology to justify them, and a 
conscience in the individual which makes him strive to conform to them. 
It is not only the ideological environment that has a relation to eco-
nomie theory, but also the technological environment in the widest sense. 
The transformation of an economie system is determined by the changing 
environment, but at the same time the environment is influenced by the 
prevailing economie system and theory. A well-known example is pro-
vided by the capitalist system in which the allocation of resources is 
completely determined by the competitive market. The working of the 
capitalist system with its individual-oriented ideology of progress has 
stimulated the development of economies, but has also resulted in the 
accumulation of the forces of production into private hands. At the same 
time it has changed the production conditions by developing new pro-
cesses with indivisibilities, increasing returns to scale and external effects. 
Gradually, the increased productive forces no longer fitted into the system 
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which had caused them to develop. Market failure, imperfect competition, 
unemployment and inequity underrnined the foundations of the capitalist 
system, and new rules became necessary. 
New economie systems have been developed, mainly under the pressure 
of political forces, and observed and influenced by political economists 
who (also!) have to analyze both the prevailing systems and theories, 
and the environment, in order to adapt the economie system to the chang-
ing environment. Gradually, however, the analysis of allocation mecha-
nisms has received more attention, which implies a more active attitude 
on the part of political economists towards the design of an economie 
system. 
A third type of environment on which economic theory depends is its 
language. It is very difficult to adequately describe and analyze complex 
economic phenomena in a verbal way. 'Therefore mathematical and other 
tools of analysis are used in economic models. Although these formal 
languages also have their deficiencies in the description of economic 
phenomena, they do make it progressively more possible to describe 
social features or systems in a mathematical model, or conceptual system. 
Some examples are: optimizing behavior (programming), confficts (game 
theory), (im-) perfect competition (measure theory), uncertainty and risk 
(probability theory), general equilibrium (topology), economic policy 
(control theory), and economic organization (system theory). 
Koopmans (1957) sees economic theory as a sequence of models, 
derived from the interaction of observation and reasoning. This dialogue 
has been intensified only during the last few decades. The postulational 
approach (see Nauta, 1970) holds many advantages, both for scientific 
efficiency and for the communication between sciences and scientists, and 
has therefore gained in momentum. 
For many models of aggregate economic behavior (or macro-economic 
models) this approach is based upon and verified with empirical data. 
Unfortunately, this cannot yet be said of micro-economic models, in which 
assumptions are made concerning the behaviors of individual agents. 
The present study does not belong to the category of positive or de-
scriptive models of an economy which can be empirically verified, but to 
the category of normative models based upon postulates and giving 
recommendations for an economy where these postulates are valid or 
acceptable. This branch of economics is usually called welfare economics. 
On the other hand, the postulates and definitions to be chosen must 
describe — as closely as possible — the essential characteristics of agents 
and features in an economy. The over all performance of a formalized 
economy with purely economic agents and pure concepts can be very 
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informative for people who have to design and improve economie 
systems in real life. This postulational approach, called pure economics 
by Walras exactly a century ago, has an operational value only if all 
relevant features in real life are continuously translated in new and better 
postulates and definitions. 
The present study is concerned with the introduction of public goods 
in a decentralized economic system. In the case of private goods it is 
assumed that the total quantity of these commodities is distributed over 
the individual agents, who have exclusive control of their bundles and 
are not affected by the bundles available to other agents. The incentive 
to expand the quantities at the disposal of an agent, causes a conflict of 
interests between individual agents which can be reconciled in some opti-
mal way through the competitive market mechanism, based on the 
parametric function of a price system (chapter 2). Public goods cannot 
be exchanged on a market and are available equally to all agents in the 
economy. Therefore, the conflict of interests between individual agents 
does not involve the quantities at the disposal of an agent, but the compo-
sition of the bundle of public goods at the disposal of all agents together 
i.e. on the valuation of the bundle. To reconcile the conflicting interests 
about prices among individual agents, mechanisms are described and 
designed (in chapters 5 and 6) which equalize the benefit of every public 
good for all agents together and the cost of the public good for all agents 
together. 
In order to do so, much attention must be paid to the theory of value 
and its mathematical counterpart, the theory of duality. The correspon-
dence between the price structure and the technology and preferences 
are analyzed in chapters 3 and 4. The mathematical tools are described 
and developed in part II of this book, (see also section 1.4). In chapter 7, 
fmally, the economie and methodological background of this study is 
described. 
1.2. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC GOODS 
A commodity or service is called an economie good if it is desired by a 
number of individuals in the economy for some characteristic, and if it 
is scarce, i.e. available only by offering some other economic goods in 
exchange. Economic goods are sometimes consumed by one individual, 
sometimes by a number of individuals simultaneously. The consumption 
of an economie good sometimes has effects on non-consuming agents; 
sometimes there are no such external effects. These properties of economic 
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goods are decisive for the way in which they can be treated in economic 
theory. 
This study deals with the allocation of resources and producible com-
modities among the individuals or agents in an economy. Until recently, 
the theory of optimal allocation was mainly concerned with economic 
goods which could be handled on a market. A market is particularly apt 
for economic goods calledprivate goods, which are by definition exclusively 
consumed by one agent so that its consumption has no external effects on 
other agents (see also section 4.2). 
Given an income distribution, or a distribution of resources, the 
market mechanism invites each consumer to demand an optimal element 
according to his individual taste and wealth. The information about 
demand and supply of other agents in the market is transmitted through 
a price vector, uniform for all agents. This uniform price for private goods 
is closely related to the fact that individual demands for private goods 
can be added to give total demand in the market. 
Private goods in the strict sense are in fact an exception in an economy 
rather than a rule. Many goods have external effects in consumption, 
because they enter into two or more persons' preference functions 
simultaneously. For example, for many people, food, clothes, or a gar-
diner's service are private goods in the strict sense. But these goods, and 
many other may have external effects in consumption: e.g. a dinner in a 
restaurant, a dress, or a garden. 
If an economic good is consumed by all agents in the economy in such a 
way that no agent is aware of this consumption by others ('pure exter-
nability'), then it is called a public good. This definition is made more 
precise in section 4.2. Examples are: national defense for a country, clean 
air for a region, public facilities for a city. If the economy is given and the 
set of agents consuming collectively a public good is a strict subset of the 
agents in the economy, then this good is called a local public good, such 
as a soccer match, a dike and control of air pollution. 
Again, the concept of a (local) public good is a formal description which 
will not be completely accurate in most cases. This definition does, 
however, come very close to many actual economic goods and is also 
operational in the sense that it serves as a corner stone for a theory of 
allocation of economic goods in an economy. 
There are operations which transform some economic goods from public 
goods to private goods or vice versa, for instance, the property of non- 
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excludability (required for public goods) can be converted into excluda-
bility (required for private goods). A public park, e.g., can be converted 
into a private garden, and a private collection into a public collection. 
The ownership of an economie good does not necessarily determine the 
economie character (private or public) of the commodity. On the other 
hand, private ownership of public goods (or vice versa) often makes it 
difficult to obtain an optimal allocation (see chapter 6). It is virtually 
impossible to transform the character of some economic goods, such as 
a radio broadcast, or a traffic regulating police officer. Obviously, 
excludability is difficult to achieve in these cases. 
Public goods can also lose their character when consumers become 
aware of their simultaneous consumption. The enjoyment of consumption 
of a good is decreased or increased by another individual's consumption 
of the same good. A well know example is congestion, e.g. of traffic. 
Thus, two features determine the character of an economie good: the 
technical or objective criterion of excludability and the individual or 
subjective criterion of external effects (see table 1.2.1): 
Table 1.2.1. Types of economie goods 




exclusive 	 no external effects 
(non-) exclusive 	extemal effects 
collective 	 pure external effects 
Many public goods have a disutility for consumers, such as pollution or 
inflation. In those cases, the positive definition would be the removal or 
the prevention of harmful situations. Free disposal of (consumed) 
commodities also belongs to this category, in my opinion, if it is indeed 
an economic good (and thus not 'free' or without social cost). Other 
definitions and interpretations of public goods are given in section 4.3. 
Public goods have, of course, always been present in an economy. 
Two — independent — problems in connection with public goods have to 
be solved by the community: 
1. Which bundle of public goods has to be provided for the agents in the 
economy ? 
2. How should it be produced or financed ? 
The early economists concentrated their attention mainly on the second 
question: `expenditure somehow got decided and had to be paid for' 
(Samuelson, 1966, p. 99). This tradition is set forth in the theory of public 
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finance. Since the neo-classical writers of the 19th century, the problem of 
optimal taxation has been considered from two distinct points of view: the 
benefit approach and the ability-to-pay approach (see Musgrave, 1959). 
The first approach is individualistic, since it questions the right of a gover-
ment to apply other nonns for taxation than the benefit the individual 
agent receives through the supply of public goods. According to Samuel-
son (1969), this approach is also legalistic, because the acquired rights 
of the individual agents are considered inviolable, and all should be 
treated similarly if taxes must be levied, whatever the individual's 
initial position may be. 
The ability-to-pay approach contends that those with greater ability 
to pay, should pay more in order to get a greater welfare for all. Both 
approaches leave problems unsolved: the second by assuming that a 
social welfare function exists and a socially optimal distribution can be 
determined, the first by assuming also that both the existing and final 
allocation are socially optimal. 
What is socially optimal ? The answer to question (1) above also contains 
the answer to this question. Presumably, it has long been thought that no 
economie considerations are involved in the assumption about the 
existence of a social welfare function, and that either an autocratic or 
democratie political mechanism can lead to a social preference ordering. 
However, it has been shown by Arrow (1951) that, given some minimal 
conditions, there is no rule for deriving a social preference ordering from 
individual preference orderings. This was already noted by Condorcet in 
1785 in connection with the majority rule with voting (see also Sen, 1970). 
Therefore, if one is interested in a decentralized system in which individual 
preferences somehow determine social preferences, one cannot assume 
that the government is acquainted with a social preference ordering 
through a political mechanism. 
An interesting way to circumvent this problem has been suggested by 
Schumpeter (1943) and analyzed by Downs (1957). They assume that 
governments and political parties competitively maximize consumers' 
votes in the economy. When consumers vote in their own interests, the 
govemment decision is — by definition — optimal. In this approach, 
however, economie theory cannot offer any criterion to compare different 
allocations. Which outcome is socially optimal depends on the perfor-
mance of the political mechanism, and it remains socially optimal even if 
economists can point to unnecessary losses or to costless improvements 
with respect to the allocation, for example. In this context, Stevers (1967) 
has noticed that govemment policy under vote maximization would be 
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characterized by: a high degree of continuity, a narrow nationalistic 
promotion of interests, and insufficient attention to long term develop-
ments. 
The normative approach to public expenditure was introduced by 
authors as Dupuit (1844), Pantaleoni (1883), Sax (1887), Wicksell (1896), 
Barone (1912) and Lindahl (1919), whose papers are translated in Mus-
grave and Peacock (1958). It was Lindahl's approach that inspired 
Samuelson to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for an opti-
mum in an economy with private and public goods (see Samuelson 1954, 
1955 and 1958). Samuelson introduced individual prices for public goods, 
and expressed these prices in terms of a private good: the numéraire. 
His quasi-equilibrium (later called Lindahl-equilibrium) solved both the 
problem of providing public goods and the problem of financing them, 
in such a way that a synthesis was obtained between the benefit approach 
and the ability-to-pay approach. 
This solution, however, is purely theoretical as Samuelson himself has 
noted. Since consumers have to pay a fee according to the individual 
benefit they receive from a commodity which will be supplied anyhow, 
it is unrealistic to assume that they will reveal their true preferences. 
Several authors, viz. Drèze and de la Vallée Poussin (1971) and Malin-
vaud (1972) have designed procedures to overcome this problem of 
incentives. 
Table 1.2.2. Government expenditures,by economic category- Percentage 
of gross national product: 1957 and 1967. 
Germany France Italy Netherlands Belgium 
1957 1967 1957 1967 1957 1967 1957 1967 1957 1967 
Kross consumption 14.3 16.7 14.6 13.7 11.2 12.8 14.6 15.5 9.9 12.7 
iirect investment 3.0 4.7 2.3 3.5 1.8 2.3 4.6 5.7 2.5 4.3 
Ticome transfers 16.7 18.5 17.7 21.4 13.8 18.0 12.3 17.9 12.5 16.9 
Issistence, interest' 4.3 3.0 4.1 2.7 3.4 3.1 7.9 8.9 3.8 5.4 
total 38.3 42.9 38.7 41.3 30.2 36.2 39.4 48.0 28.7 39.3 
Interest paid, Capital transfers, loans, advances, and participations. 
Source: E.E.C. (1970, tables Al and A2). 
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In this study, an attempt is made to solve the problems related to public 
goods by separating the financing of public goods from the provision of 
public goods. The individual prices introduced by Samuelson are given 
a quite different interpretation, and - like votes - are applicable only on 
the level of public goods. The formal optimality conditions are, of course, 
the same. The financing problem is solved by a taxation system which is 
independent of the public goods to be provided, similar to Bowen's 
1943 suggestion. This approach is made possible by application of the 
duality theory, and has resulted in a concrete allocation mechanism. 
Table 1.2.3. Government expenditures, by major function - Percent 
distribution: 1957 and 1966. 
Germany France Italy Netherlands Belgium 
1957 1966 1957 1966 1957 1966 1957 1966 1957 1966 
1. general 
government 5.8 5.4 3.9 3.7 9.3 6.7 5.2 7.9 5.0 4.5 
2. the judiciary 
and police 3.1 2.8 3.0 2.5 4.0 5.1' 2.9 2.9 3.4 2.8 
3. national defense 8.8 9.9 18.0 10.4 9.7 7.9 14.3 8.3 12.7 7.6 
4. foreign relations 0.6 1.1 5.1 3.3 0.6 0.4 2.1 1.5 0.9 2.3 
5. transportation, 
traffic 6.2 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.6 7.6 9.8 9.5 11.8 12.7 
6. industry and 
commerce 3.9 2.7 6.8 6.8 1.3 2.4 3.3 3.8 3.2 2.8 
7. agriculture 5.5 4.0 2.8 3.3 5.4 4.5 5.6 3.5 1.3 2.3 
8. education, culture 7.8 10.1 8.3 13.1 9.7 13.9 12.6 16.4 12.7 14.9 
9. welfare 33.0 35.3 30.7 36.8 30.9 38.1 25.2 33.0 32.9 34.9 
10. health 4.0 5.6 0.8 1.8 4.5 3.1 2.6 3.3 1.7 1.7 
11. housing 5.2 3.6 3.5 4.4 1.4 1.0 8.7 7.8 1.2 1.1 
12. disasters and war 
payment 11.9 7.4 5.5 2.6 5.3 2.9 1.4 0.2 5.8 2.7 
13. undistributed 4.2 4.6 3.8 3.3 9.3 6.7 6.3 1.9 7.4 9.7 
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: E.E.C. (1970, table A10). 
10 
Table 1.2.4. Government expenditures, by level of government i — Percent 
distribution: 1957 and 1966. 
Germany France Italy Netherlands Belgium 
1957 1966 1957 1966 1957 1966 1957 1966 1957 1966 
the state 54 50 59 50 52 45 42 30 51 52 
lower public bodies 18 21 14 16 18 18 41 44 20 15 
social insurance 28 29 27 34 30 36 17 26 29 33 
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1. Transfers between public bodies and redemptions excluded. 
Source: E.E.C. (1970, table B1). 
The increasing relevance of public goods can be verified — if necessary — 
by the preceeding tables, indicating the relative importance and compo-
sition of government expenditures for several E.E.C. countries. 
1.3. THE DUALITY APPROACH 
An often applied device for solving mathematical problems is to translate 
the concepts in which the problem is described, into other concepts which 
simplify the solution of the problem. Examples are the Laplace transfor-
mation (from time- to frequency-domain), and the transformation from 
the primal to the dual problem in linear programming. Such a transfor-
mation is in itself valuable, as it can give a deeper insight in the problem 
under consideration. 
For both reasons, the duality transformation is applied in this study. 
A third reason for relevance of the duality approach in the social sciences 
is, that both representations of the problem may be influenced indepen-
dently (see chapter 7). This is not assumed to be true in the main part of 
this study. 
Duality phenomena are also well known in economie theory: maximizing 
profits and minimizing costs, for example, and: maximizing the 
value of output and minimi7ing the value of shadow prices in a 
programming problem. It is essential that there be a common concept 
connecting both problems. 
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The mathematical duality concept which is basic to the dual concepts 
used in this study, is defined in section 9.1 as the set of all linear functions 
which map a vector of a finite-dimensional euclidean space (the primal 
space) into a real number. Thus, the real line connects in a way the primal 
space and the dual space. 
Since quantities of an economie good are assumed to be represented 
by the real line and quantities of n commodities by the real euclidean 
n-space, this space is called the commodity space or quantity space. The 
quantity space is considered to be the primal space. The meaning of the 
dual space in economie theory depends completely on the connotation 
given to the real line common to the primal system and the dual system. 
This connotation can be for example: weight of gold, amount of money, 
or hours of homogenous labor per year. Since these concepts determine 
the meaning of the elements in the dual space, such a concept is called the 
standard or denominator of the dual systems. 
The Walrasian economic theory and most contemporary western 
economic theories assume a single standard: mostly money. The value 
of a commodity in these theories is indicated by an amount of money 
per unit quantity of the commodity, i.e. an element of the dual space. 
Values and prices are identical in these theories. 
The Marxian economie theory knows two independent standards: 
money and (homogenous) labor. The value of a commodity is expressed 
in terms of labor, the price in terms of money. The `profir of producers in 
terms of labor values (which are determined by the amount of labor 
socially necessary to reproduce a unit of the commodity considered) 
indicates the surplus value of production. Since the labor values need not 
be proportional to the money prices, the distribution of profits is not 
proportional to the distribution of surplus values. 
It is possible, of course, to introduce other standards of measurement 
for economie values, such as the amount of counters, or `votes' per 
unit quantity of a commodity. In this study (chapter 5) such a standard 
will be proposed for public goods, not independent of the money stan-
dard for private goods but carefully linked with it. Probably, the `vote' 
standard offers better opportunities of determining a socially desired 
output of public goods than the money or labor standards proposed 
thus far. Further, since the methodology applied is independent of the 
standard chosen, proportional solutions exist for all standards. 
The methodology applied in this study to derive dual concepts is based 
on fixing the standard on an arbitrary real number — say 1 — and deter-
rnining the prices (or values) in the dual space which assign the (mathe- 
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matical) value of at least, or at most, 1 to the vectors in the primal space. 
This was first done in economie theory by Hotelling (1932) and Roy (1942) 
who deduced that a consumer's utility function with arguments in the 
quanty space can be replaced by an `indirect' utility function in the price 
space only if the prices are market prices and the consumer's income is 
fixed. (See section 4.1.) 
Duality in consumption theory has been studied independently by 
Milleron (1968) and Weddepohl (1970). Their findings were extended to 
production theory by Ruys (1971a), to aggregation of sets by Weddepohl 
(1972), to dual correspondences (or polar multifunctions) by Weddepohl 
(1973a, b), and to adjoint multifunctions by Ruys (1974). This adjoint 
multifunction is a generalization of the adjoint of a convex polyhedral 
process, defined by Rockafellar (1972). (See chapters 9 and 10.) 
Shephard (1953) bas shown that in many cases production functions 
can be derived from cost functions, and the converse relation was shown 
by Uzawa (1964). Shephard (1970) has generalized these results to multi-
functions and derived a dual relation between cost structures (c.q. output 
revenue structures) in the price space, and production-input structures 
(c.q. output structures) in the quantity space. (See chapter 3.) 
The duality approach in equilibrium theory was first applied by 
Milleron (1969) to public goods. This was also done — independently — by 
Ruys (1970). Weddepohl (1972, 1973) has applied this approach to a 
private goods economy, in order to simplify proof of existence given by 
Debreu (1962). 
One of the main mathematical generalizations made possible by the 
duality approach is that the requirement of differentiability of functions 
is no longer necessary. In fact, an element of the dual space can be con-
sidered as a generalization of the concept of a differential in calculus. It 
also allow for the application of all tools developed in set theory. For 
example, the necessary and sufficient conditions of Pareto optimality 
given by Samuelson (1954) can be generalized and reformulated in terms 
of separating hyperplanes (see Fabre, 1969, and chapter 9). Finally, since 
the behavior of concepts at the origin determines the behavior of concepts 
in the dual space at infinity, compactness arguments can mostly be applied 
in either space. 
The duality concepts and tools mentioned above are related to the dual 
structures in prograrnming problems, discovered by Kantorovich (1939) 
and Dantzig (1948). A relation between these concepts is given in section 
10.5. In the present study, the time-dimension is not explicitly treated. 
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A recent contribution to the analysis of dual structures in linear program-
ming problems over an infinite horizon has been made by Evers (1973). 
1.4. DECENTRALIZED ALLOCATION MECHANISMS 
A theory of value of commodities depends on the technology of producers 
and the preferences of consumers, both individually and socially, given 
the standard in which values are expressed. One problem is to show the 
interdependence and to formulate criteria for equilibrium and optimality 
of an allocation (see chapter 2). 
Another problem is to design an organization through which the 
technology of producers and the preferences of consumers can be com-
municated, so that optimal decisions about allocation can be made. One 
of the oldest mechanisms developed for private goods is the market. 
Let us cell an agent's set of alternative actions in a given situation his 
choice set. The individual's choice set in a market is then determined by 
the individual's resources and the prevailing prices of the marketable 
commodities. Usually, the choice sets determined through a market 
mechanism are large enough to express the producer's technology and 
the consumer's preferences, while the prices contain enough information 
to equalize supply and demand. It has been shown that, if all consumers 
and producers choose a maximal element from their choice set, an allo-
cation is obtained which is Pareto optimal (see chapter 2). 
The market mechanism has some remarkable properties, such as: 
a. It is decentralized with regard to decisions. 
b. It is decentralized with regard to information about local circum-
stances. 
c. It finances the allocation. 
d. It is incentive compatible to a large degree (see section 6.1). 
e. It is adaptable to some forms of change. 
f. It is locally converging to an equilibrium under some restrictions. 
These properties (defined in chapter 6) were mentioned in a discussion 
between economists in the first half of this century about allocation 
mechanisms in a socialist economy. This 'socialist controversy' drew 
attention to the design of allocation procedures for the first time. 
It is well known that the environment in the 19th century changed to 
such an extent that the private ownership economy with the competitive 
market mechanism as only rule of allocation no longer functioned satis- 
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factorily. Marxian analysis pointed out that a contradiction existed 
between productive relations (economie organization) and productive 
forces or capacities of individuals. Many productive capacities had out-
grown the individual right of disposal and had become in fact social 
capacities. The socialist economists therefore advocated abolition of 
private ownership of production factors. Although they emphasized the 
importance of planning in a socialist system, concrete proposals to run a 
socialist economy were hardly made at the time. 
The most accepted point of view was a centralized economic organi-
zation. The conclusion of the socialist controversy was that it is possible 
to design a mechanism which is formally similar to a market mechanism, 
but which is very different in other aspects. 
The analysis of allocation procedures has only recently been introduced. 
Hurwicz (1959) has proposed some criteria for informational decentrali-
zation. A different approach, based on uncertainty and limited informa-
tion has inspired J. Marschak (1955) and Marschak and Radner (1972) 
to develop a `theory of teams' for organizations with a conunon goal. 
Several authors have studied planning procedures in a macro economic 
context (see Tinbergen, 1964, and Ellman, 1971). 
Malinvaud (1968) has defined some criteria or properties for planning 
procedures in a decentralized economy, and has analyzed procedures for 
several economic environments. In subsequent papers published by him 
and other authors, this environment also included public goods (see 
sections 6.3 and 6.4). 
The presence of public goods has important consequences for the 
design of decision procedures. First of all, at least one decision has to be 
made centrally. The finance of the provision of public goods and the true 
revelation of preferences and production technologies also become prob-
lems. It is therefore difficult to develop allocation mechanisms for 
public goods, if some attractive properties of allocation mechanisms 
for private goods are also to be realized. 
The solution proposed in this study is that each agent be ffiven a choice 
set of priorities for public goods, comparable with the choice set, or 
budget set, of private goods. Through these choice sets, the individual 
agents can reveal their own priorities and preferences, and the social 
decision to be made takes into account of all individual choices. 
These choice sets are called voting-papers on which each agent can 
quote his 'price', i.e. the highest priority for additional units to a given 
bundle of public goods: see table 1.4.1 for an example. These prices are 
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averaged over all agents and the average is scaled to the income in terms 
of money of the collectivity considered. The resulting price is called the 
social benefit price of the bundle of public goods proposed. If the social 
benefit price equals the social cost price, then the bundle is said to be an 
equilibrium bundle (see section 5.2). 
Table 1.4.1. A voting-paper for a city-economy 
Public commodity* 	 Proposed quantity in 
crucial characteristics 
housing 	 1000 per year 
city reconstruction 	 10 blocks 
private transport + roads 	1000 acres 
public transport 	 every 15 minutes 
safety 	 300 police officers 
parcs and recreation 	1000 acres 
heaith and sport 4 swimming pools 
conununity development 	8 district houses 
education 	 30 children per teacher 
Agent's priority to 
one additional unit 
+ 
"other: depending on task 	 max. 100 
If the social benefit price does not equal the social cost price of that 
bundle, then a new bundle is proposed, until an equilibrium bundle is 
found. This mechanism, which is assumed to work completely analogous 
to the market mechanism for private goods, is called a referendum mecha-
nism for public goods. 
The referendum mechanism is a forma! concept, just as the economic 
market mechanism, and will never be perfectly realized, nor perfectly 
applicable. But it demands from the individual agents as much informa-
tion for an allocation of public goods, as the market mechanism for an 
allocation of private goods. However, people must have an attitude 
towards this mechanism, different from the competitive behavior 
required for a market mechanism. People must be willing to be informed 
and to vote, just as in politica! elections. The equilibrium thus obtained 
is called a public equilibrium. In real life, also, the referendum mechanism 
is replaced by a political mechanism which appoints people to make the 
decisions about public goods. However, if the political mechanism 
appoints people through elections, this real life solution can be considered 
as a two-step referendum mechanism. If a political mechanism can 
guarantee that each representative represents the `average' preferences 
of the corresponding proportion of voters and if the referendum-mecha-
nism is applied in the political body of representatives, then the resulting 
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decision also meets the optimality criteria developed in welfare theory. 
This idea is compatible with the views of Downs, mentioned in section 
1.3, and his theory can be generalized in this way. 
The organization of decisions in an economy proposed in section 6.5, 
has some characteristics similar to the proposals of Musgrave (1959), 
Tinbergen (1961) and Kolm (1967). Musgrave distinguishes three govern-
ment branches: the allocation branch, the distribution branch and the 
stabilization branch. Tinbergen distinguishes various levels of local public 
goods which are hierarchically ordened. This ordering is similarly deter-
mined here according to the extent (the locality') of public goods, and a 
converse ordering is given by the markets of private goods. 
The referendum mechanism proposed in this study can be considered to 
belong to the class of voting procedures. This is one method from the 
several methods for allocating resources mentioned by Shubik (1970). 
Since the analysis of economic laws and their conditioning belongs 
typically to the field of political economy (cf. Lange, 1959, ch. 6), it 
follows that the renewed interest in allocation mechanisms can be con-
sidered as a return to the classical theory of political economy (see 
Morgenstern, 1972, p. 1175). 
It should be stressed, finally, that every allocation mechanism must be 
sustained by assumptions about the agents' behavior. An agent in an 
economy is said to have an individual rationality if he chooses a maximal 
element in his own choice set. When agents are allowed to form coalitions 
in an economy, they can behave rationally in a different way. An agent 
is said to have a group rationality if he joins a coalition of agents that can 
offer the best opportunities to all members of the coalition. Group 
rationality is closely related to the concept of the core, defined in section 
2.2. An allocation mechanism can have an outcome which is sustained 
by both types of rationality (cf. the competitive equilibrium in section 
2.2), but this is not necessary (see section 5.3). 
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2. Equilibrium in a system 
of economie relations 
2.1. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY 
The concept of equilibrium has received attention in economie theory 
since its emergence as a science, although the interest it receives is not 
always in a state of equilibrium (cf. Komai's Anti-Equilibrium, 1971). 
Partial equilibrium theory contains studies of consumer's or producer's 
behavior, their strivings and constraints. In general equilibrium theory, 
these often confficting behavioral patterns were brought together in one 
model in order to analyze compatibility of the assumptions and defini-
tions, and to develop criteria to judge possible allocations in an economy. 
Analysis of equilibrium is not only interesting in order to derive 
properties of equilibrium situations, it is also necessary for understanding 
the forces and movements causing disequilibrium. Disequilibrium and 
change are closely related. Change is evident in economic life, but less 
evident the answers to questions such as: why, how and in which 
direction are we changing or should we change. Before trying to answer 
these questions about disequilibrium, a model will be developed in which 
an equilibrium exists, and its properties analyzed. 
What is equilibrium in a social system, such as an economic system ? A 
system is said to be a set of elements and a set of (binary) relations between 
these elements. These elements are characterized by specific features 
which can leave room for variations. If all variations in elements are 
explained by elements and relations of the system, the system is called 
closed. The elements in economie systems have specific capacities, 
e.g., a particular consumptive need for a consumer, or alternative uses 
for a unit of capital. The relations betvveen different elements are con-
straints on the elements. 
For every relation in a system, a state of equilibrium can be defined. If 
all relations are in equilibrium, then the system is said to be in a state of 
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equilibrium. The system is in motion if one or more of its relations is not 
in a state of equilibrium. If all elements of the system are changing 
through the motion of the system, then the motion is irreversible or 
non-stationary and the system is changing (see section 7.2). 
Change of social systems is virtually accepted nowadays, but the philoso-
phy of the 'harmonia praestabilita', the belief in the stable and natural 
order given to everything on earth, has left an imprint on many economie 
theories (see Dalmulder, 1960). If this philosophy is accepted, the models 
can only be in a stationary motion towards a state of equilibrium. The 
economie systems described in this study are not changing. This is not 
because of the above philosophy, but because they are complex enough 
and serve their purpose well without proper change and also because 
they are closed systems, for which change is extremely difficult to imple-
ment in formal (and not intuitive) relations. A (stationary) motion 
towards a state of equilibrium is probably the most one can deduce. 
For the time being this is sufficient. 
Thus, a general equilibrium theory describes an economie system by 
means of a set of relations between entities in the system, which determine 
values of variables that sustain a state of equilibrium in all relations. 
The notion 'that a social system moved by independent actions in pursuit 
of different values is consistent with a final coherent state of balance, and 
one in which the outcomes may be quite different from those intended 
by the agents, is surely the most important intellectual contribution that 
economie thought has made to the general understanding of social 
processes' (Arrow and Hahn, 1971, p. 1). 
The first contribution to general equilibrium theory was made by Adam 
Smith (1776). He recognized that 'the division of labour' and other 
factors of production is based on the self interest of laborers and other 
agents to move from low to high renumeration and thus equalizing the 
rate of return in a society. Besides, in the pursuit of his own interest, 
every individual is 'led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was 
no part of his intention': the public interest (vol. I, p. 400). Although 
Smith and other classical authors have made an important contribution 
to the analysis of allocation of resources, they did not recognize the fact 
that the demand for commodities and therefore also the equality between 
demand and supply is influenced by prices. 
This fact was considered by later authors e.g. Coumot (1838), and 
integrated by Walras (1874) into an economie model. Walras succeeded in 
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describing the first closed general equilibrium model for a competitive, 
private ownership economy. An equilibrium price is that vector of prices 
at which both consumers and producers are in a state of equilibrium and 
at which their total supply equals total demand. Since the mathematical 
tools at that time were deficient, he was not able to prove existence or 
stability of an equilibrium. 
Although Walras defined a stationary motion for his system, he also 
attempted to introduce proper change in his system. This is obtained if 
the individual agents are able to overcome the constraints put upon 
them by the given resources and capacities, by changing their capacities. 
A model of endogenously determined economic change and growth 
would have emerged, distinguishable from the dynarnic models in which 
growth is determined exogenously. 
Change is firstly introduced into general equilibrium theory by Marx 
(1871). He drew attention to the relation between the productive capaci-
ties or forces of individuals and the organization or institutional structure 
in an economy. This relation is in a state of disequilibrium and generates 
changes in elements within the system. Through a dialectic process, the 
economy changes irreversibly from one stage to another. 
2.2. OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS 
Economie theory is not endowed with strong criteria for optimality. 
The first to be mentioned is rather a necessary condition: efficiency in 
production. This principle was applied by Pareto (1909) to consumers in 
an economy. Recently, Shubik (1959) and Scarf (1962) have introduced 
a stronger concept from game theory, called the core of an economy, 
which has been developed by Edgeworth (1881). 
In order to define these concepts, a description of an exchange economy 
Eo is given here. 
The economy consists of h consumers, f producers, and m commodities 
or economie goods, where h, f and m are finite natural numbers. 
For each economie good, a unit of measurement is given to indicate a 
quantity of that good. Quantities of all economic goods are represented 
in the real euclidian m-space Ir, called the commodity space of the 
economy. 
Consumers are indicated by the index ié H := {1, , h} . Each con-
sumer is characterized by his consumption set X, which is a relation in the 
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commodity space specifying the inputs (positive numbers) and the out-
puts (negative numbers) to which the 1-th consumer is constrained by his 
needs, capacities or otherwise, and by his preference relation in his 
consumption set. The consumers are also endowed with a vector of 
original resources, wi effil. 
The producers are indicated by the index JEF := {1,...,f). Each pro-
ducer is characterized by his production set Y, which is a relation in the 
commodity space specifying the outputs (positive numbers) which the 
producer can produce by means of certain quantities of inputs (negative 
numbers). The surplus of production of producer j is distributed to the 
consumers in the proportion Oij , with E = 1. 
The economy Eo is thus defined as follows: 
Eo := {H,(Xi , 	w i); F,(Yp O i.i)}. 
Consumers and producers are agents in the economy. These agents can 
be individual persons, but also collectivities such as households or firms. 
Agents make a choice from their choice sets, decide to act, and consume 
or produce. No distinction is made between choice, decision and activity. 
Many agents are both consumer and producer: in that case they have a 
consumer index and a producer index. Finally, an employee can be con-
sidered as a producer, or as a holder of resources, viz. labor, selling these 
services to a producer. 
Agents choose elements from their choice sets. The choice sets of producer 
j is equal to his production set Yi . The choice set of consumer i is deter-
mined by his consumption set X, the value of his resources w i and his 
share in the profit of producers: 
Mi (p) : = {x i e Xi I pxi spw i+E0 iipyi , yi E /Ti} 
= {xi e Xi Ipxi 2i (p)}j. 
This choice set M. (p) is also called the consumer's budget set, and is 
determined by the prices and the consumer's income 2 i (p). If the con-
sumers are in possession of the primary resources w i and of the produc-
tion units, then their income depends on the value of these resources and 
production activities, and thus on the prices. The economy E o in which 
the income distribution is determined by the initial distribution of 
resources and of shares in firms, and by the prices formed on a market of 
resources and other commodities, is called an exchange economy. The 
commodities in an exchange economy are all privately owned. 
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It is possible, however, to separate the income distribution from the 
market and to determine exogenously each consumer's income 2. The 
set of positive real numbers 1 ie H, A i > 0 and Di = 1} is called an 
income distribution and denoted by {ij. In that case, the consumers 
receive an income which is independent of the actual market conditions, 
and specification of individual resources and shares is superfiuous. The 
economy with only private goods 
:= {H, (Xi, 	2i); F, (0; w}, 
in which the income distribution is given exogenously, is called a distri-
bution economy (see Malinvaud, 1969b, section 5.2). In a distribution 
economy, markets can exist for all commodities, so that prices are formed 
via competitive behavior of agents, at which the quantities produced 
equal the quantities consumed. 
In an exchange economy as well as in a distribution economy, all 
agents are assumed to choose maximal elements in their choice sets. The 
budget sets of consumers are ordered according to the preference relation 
i , and the production sets of producers are ordered according to the 
profit obtained. 
A state or an allocation of the economy Eo is an (h +ƒ)-tuple of points 
{(xi), (y.i)} in Ir , specifying the activity of each agent. A state {(x), (y)} 
is called attainable if the following conditions are satisfied: 
(a) xi eXi , for every ieH, 
(b) yie Y,, for every jeF, 
(c) Exi yy; + Ew 
Let the set of attainable states of E o be indicated by A (Eo). On A (Eo) 
R(h+ f)'" is defined the partial ordering relation 
{(xj), (yj)} 	{(4), (y)}, if xl 	4, for all ieH. 
A state is called Pareto superior to or dominating another state if it is 
greater according to the relation 	A state is called Pareto optima! or a 
Pareto optimum if it is a maximal element of A(E0) for 	The set of 
Pareto optima in Eo is indicated by B(E0). 
A more general concept, Le. based on group rationality, is the core of an 
economy. Let Eo be an economy Eo without production, i.e. an exchange 
economy. A coalition S is a set of consumers, S H. A state (xi) is said 
to be attainable for coalition S if x i eXi , for all iES, and E xi E w.. A 
	
teS 	ieS 
state (4) is blocked by coalition S if there is another attainable state (4) 
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for coalition S so that xl -<,4, for all ie S. The core of economy Eo is 
the set of all attainable states that are not blocked by any coalition, and 
is indicated by C(E0). It is evident that A(Ë0) B(E0) 2 C(E0). 
If the production sets and preference orderings are convex, then a 
necessary and sufficient condition for Pareto optimality is the existence of 
a hyperplane separating the sum of the production sets and the sum of 
upper-preference sets of an allocation. This approach (described in 
chapter 5) is also valid if public goods are present in the economy (see 
Fabre, 1969). 
If the production and utility functions are also differentiable, then 
necessary and sufficient conditions can be expressed in terms of marginal 
utilities and marginal productivities (see Samuelson, 1954). This approach 
is taken in classical welfare theory. One of the main results of welfare 
theory is that the existence of markets and convexity of production and 
preferences means that vvith each Pareto optimal allocation, a price can 
be associated that sustains the allocation. This price and the allocation is 
called a competitive equilibrium. (See also Arrow, 1970). 
2.3. AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 
The allocation process through a price forming market mechanism with 
competitive behavior of all agents, is formally described by the Competi-
tive Equilibrium models. If all resources and production units in an 
economy are privately owned by agents, and exchange of these resources 
and products determines the incomes of the agents, then the economy 
is called an exchange economy with private ownership. It has been men-
tioned already that Walras (1874) first succeeded in designing a compe-
titive equilibrium for such a private ownership economy. This economy 
also included production, investment, and storage of products and 
production factors. 
Properties of the market mechanism are given in sections 1.4 and 6.1. 
The income distribution in a private ownership economy is partially 
determined endogenously, because it depends not only on the given 
distribution of ownership, but also on the prices of these possessions. 
The Walrasian model has been generalized and improved greatly by later 
scholars, although the essential characteristics have remained unaltered. 
The uniqueness of a competitive equilibrium was denied by J. G. 
Koopmans (1932). The existence of a competitive equilibrium was 
demonstrated firstly by A. Wald (1936). In the meantime, new tools were 
applied in economie theory (cf. T. Koopmans, 1951). An important 
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instrument in this context was Brouwer's fixed-point theorem, applied by 
von Neuman (1937) to prove the existence of a process of proportional 
growth in a competitive economy. The set theoretical approach, the 
developments in linear programming, and topological results as fixed-
point theorems, renewed interest both in optimality problems and in 
general equilibrium theory. These new formulations also brought out 
clearly 'the basic unity of welfare economics with the descriptive theory 
of competitive equilibrium' (Koopmans, 1957, p. 6). 
With these new tools, a competitive equilibrium for a more general 
economy can be shown to exist. This was done firstly by McKenzie (1954) 
and Arrow and Debreu (1954). A complete and translucent exposition 
of a private ownership economy, rigorously built on an axiomatic foun-
dation, is given by Debreu (1959). An outline of this model will be given 
below. A more general model is given by Debreu (1962). 
Competitive equilibria are based upon price adapting behavior of 
agents. Another solution for the allocation of resources in an exchange 
economy is based upon coalition fonning behavior of agents. In that case, 
it is assumed that every agent can freely form coalitions with other agents 
and will do that if it is advantageous for every member of the coalition. 
The set of coalition equilibria is called the core of an economy (see the 
previous section). It was shown by Debreu and Scarf (1963) that a 
competitive equilibrium determines an allocation which also belongs to 
the core of the economy, and that the core converges to the set of com-
petitive equilibria if the number of agents becomes very large. This was 
conjectured already by Edgeworth (1881) for a two person economy, 
and is caused by the fact that the influence of an individual agent on the 
final allocation is negligible. A precise mathematical formulation of such 
a situation is given by Aumann (1964), who defined the set of economic 
agents to be an atomless measure space, called a continuum of agents, 
and by Vind (1964). Thus, for an exchange economy with a continuum of 
traders it is possible to find a price vector that sustains an allocation in 
the core, without changing the initial allocation of resources. In that 
case it is also possible to relax some of the conditions for the existence of 
an equilibrium (see Hildenbrand, 1970). The economics described in 
this study, however, are assumed to consist of a finite number of agents. 
Consider the exchange economy for private goods with private 
ownership Eo := {H, (Xi , i , wi); F, (1"1 , Bij)}. An allocation {(2 i), 
(Pi)} and a price vector /3 is said to be a competitive equilibrium if: 
(a) Every consumer ie H is in a state of equilibrium, i.e. i, is a maximal 
element in {x i e Xi I fizi 5 pwi +EetiNi} for '- 
J 
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(b) Every producer :lef' is in a state of equilibrium, i.e. /3.5;i is a maximal 
element in {pyi lyi E Y}. 
(c) The market is in equilibrium, i.e. 
= 
Let the economy Eo satisfy the following conditions: 
Assumption 2.3.1. Oe Y , i.e. 
each firm has the possibility of inaction if loss would otherwise be 
incurred. 
Assumption 2.3.2. E Y. is closed, i.e. 
the social production set Y := EY contains the production vector which 
is the limit of a sequence of production vectors in Y. 
Assumption 2.3.3. Y n (— Y)c {0}, i.e. 
the social production is irreversible, or if y0 0 and y e Y, then —y Y. 
Assumption 2.3.4. Rt Y, i.e. 
any commodity can freely be disposed of. 
Assumption 2.3.5. Y is convex, i.e. 
every production vector can be produced which belongs to the line 
segment connecting two producible production vectors. 
These assumptions about production are sometimes rough approxima-
tions of reality, e.g. if some commodities are socially produced with 
increasing returns to scale or with indivisibilities. The next five assump-
tions are about the consumption characteristics for each consumer ie H. 
Assumption 2.3.6. X, is closed, i.e. 
each consumer's consumption set contains the consumption vector which 
is the limit of a sequence of consumption bundles in Xi . 
Assumption 2.3.7. X1 is bounded below for , i.e. 
each consumer can assign a lower bound for every commodity, whether 
it is positively or negatively appreciated. 
Assumption 2.3.8. X. is convex, i.e. 
each consumer can appreciate a bundle which belongs to the line segment 
connecting two bundles in his consumption set. 
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Assumption 2.3.9. There exists an xi e X, such that xi < wi , i.e. 
each consumer can dispose of initial resources above his minimum level 
of subsistance. 
The last assumption is made about the preference relation 	on X. 
Therefore, with each z i e Xt is associated the set of consumption bundles 
C,(xi) := {y i e Xi lxi 	called an upper-preference set. 
Assumption 2.3.10. The preference relation 	on X. is: 
(a) transive and complete (see section 8.1), 
(b) continuous : Ci (x1) and C' (x1)are closed in Xi , 
(c) convex 	: Ci (xi) is convex, 
(d) without satiation: there exists no greatest element in Xi for 
This assumption demands a rational and diligent consumer, who can 
overlook and order all his consumption possibilities for every imaginable 
quantity, and who is not influenced by the consumption of other people. 
These rigorous requirements are needed to determine an activity in 
all, even extreme and improbable, situations which may arise in the 
model. 
In order to appreciate the concepts and proofs for an economy with 
public goods, some concepts for a private ownership economy are given 
here, as well as an outline of the proof of existence of a competitive 
equilibrium. 
An important problem for the proof is the unboundedness of both 
production and consumption sets. This can cause a lack of continuity in 
the demand or the supply of consumers and producers as a function of 
the prices. At one price the demand can be infinite and at another 
— arbitrarily close — price, the demand can be finite. In the course of the 
proof however, it is shown (see Debreu, 1959, p. 85) that the relevant 
subsets of the production and consumption sets are bounded. In order to 
simplify this reasoning, it is assumed here that the sets X, and Yi are 
bounded to their relevant subsets X 1 and Y; (and assumptions 2.3.4 and 
2.3.10d are temporarily neglected). Then the following concepts and 
properties can be defined and derived. 
For each producer JEF, a profit function n 1 : Rm —> R is defined by 
n1 (p) := max py, with ye Yi . The producer will choose that activity 
which maximizes his profit. Since this result can be obtained from more 
than one production activity (contrary to the classical calculus approach 
with strict convexity requirements), a producer's supply multifunction y., : 
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—>Y, is defined by 
y j (p):= {yEYj lpy= ir (p)}. 
The sum of the producer's supply multifunctions is called the social 
supply multifunction y(p) := Ey.,(p). From properties 8.2.4 and 8.2.3 it 
follows that this multifunction is upper hemi-continuous. 
Next, the consumer's budget multifunction M i : le --> X is defined by 
(see the previous section): 
Mi (p):= {xeX i lpx pwi +10i.i ni (p)}. 
The assumptions imply that for each p, the set Mg (p) is non-empty, 
convex and compact, and that Mi is continuous on Ie. Each consumer 
chooses a greatest element in his budget set, which ensures a state of 
equilibrium relative to the price p. The consumer's demand multifunction 
x i : Rm —› X i is thus defined by: 
xi (p):={xeM,(p) I for all y e M i (p): 
The sum of the consumer's demand multifunctions x(p):=Exi (p) is 
called the social demand multifunction. 
Finally, the difference between demand and supply in a market is deter-
mined by the excess demand multifunction z: 	—>Z, defined by: 
z (p) : = x (p) — y (p) — {Ew i} 
From the above definition of a competitive equilibrium it can be deduced 
that the price vector p sustains a competitive equilibrium if and only if 
Oez(p). Therefore, the problem of existence is solved if there exists a 
price p such that 0e z(). 
Since x(p) and z(p) are upper hemi-continuous, and non-empty, 
convex and compact fbi each p, and since the price space can be reduced 
to a compact subset P Rm without loss of generality by fixing the sum 
of all piices, it is possible to define a multifunction (p from Z xP into 
itself which satisfies the conditions of Kakutani's fixed point theorem 
(10.2.1). A fixed point (243) is thus shown to exist and the definition of (p 
implies that 0 e z (p). 
The concepts mentioned here will be analogously defined in section 5.2 
from the quantity space into the price space, in order to determine the 
social benefit and social cost of a certain bundle of public goods. 
27 
It is easily checked that the allocation {(5Z ;), ()} is Pareto optimal. 
If it were not Pareto optimal, then a Pareto superior allocation {(x 1), (yi)} 
would exist such that: 
for all JEF : — r333.1 — pyi with yi e 
for all 	ieH : 	fixi 	with .)7i ixi , and 
for some heH: Pic h < pxh with Xh -<hxh • 
Thus fi (Di 	< p(Exi -Ey,)= 
This contradicts part (c) of the definition of a competitive equilibrium, 
requiring that E5c- i —Di =E w i . 
Similar results can be obtained for a distribution economy E i with 
private goods and individual decisions about consumption and production 
(see property 5.3.4). 
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3. Production 
3.1. PRODUCTION SETS AND PRODUCTION MULTIFUNCTIONS 
Each producer in an economy can be definition decide about the quan-
tities of output of the commodities he wants to produce, which are 
in turn related to the quantities of input of the production factors he 
needs for production. The set of all input-output combinations for a 
producer is called the producer's production set (see 2.2), and gives full 
information about the producer's technological production possibilities. 
It is, however, not the only way of describing production possibilities; 
this can be done equivalently by means of a relation (a function or multi-
function) defined on the space of economic goods. 
Assume that there are / commodities in the economy; then any specifi-
cation of quantities of these commodities is an element of the /-dimen-
sional euclidean vector space R'. A component z, of ze R' is said to be an 
input if it is negative and an output if it is positive. 
Choose any bipartition of the set of commodities, say m and n, such that 
/ = m +n and m 0 0, n 0 0. This bisection can be done according to any 
criterion, although it is useful to anticipate the problem under consider-
ation. In most cases, one assumes that the input or output characterization 
is tied to a specific commodity and the bisection goes along these lines 
(see the examples below). In this study, the bisection is also done accord-
ing to the private or public character of the economic goods. 
Given the bisection of le into le and R", and the production set 
YgR 1, the input-output multifunction f: K " —› R" is defined by f(x) := 
{y1 (— x, y) e Y}. On the other hand, given the input-output multifunction 
j", the production set Y is defined by Y := {( — x, y)! yef(x)}. 
A typical production set Y in two dimensions is given in fig. 3.1.1; 
the commodity x is an input-good (x 0) and the commodity y is an 
output-good (there exists a y> 0). This production set Y is extended to a 
production set Y„ with two inputs, x, and x 2 , in fig. 3.1.2. 
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Fig. 3.1.1. A production set Y. 	Fig. 3.1.2. A production set Y, 
with two inputs. 
The input-output multifunction is defined such that a component xi of 
xeD(ƒ), i.e. the domain off, is an input if it is positive and an output if 
it is negative, and such that a component y i of y e /2 (f), i.e. the range off, 
is an output if it is positive and an input if it is negative. 
If, however, the technology is such that the commodity space R 1 can be 
bisected into a factor-, or input-, space RI" and a product-, or output-, 
space R", and if the production multifunction f is defined from 12 1" into 
Rh, then all xeD(ƒ) and ye R(f) are nonnegative. Production multifunc-
tions are usually assumed to be nonnegative, implying the bisection of 
commodities in inputs (or factors) and outputs (or products). Unless 
otherwise stated, this assumption will also be made here. 
The set-representation of the production technology Y 1 in fig. 3.1.2 
may be replaced by the representation of the input sets belonging to a 
certain level of output. These sets are called input sets (or level sets) and 
specify the combination of factor-input quantities which enable the 
producer to produce at least a given quantity of output. The boundaries 
of these factor sets are called the isoquants corresponding to a given out-
put- or production-level, and are denoted by x (y) : = Bdf -1 (y) (see 
fig. 3.1.3). 
The boundaries of the factor sets (and of all other sets in this study) are of 
crucial importance. It will be seen that the valuation of elements in the 
set is determined by the elements on the boundary of the set. The econo-
mic interpretation of this fact is that it is only these latter elements which 
are optimally used, or are in some sense 'efficient'. An element of a set 
is said to be efficient if it is a maximal or minimal element of that set, 
according to a given ordering relation. Let the ordering relation be 
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Fig. 3.1.3. Input-isoquants related to Y1 in fig. 3.1.2. 
less is better', or: xl g x2 is equivalent to x 1 x2 . Then an efficient ele-
ment of a factor set is a maxima' element in the sense that there does not 
exist an element that produces the given output-level with less factor-
input in any component. Another ordering relation is 'closer to zero is 
better', or: x l = 2x2 and 0 1 1 is equivalent to x 1 ›- x2 . Then no 
proportional diminution of an efficient factor-input is possible if one 
wants to maintain the required output level. 
In both cases, the set of efficient points of a factor set, f -1 (y), is 
contained in the boundary of that set, x(y). It should be noticed that the 
set of efficient points according to the criteria mentioned above overlap 
if the factor sets are both monotonous and aureoled; this is the case in 
fig. 3.1.3. 
Another extension of the production set Y in fig. 3.1.1 is obtained by 
adding an output to the production set, to get the production set Y2 
with outputs y l and y2 and with input x (see fig. 3.1.4). The production 
technology can also be represented by the corresponding input-output 
multifunction f: R---> R2 defined by f(x) = {(Yi , Y2) — x, Y Y2)E 172} 
This is done by means of the boundaries of the output-sets f(x), which 
boundaries are called the product transformation curves or production-
possibility frontiers corresponding to a given quantity of factor-inputs 
(see fig. 3.1.5), and which are denoted by y(x) := Bdf(x). 
Again it is truc that all efficient points of the output-sets f(x) are ele-
ments of the boundary of the output-sets. These efficient points are 
minimal elements according to the ordering relations defined above, or 
maximal elements according to the ordering relations 'more is better', 
i.e. x 1 x2 .4.›. x2...< x2 , and 'farther from zero is better', i.e. x' = Ax2 and 
A 1 .©. x'» x2 . If the product sets are both lower-monotonous and 
starred (as in fig. 3.1.5) then the sets of efficient points coincide. 
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Fig. 3.1.4. A production set Y2 Fig. 3.1.5. Output-isoquants 
with two outputs. 	 related to fig. 3.1.4. 
The set of efficient points contains only one element if the output of 
the input-output multifunction consists of only one commodity. The 
function which assigns to every input-vector the (unique) maximal or 
efficient element of the corresponding one-commodity output-set is 
said to be a production function. Production functions are frequently used 
to describe a production technology, but not in this study. The reason for 
this is, of course, that they can only be used when the technology under 
consideration has a one-commodity output. The conversion of an input-
output multifunctionf : R'" -> R into a production function : -> R 
and vice versa is accomplished by: 
j(x) := max {f(x)}, resp. f(x) := {y I y j(x)} . 
Finally, the inverse of an input-output multifunction j": R'" -> Rn is called 
the output-input multifunctionf - : R"--> le. It follows then that: 
f-1 (y)= {xi y ef(x)} = {x I (- x, y) e Y) . 
3.2. CONDITIONS IN THE PRODUCTION MODEL 
Axioms about the production technology can be formulated in terms of 
conditions on the production set Y in the commodity space (defined 
in 2.2), or on the input-output multifunction (defined in 3.1). Because the 
one can be derived from the other; the conditions are narrowly related. 
Still, conditions on multifunctions give more opportunity for gradations 
than do conditions on sets. 
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Using results obtained in chapter 10, the above statement can be made 
more precise. Firstly, the following axioms or assumptions about pro-
duction sets will be defined (see also section 2.3): 
Let Y be a production set in the commodity space le = R"' x R. 
Al. Y is closed; 
A2. Yn - Y= {0} ; 	(irreversible production) 
A3. Y is unbounded; 
A4. Y= 	 (free disposal) 
A5. Proj i Y = R'7_ and Proj 2 Y 	; (input-output partition) 
A6. Y is convex. 
Assumptions Al-A6, except for A4, are met by the production sets in 
figs. 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.4. If A4 is chosen, A3 may be dropped and A5 
must be dropped. Let f: R"'-> R" be an input-output multifunction. Then 
the following assumptions may be defined (see also sections 8.2 and 10.2): 
Bl. f has a closed graph, G (f); 
B2. f(x) is upper bounded for every xe D (f); 
B3. R(f)= D(f 1) is a cone and there exists a non-zero xeD(f) such 
that f(0) cf(x): 
B4. f is starred, i.e. f is point-starred and f -1 is point-aureoled; 
B5. f is monotone increasing, i.e. f is monotone decreasing; 
B6. f is non-negative; 
B7. f and f -1 are quasi-convex; 
B8. f is convex; 
B9. f is a convex star process; 
B10. f is homogeneous of degree k. 
Shephard (1970, p. 185) defines an input-output multifunction (or produc-
tion correspondence) in terms of the assumptions B(1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7). In 
a 1972 paper, however, he uses only the assumptions B(1, 2, 3, 4, 6) to 
define an input-output multifunction. 
It can be easily checked that both series of assumptions imply assump-
tions A(1, 2, 3, 5) about production sets, but that the converse is not true. 
Further, B(6) is equivalent to A(5) and B(8) is equivalent to A(6). 
If one assumes B(9), then all other assumptions are also implied except 
for B(5 and 6). Assumption B(9) also implies A(1, 2, 3, 6). 
Property 3.2.1. (equivalences between Y and!) 
Let Yg Ir" be a production set and f 	-› R" be the corresponding 
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input-output multifunction. Then the following pairs of statements are 
equivalent: 
1.a. Y is closed and convex, i.e. A(1, 6); 
b. f is a convex process, i.e. B(1, 8). 
2.a. Y is closed, convex and contains R', i.e. A(1, 4, 6); 
b. f is a monotone increasing convex process, i.e. B(1, 5, 8). 
3.a. Y is closed, convex and input-output partitioned, i.e. A(1, 5, 6); 
b. f is a non-negative starred convex process, i.e. B(1, 4, 6, 8). 
Proof 
1. As Y= {( — x, y) j y e f(x)}, the equivalence follows by definition. 
2. As Y is closed and convex, f is a convex process. 
Further, as Y is starred (0e Y and Y convex), it follows from property 
8.3.1 that the recession cone 0 Y = Conint Y2 Rn . Therefore, Less 
Y= {z Y: z i} = Y, which is equivalent to f being monotone 
increasing, according to property 10.2.5.1. 
3. As Vis closed and convex,fis a convex process. 
As Vis input-output partitioned, i.e. (— x, y)e Y iniplies that —x 0 
and y k 0,f is non-negative. 
As Proj, Y 	it follows that (—x, 0)e Y, for each xeD(f); as 
0 ef(x) and f(x) is convex, f is point-starred. Further, assume that 
xef (y) and AxOf -1 (y), for some 2>1. Then yef(x) and yOf(Ax). 
This contradicts the fact that 0 + YD. {( - 0)1 - x such that 
( — x, y) e Y and (2— 1)k 0 imply ( — x, y)+ (A — 1) (— x, 0) = ( — Ax, y) e Y. 
Therefore f is point-aureoled and, by definition, f is starred. 
4. As f is a convex process, Y is closed and convex. 
As f1  is point-aureoled, Vis unbounded. 
As f is point-starred and 0 ef, (0) =f(0), G (f) is contained in a pointed 
cone and (f) n — G (f) = {0}. 
Some features of a technology however cannot be so easily expressed in 
terms of sets: e.g., 
being non-negative monotone increasing; 
f being starred; 
f being quasi-convex; 
f being homothetic or homogeneous, etc. 
It should be noticed that assumptions A(1, 2, 4, 6) about the produc-
tion set Y are frequently used (compare Debreu, 1959, p. 85, and section 
2.3 above). These assumptions imply that the corresponding input-output 
multifunction f "—> R" is a monotone increasing convex process such 
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that f(0) and f1  (0) are cones. The properties of convex processes (see 
section 10.3) are thus also applicable. 
The assumptions about the input-output multifunction have, of course, 
implications for the inverse, the output-input multifunction. This is 
formulated in the following theorem, which follows immediately from the 
definitions previously given (see sections 10.2 and 10.5): 
Property 3.2.2. (equivalent assumptions on the inverse) 
Let f Ri —■ Rm be an input-output multifunction, and f : Rm —› R 1 its 
inverse, the output-input multifunction. Then: 
1. f -1 (y) is lower-bounded for every ,  y, if and only if 
f(x) is upper-bounded for every x (B2); 
2. is aureoled, if and only if 
f is starred (B4); 
3. J. ' is monotone decreasing, if and only if 
f is monotone increasing (B5); 
4. ƒ -1 is a convex aureole process, if and only if 
fis a convex star process (B9); 
5. is homogeneous of degree 1/k, if and only if 
is homogeneous of degree k (B10). 
The other assumptions are equally valid. 
3.3. THE PRICE STRUCTURE CORRESPONDING TO 
A TECHNOLOGY 
The technology has implications for the various representations given in 
terms of quantities, such as the production set, the input-output multi-
function and the output-input multifunction. Under the assumption that 
prices are determined by marginal conditions, it will be shown that tech-
nology also has implications on the prices feasible for a given technology. 
Moreover, technology can be represented in terms of prices, exactly as 
it was shown that it was possible to represent technology in terms of 
quantities. 
Two kinds of effects of technology on prices are studied here. Firstly, the 
effect on prices of outputs, (resp. inputs), if the turnover is given; it will 
be shown that this effect can be represented by the polar multifunctions 
off (resp.ƒ -1) defined from Ir into R" (resp. from R" into R"). 
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Secondly, the effect on the prices of outputs and inputs, if the profit is 
given ; this effect can be represented by the adjoint multifunctions of 
f (resp. f defined from R"* into le* (resp. from le* into R"*). The 
definitions of polar- or adjoint multifunctions are given in section 10.1. 
Before the relevant properties are deduced, the following example is given 
to illustrate the above points. 
Consider the function J: R 2, R, , defined by j(x„ x2) := 
This function belongs to the well-known class of Cobb-Douglas functions, 
when a and /3 are positive. From this function j, a multifunction 
: R, can be derived by positing that if y = , )72), then 
ef( 1 , 2) and all y such that 0 y y. The multifunctionf is called the 
non-negative less-closure of j (see sections 8.2), and belongs to the class 
of Cobb-Douglas multifunctions (see fig. 3.3.1). 
The following three assumptions are made: 
Fig. 3.3.1. The graph of a Cobb-Douglas input-output multifunction and 
its adjoint. 
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1. Let the input-output multifunction : R2+ - R, be defined by the 
Cobb-Douglas multifunction f(x i , x2) := {y I y 	. 
We consider first the case of decreasing returns of scale, i.e. a + fl < 1. 
The graph of this multifunction, G(f), is depicted in fig. 3.3.1. 
2. Let the prices be proportional to the marginal productivities of the 
inputs, resp. to the marginal costs of the outputs. This can be realized 
under a régime of perfect competition. 
Then the solution of the problem: 
maximize the value (qy- p x i - p2 x2) 
under the constraint y = x 1 xg 
is: xi = nylp i and x2 = fiqylp2 . 
It also follows that: 
p i x i +p2 x2 = (a+13)qy. 
3a. Next, let the value of the input for a production activity be given and 
scaled to the value 1, i.e. total expenditures p i x 1 + p 2 x2 = 1, for y = xg 
It follows that qy = (a+ fl) - 1 , and some substitution of x 1 and x2 results 
in: Y = (Gt + fi) (2") (a/Pir (fl/P2)P - 
Thus, the output is expressed in terms of input prices or - conversely - 
with each output a set of input prices can be associated that gives the 
input a value of 1. 
With each output y, therefore, set of input prices can be associated 
that gives the input a value of at least 1: 
{(Pi P2) e R 2+ l(cx + 	(2+P) (oc/Pi) (fl/P2)13 5 5, } • 
This set can also be derived as follows. The set of inputs producing at 
least the output y is given by the inverse off: 
= {(x l , x2)1 	xlx1} . 
The upper-polar set of this, defined in section 10.1, is the set of input prices 
assigning to each input inr ( y) a value of at least 1: 
= {(p P2)IV(x1 x2)0-1 (9): Pixi +P2x2 1) 
= {(pi , p2)I(« +/i) ' (/Pi) 057P20 y} • 
The input set f -1 (9), and the input-price set lf - 1 (Dr:. are represented 
in fig. 3.3.2. The multifunction : R".-> R" generating input-price 
sets is called an output-input-price multifunction and is defined by 
*.f (Y): =[f' (y)]. , 	 for every y e Range f .  
3b. Finally, let the value of the output for a production activity be given 
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and scaled to the value 1, i.e. total income qy = 1, for y = xlx1 Then 
q x " x2-P, and with each input (5c-1, 5c-2) can be associated a set of 
output-prices giving the income a value of at most 1. This set is equal to 
the lower polar set off(,, 
	
[R-Z i 5.2)] *- = {qi VY Ef ("1 , Ï2): 4Y 	1 ) 
= {qIq 	« x2- P } . 
The multifunction *f : 	R"* generating output -price sets is called an 
input-output-price multifunction and is defined by 
*f(x) := [f(x)]t, for every x eDom f 
It may be noticed that for some feasible production plan 	9) e G (f) 
the value of total income at prices et f(ïl , 5Z2) just equals the value of 
total expenditure at prices 05, , f -1 ( also in the case of decreas-
ing returns of scale. This is due to the fact that the value of inputs and the 
value of outputs are independently scaled to the value 1. 
3 ' . In order to determine the prices of inputs and outputs simultaneously, 
thereby recognizing the fact that in the case of decreasing returns to scale 
total income is larger than total expenditure, we need to fix the profit 
value and scale it to the value 1. Instead of assumption (3) above, 
suppose that qy-p1x1 -p2x2 = 1. 
As plx, +p2x2 = (cc +13) qy, it follows that qy(1 - a - fl) = 1. Substitu-
tion of the values x1 and x2 above in y = xxil and elimination of y gives: 
q = (1 - a - /3) (2 4" 9 —1) (pi/CZ)a  (p2113)13 . 
This means that the input-output multifunction 
f (x, , x2) = {yeR+ly 
has the following adjoint: 
f: (q) = {(pi , p2) I v (xi , x2), Vyef(x, , x2) : p, x, +p2 x2 qy - 1} = 
Both multifunctions are given in fig. 3.3.1. 
The adjoint 	: R"* -■ Ir* of an input-output multifunction f: R"'  R" , 
is called a price-cost multifunction; at output-prices q, the input-prices must 
be elements of (q) to ensure a profit equal to or smaller than 1. 
The inverse, f : 1* : R"** -) R"* , is called a cost-price multifunction. 
Next, consider the case of a Cobb-Douglas function y := xg with 
constant returns of scale, i.e. a+ 13 = 1. In this case, the input -output 
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price multifunction is the same as the one above, but the output-input, 
price multifunction reduces to: 
*/-1 (Y) = {(Pi' p2) I Y (ce/pir (0 -00/P2)' -11. 
As p i x 1 +p2 x2 = qy, no profits are made, and the price-cost multifunc-
tion reduces to: 
f* (q) = {(Pi P2)Iq  
In this case, the graphs off andf* are cones. 
As a final remark, it may be mentioned that the definitions of *f and f * 
can be applied to any input-output multifunction. It does not need to be 
continuous, differentiable, concave, etc., as is the Cobb-Douglas function. 
The properties of the polar *J" and adjointf * are given in chapter 10. 
Although profit is scaled to the value 1, this value 1 is not so important 
for the results obtained from the price-cost multifunction. It is the relative 
prices between the input and output components that counts. If this 
production model is part of a genera] model in which prices are equalized, 
then the degree of freedom obtained in scaling the value of profit to 1 is 
lost. Profit will then be equal to some non-negative scalar a. 
One important conclusion which may be drawn from the price-cost 
multifunction is that profit is not a remuneration for managing the pro-
duction process, but (at most) a reward for selecting (or developing) the 
production technology. Given an implementable technology, i.e. a 
production process with prices the economy is willing to accept, then 
profits are fixed under perfect competition. These profits are quite different 
for different production units, and need not be zero. 
Profits may, however, be levelled (and approach zero) if one production 
unit can be split up in more units with the same technology, as in the case 
of decreasing returns to scale. The marginal value of output of a subunit 
is smaller than the marginal value of output of the integral unit. If 
sufficiently divided, the sum of the sub-units has a technology which can 
be represented by a cone (i.e. the cone closure of the technology of the 
integral unit), implying that each unit has zero (and equal) profit. 
Thus, if all producers have the same (convex) technology and each 
producer can freely enter the market, then the joint technology reduces 
to a cone (and profit reduces to zero for each producer). 
We will see that, ultimately, it is aggregate production and consumption 
which determine the relative prices of commodities in an economy. 
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The assumption of free entry into an economy, however, implies an 
aggregate technology (a cone) which is different from the aggregate 
technology when free entry is not possible in an economy. 
Therefore, both the organizational structure and the individual tech-
nologies determine the social production technology and the relative 
prices in the economy. Assumptions about the organizational structure 
(such as perfect competition; free entry) cannot be omitted in a theory of 
value. 
3.4. CONDITIONS IN THE PRICE SPACE 
The assumptions about the production model were given in terms of 
quantities (section 3.2); these have of course, implications for the proper-
ties of dual models of the same technology, expressed in terms of prices 
and defined in section 3.3. Information about a production technology 
can be transmitted in terms of quantities, as usually is doile. But is it 
also possible to transmit information about a technology in terms of the 
prices or valuations related to that technology? 
The prices related to a production technology are determined by the 
two duality operations defined in section 3.3. Duality operations, such 
as those outlined in chapter 9, transform information about a technology 
from one space into another; in the case under consideration here: from 
the quantity space into the price space, and vice versa. The question is 
whether any information about the technology is lost in the process of 
transforming it by means of a duality operation. The answer depends, of 
course, on the properties (and complexity) of the technology. 
If the assumptions about a production model are such that it is possible 
to regain the original model after application of duality operations, the 
model is called reflexive. No information about a technology will be lost 
under a duality operation if, and only if, the model describing the tech-
nology is reflexive. 
From properties 9.2.3.5 and 10.3.1.6 we know that a production set Y 
containing zero is reflexive under the duality operation * if, and only if, 
Y is closed and convex; if Y is a convex cone, then Y is also reflexive 
under the polarity operation 0, defined in section 9.2. An input-output 
multifunction je: R" —> R" is reflexive under the operation * if and only 
if it is a convex process; if f is a convex cone process (see section 10.3), 
then fis also reflexive under the polarity operation 0, defined in 10.1. 
The next question is: what are the properties of the model in the price 
space given some specific assumptions about the model in the quantity 
space ? 
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Let us consider firstly the effects of the technology on input prices or 
output prices, in the case of the polarity operation. 
Property 3.4.1 
Let f: Ie -41?" be either a starred input-output multifunction or an 
aureoled output-input multifunction; *f :  Rrn —› R" is then a point-starred 
input-output price multifunction, resp. a point-aureoled output-input 
price multifunction. The following pairs of conditions are equivalent: 
1.a. f is homothetic; 
b. *f is homothetic. 
2.a. f is homogeneous of degree k; 
b. *f is homogeneous of degree — k. 
3.a. there exists a constant elasticity of product-(factor-) substitution 
along the boundary of f(x), equal to a; 1 
b. there exists a constant elasticity of output price-(factor price-) sub-
stitution along the boundary of *f(x), equal to 1/a. 
Proof (1) and (2) follow from properties 10.2.3 and 10.2.4.3. Let j(x) := 
Bnd f(x), the boundary of f(x). As there exists a constant elasticity of 
product substitution, j(x) may be represented by the CES-function as 
follows: for each x, there exists a scalar q such that 
)
\ 1/p 
(i ln i with o = 1/(1 — p). 
  
Uzawa (1964) has shown that 
m 	_)1/7, 
*j (x) = {til( E 	qi1,5i)P 	= 1 /n} , 	with p- = pgp-1). 
1=1 
The elasticity of substitution of this set is d = 1/(1 —) = (p - 1)= 1/a. El 
The boundary of an output-set given some input x has been called the 
transformation curve corresponding to the quantity x, Bnd f(x). Similar 
definitions are applicable for the output price-isoquant, Bnd *f(x), and 
the input price-isoquant Bnd, *f -1 (y). 
1. The elasticity of substitution between any two factors xi and x2 is defined by 
d(xi/x2)/d(dxi/dxs) 
(xtlx3) 	(dxildx2) . 
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Fig. 3.4.1. Isoquants with constant elasticity of substitution and the corre-
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An illustration of property 3.4.1.2 is provided by the input-output 
multifunction f(xi , x2) = {y10 y Je:4} in section 3.3; here it was 
shown that tf(x l , x2) = {gig x 1-"x2-0}. 
Illustrations of property 3.4.1.3 are given in fig. 3.4.1 for isoquants. 
If no substitution between input is possible (a = 0), the technology reduces 
to the Leontief technology with fixed coefficients; in this case, there is 
perfect substitution (• =co) between input prices. The reasoning may 
also be reversed, of course, so that a linear isoquant technology (a =c\D) 
implies a unique relative price composition (a = 0). 
If the substitution between inputs is constantly equal to 1, the model 
reduces to the Cobb-Douglas technology; in this case the substitution 
between optimal input prices corresponding to a given output is also 
equal to 1. 
Intermediate cases are represented by the C.E.S. technology. 




A similar reasoning can be given for the output sets f(x) and the output 
price-sets f(x) corresponding to a given input x (see fig. 3.4.2). 
The following property of the input-output price, resp. output-input 
price multifunction, is deduced from properties 10.5.1 and 9.2.3.4, resp. 
9.2.2.4: (see also section 10.5). 
Property 3.4.2 
Let the input-output multifunction : 	--> R" be a convex star process. 
Then: 
1. the input-output price multifunction *f : R m --> R"* is point-starred, 
quasi-convex, graph-closed and 1.h.c. ; 
2. the output-input price multifunction t(f -1) : R"--> Ir* is point-
aureoled, quasi-convex, graph-closed and 1.h.c. 
These results are complementary to those obtained by Shephard (1970, 
chapter 10). 
Next, the effects of the adjoint operation on input-output multifunc-
tions will be considered. The adjoint operation generates a relation 
between output prices and input prices such that, if the technology per-
mits, the excess value of output over input (or profit) equals one. The 
following proposition is deduced from properties 10.3.1.6, 10.3.1.5, 
10.5.1.4, 10.5.2.4 and 10.5.2.3. 
Property 3.4.3 
Let f : R'"—> R" be an input-output multifunction. Then: 
1. the corresponding price-cost multifunction 	: R" _+R*,  and its 
inversef: -1 , are both convex processes. 
2. if the input-output multifunction, f, is starred, then the price-cost 
multifunction,f,t, and the output-input multifunction, of -1 , are aure-
oled, and the cost-price multifunction f,! -1 is starred again. 
The polarity operation may be applied to the price-cost multifunctions; 
and properties 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 are valid for the corresponding input-output 
multifunction. If the adjoint operation is applied to a price-cost mul ti-
function, one obtains an input-output multifunction which is a convex 
process. 
The various multifunctions describing the technology and defined in 
section 3.3 are related as is shown by the diagram in fig. 3.4.3. 
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Fig. 3.4.3. Representations of a technology 
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If it is known that the technology is closed and convex, then each of 
the multifunctions J.-1 , J: or '. gives complete information about 
the technology and, given one, the others can be derived. 
If it is also known that the technology is starred, then each of the just-
mentioned multifunctions can also be derived from any of the four polar 
multifunctions (by virtue of property 9.2.2.5 and 9.2.3.5). 
This means that one can estimate the technology in the space in which 
most information is available and derive the properties of it in the other 
spaces. 
3.5. PREFERENCE ORDERINGS OF INPUTS 
The last two sections of this chapter will deal with the input-side of a 
production technology. In this section it will be shown that, under certain 
assumptions, a producer has a preference ordering of all combinations 
of input quantities and all combinations of input prices. These preferences, 
dependent of course on the production technology, determine the 
producer's demand for inputs. 
On the other hand, it is possible under some conditions to derive from 
the behavior of the producer (as expressed by his demand) his preferences 
for inputs. And with these preferences, the input-side of the technology 
can be calculated. The assumptions necessary to derive from the (obser-
vable) demand-multifunctions, the (unknown) production-technologies, 
are given in the next section. The main properties in both sections are 
based on the work by Weddepohl (1970) for a consumption model, 
but they can be transposed to any choice model, such as the production 
model outlined in this chapter. 
Suppose that a producer has a technology that obeys the following 
assumptions: 
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Assumption 3.5.1 (on the technology) 
The input-output multifunction f: X —) Y is a non-negative, monoto-
nously increasing, convex process. 
Assumption 3.5.2 (on non-satiation) 
Every non-negative scalar multiple of output 7 can be produced, i.e. 
0, 3xeX : 27ef(x). 
From the technology f : X— Y, a sub-technology can be derived for 
a given composition 7 of an output bundle. This sub- technology indicates 
the levels of output of composition 9, and is defined on the subset Xy 
of X enabling the producer to produc,e any positive level t of 9: 
Xy := u{ƒ-1 (29)1,1.>0}. 
The sub-technology for 7  is determined by the production-level function 
X,—)R„, defined by 
fp (x) : = max {A I Af e f(x)} . 
Property 3.5.1. 
If assumptions 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 are satisfied for the input-output multi-
function f, then fp is a non-negative, monotone increasing, quasi-con-
cave and continuous function. 
Proof 
Since the graph of the less-closure off, the set {(x, ).9)119ef(x)}, is equal 
to the intersection of a (convex) subspace and the (convex) graph of f, 
it is also a convex set (see property 8.3.3). This is sufficient for f p, being 
quasi-concave (see section 10.2). Via a similar reasoning it follows that 
fy is non-negative and monotone increasing. Since the less-closure of 
fy is lower hemi-continuous (see property 10.3.1.4), it follows that the 
function fp is continuous (see section 8.2). EI 
The inverse of the production-level function, JY(.1), determines the 
input sets (see figs. 3.3.2 or 3.4.1). The boundaries of the input sets are 
the isoquants in X. The isoquants contain all inputs enabling the pro-
ducer to produce a given level of output, and between which the producer 
is therefore indifferent. 
Thus, the set Xy of inputs relative to 7  can be ordered according to the 
output level obtained. The preference relation;.,5, of producers on Xp is 
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defined by: 
x, 	.X2 <4> MX1) 5.4(X2) • 
Property 3.5.2. 
The production-level function : 	R„ is non-negative, monotone 
increasing, quasi-concave and continuous, if and only if the preference 
relation 	on Xy,.gR satisfies the following conditions: 
1. transitive : x, x2 and x2 x3 x, x3 . 
2. complete : Vx„ x2 e Xy, : x, x2 or x2 x, . 
3. monotone : x, x2 x, x2 and 
x, < X2 	XI ••< X2 . 
4. convex 	: Vx, e Xy„ the set {x I x, x} is convex. 
5. continuous : x, x2 and x2 x, =. 3ot e [0, 1]: 
x2 	(ca, + (1 — a)x3). 
Proof 
Let fy, be given. Then X Dom fy, = R, and both transitivity and com-
pleteness follow from the definition of ,«5, . Since for each 1> 0, the input 
setf (2) is closed in X, - and is convex and monotone for 	the other Y 
properties follow. The converse statement has been shown by Debreu 
(1959, section 4.6). 1:1 
Next, assume that there exist pric,es for inputs and that the amount 
which the producer can spend on inputs is equal to 1. The choice sets of 
the producer are then determined by the prevailing prices: 
M (p) = {x e X "Ipx 51} . 
The producer will 'of course' choose the maximal elements according 
to in M (p), with which input he can obtain the highest level of output. 
This, however, is an assumption which has to be explicitly stated (see 
assumption 3.7.1 below). Another problem is whether there exist maximal 
elements in the producer's choice sets; in order to answer this question, 
we must look at the price structure corresponding to the technology. 
In section 3.3 the input price set f (y) is defined which corresponds 
with the input set f 1 (y). The input price set contains all prices that give 
a value of at least 1 to any element of the input set. In a similar way, the 
polar set of the input set f 3,7 1 (A) can be derived. The set of all input prices 




non-zero level of production of composition y7, is called the set of input 
prices relative to fr and is denoted by Py,: 
Py : = u {[fy- (2)]*,12 > 0} 
= 
= {p E R"132. > 0: M (p) (-) Int f (2y) = . 
Fig. 3.5.1. Isoquants in Xy and their corresponding isoquants in P y 
This equality follows from the definition of the dual space given in section 
9.1, as the dimension off -1 (4) is equal to m, the dimension of M(p). 
This way of writing makes clear that it is very well possible that for some 
pePy„ there exists no ,Q>0 such that M(p) nInt fy" (2) = .0 and 
M(p)nfy" (2) (1), implying that no maximal element exists in M(p). 
See, for example, M(p) in fig. 3.5.1. This case however will be excluded 
by means of suitable assumptions, given in section 3.6. 
Just as the isoquants in A's,- generate a preference relation < in Xj„ which 
is equivalently expressed as: 
x2 -=• 32 > 0: x l e Bnd 	1 (2) and 
so the isoquants in Py generate a relation 	in P. A price p 2 is said to 
be as least as costly as pl , or pl 	if, given the amount to be spend, 
for every bundle xl in the choice set M(p2), there exist a bundle x1 in 
M(p1 ) such that x 1 is preferred to x2, i.e.: Vx2em(p2), em(y.): 
x1 > x2 . This relation <* on Py- is called a costing relation on the prices 
in P is equivalently expressed as: 
pl * 2 p .4> 32 > 0: p l e Bnd *fr,- (2) and p2 e *.4,- (2) . 
This relation has been defined by Milleron (1968) and, independently, 
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by Weddepohl (1970). The equivalent expression given above seems, 
however, more neutral if the choice sets are subsets of Pi, rather than of 
Xy„ as in the case of public goods. 
The monotonicity assumption in 3.5.1 implies that a larger price for 
is always a dearer price for <*. The inverse statement, of course, is not 
true. Suppose, for example, that a certain amount of money must be 
spent, either in a supermarket with prices p 1 , or in a supermarket with 
prices ; then p' is costlier for the buyer than p2 if a better basket can 
be bought by him at prices p 2 than at prices p'. Without extra assump- 
tions, the costing relation < * on P 	not have the same properties 
as the relation 	on Xy ; e.g. if in fig. 3.5.1 both the isoquants in X;,- 
converging in C are feasible, then there exists a price (C) in P 	is 
equivalent to prices on two different isoquants. This clearly contradicts 
the transitivity condition. In order to derive and valuate what is a neces-
sary assumption, the concepts of satiation and dispensability will be 
defined. 
3.6. SATIATION FOR AND DISPENSABILITY OF INPUTS 
An input-component i is said to be indispensable (or: essential) for the 
production of ƒ via .f, if xi = 0 implies that x := (x 1 , ..., xi , xi)0 Xy . 
(See fig. 3.5.2.) 
F. 3.5.2. Input x1 is indispensable (essential) to y 
If a positive level a can be indicated, which is indispensable in the produc-
tion of y, i.e. xi = a x0 Xs„ then we can assume that any level between a 
and 0 is also indispensable. In this case, the input-set X s, is transposed by 
withdrawing the vector ace, := (0, , a, ..., 0), with a on the i-th place, 
from X. The resulting input set X; = Xs,— {ae} has only one (zero-) level 
of indispensability (see assumption 3.6.2). 
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It follows from the definition that component i is dispensable in the 
production of, if there exists an x e Xs, such that xi = 0. As there exists a 
pePs, such that px = 1 and (p+ei)x = 1 whenever x i = 0, it is also truc 
that component i is dispensable if and only if there exists a p e Pi, such 
that p + e i — * p. This, again, is equivalent to saying that component i is 
indispensable if, and only if, for all p EP), p + e 1 -<* p. (See property 3.6.1.) 
On the other hand, the production of p is said to be insatiable for com-
ponent j of input x, if for all x e Xi x+ 	x. 
This means that an increase of component j in the input always strictly 
increases the quantity of output (see fig. 3.6.1). 
Fig. 3.6.1. The production of y, is insatiable for input x 1 
The production of p is satiable for component i of the input x, if there 
exists an ïeX such that 5-c +ei —, . If the production of p is satiable for 
all components of input x simultaneously, i.e. 35i e Xs, : 5E+ then 
there exist (given assumption 3.5.1) a maximum level Z for the production 
of p. For at that input 5c", Z =f) = fy,(5e + ge), for all g 0. In this case, 
the set of inputs relative to 7 has a thick indifference class (i.e. an indiffer-
ence class with a non-empty interior in X5-,), viz. the satiation class. Sati-
ation in the production of 7  is ruled out by assumption 3.5.2. 
It should be noted that the case in which all components of input x are 
simultaneously dispensable for the production of p is ruled out by 
assumption 3.5.1, for x =0 implies thatf(x) contains no element y having 
a positive component. 
An analogous reasoning can be applied to the case of indispensable com-
modities. This results in the following property: 
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Property 3.6.1. 
Given the preference orderings on X and 	on Pr„ the characteristics 
of a commodity i defined above are expressed equivalently in the following 
way: 
1. indispensable : xi = 0 x0 X5,.; 
2. insatiable 	: pi =0 pOPi,; 
3. dispensable : 2pePj : p ,-*p+ ei ; 
4. satiable 	: 3xeXi, : x— x+e i . 
The following assumption 3.6.1 restricts the class of production tech-
nologies determined by assumption 3.5.1. 
Assumption 3.6.1. (On satiation and dispensability) 
The technology represented by 	R + and determined by assump- 
tion 3.5.1 has the following properties: 
1. If production is satiable for some input-component i, then VxeXi,, 
: x+1e1 —x+2e i +ei ; 
2. If some input-component i is dispensable for production, 
then VpePy,, 32 0 : 
This assumption does not imply that production is satiable for some or 
all components of input. E.g., the Cobb-Douglas function, which repre-
sents a technology that is insatiable for all components, is not ruled out 
by this assumption (in this case the set X.), of inputs is open in R"). The 
assumption requires, however, that if production is satiable somewhere 
for some component, then increasing the quantity of this input-compo-
nent from any point in Xy, will ultimately cause no further increase in 
output. Since this `ultimate' point (x may be arbitrary far from 
x, it is not a strong assumption at all: if the inputs are narrowly enough 
specified, then it is always true. 
The assumption implies that (1) if the price of an input-component is 
zero, its demand can never be infinite, and (2) if an input-component is 
dispensable, then its price will not be infinite. Some C.E.S. functions are 
therefore ruled out by this assumption (see also section 4.1). This assum-
ption is essential for the following two important properties 3.6.2 and 3.7.1. 
Property 3.6.2. 
Let the technology satisfy the assumptions 3.5.1 and 3.6.1. Then the 
costing relation 	on P a complete preorder. 
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Proof 
The refiexivity of 	follows from Bnd 	(2) g *, .f; 1 (2), such that 
P 
The transitivity of 	is shown as follows. 
Fig. 3.6.2. 
xl 	fit (4) 
1 4) 
Suppose that there exist positive 2, p, 20p , such that peBnd tfy,' (u), 
qet f ; 1 (p) n Bnd j'y,-1 (2), and retf 1,-1 (2). If re*, f (R), then p * q * r, 
implying transitivity of Suppose that re.ffs7 1 (p), as in fig. 3.6.2, then 
p >-* r and geBnd ƒ57 1 (p) n Bnd fy7 1 (2), for 2, 0 p. 
It follows that there exists some component g; in q which is zero, and 
that the budget set M (q) is such that M (q) nf 57 1 (p) 0 49 and M (q) n 
(2) = 4i (see fig. 3.6.2). Therefore, for some x, e Bnd ƒ)-7 1 (p) it is true 
that x, + ei eBnd fi,-1 (p), or x, —x, +ef , and for another isoquant it is 
so that there does not exist a 2 0 such that for some x, (x + j) = :x2 e 
Bndf y7 1- (1) implies that x 2 + ei eBndf5,7 1 (2), or x + 2e; x + Âe + e•. This 
contradicts assumption 3.6.1. 
Completeness of 	is implied by the definition of P j, , by which for 
every p e P y„ there exists a 2>0 such that p etfy- (2). El 
It finally should be noted that assumption 3.6.1 in property 3.6.2 can be 
replaced by the assumption that X compact. 
3.7. THE DEMAND MULTIFUNCTION 
AND THE PRICE MULTIFUNCTION 
If the choice sets in X 	by prices in P 	contain maximal 
elements, then a set of maximal elements can be associated with every 
price. If one assumes that all agents will actually choose or demand the 
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bundle which is best for them, then the demand multifunction can be 
sensibly defined. 
The necessary condition mentioned above can be derived from the 
assumptions 3.5.1 and 3.6.1: 
Property 3.7.1. 
Let the technology be given by assumptions 3.5.1 and 3.6.1. Then: 
1. All choice sets M (p) in Xy, , generated by p e Py„ have maximal (or most 
preferred) elements for , i.e. 
P 	{p 31> 0: M(p) Int j';' (2) = 0 and 
M (p) n 4-1 (1)0 0} . 
2. All choice sets M(x) in P generated by xe )(j , have maximal (or most 
costly) elements for 	i.e. 
Xy, = {x 22> 0: M (x) n Int W 1 (1) = 0 and 
M(x) n*fy,-1 (1) #4)}. 
 
Proof 
1. A choice set M(p) in Xy has, by definition, a maximal element if 
*X- e M(p) and x>-5c" =• x0 M(p), i.e., there exists a 2>0 such that 
ce M(p) fr' (1) and Int IV (1) n M(p)= 0. This must be true for all 
pePy,. 
If p > 0, then peInt P 	M(p)nXy, is a bounded set. As M (p) is 
also closed in Xy„ it has a maximal element. 
If p ePy, and 0- 0, then by the definition given of Pi„ there exists a 
2>0 such that p e Bnd *ƒ" (2), or M (p) n Int f 1 (1) = 4) and a compo-
nent j in p exists for which pi = 0. Therefore, production is satiable for 
input component j and (from assumption 3.6.1) VxeXy , 	0: 
x + 2e; x + le; + e; ; by which there exists an 5?eBnd f y- 1 	such that 
Since p e Bnd *ƒ5,- (2), e M(p) n fy: (A). 
2. An analogous reasoning can be applied to the polar case. As the set 
Xy, is defined in another way than the set P it may be noted that 
X = u (fr,' (1)11> 0} = u 	57 1 (1)]*P. > 0} 
= {x132> 0: M(x) n Int *4-1 (2) = 4)} , 
according to property 10.5.2. P 
Next we assume that the behavior of agents is in accordance with their 
opinions or ambitions: 
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Assumption 3.7.1. (on behavior) 
Each agent in the economy chooses a maximal element in his choice set. 
This assumption is natural if a maximal element is a best element for 
in the quantity space; it is less natural, however, if it is a most costly 
element for 	in the price space. In this case, special consideration is 
needed to interprete this assumption. 
The multifunction which associates with each price in P y the set of 
maximal elements in the choice set generated by that price is called the 
demand multifunction h : Xs 
h(p) := {x e X pix is a maximal element of M(p) for 
= 	(p) n fy- (iji p e tfy- ( 
The last equality is checked as follows: if were not maximal, then 
J7>-x and pi-c 1, or xeIntf3-7 1 (2) for 2 such that p etf3,- 1 (1); by definition 
M (p) n Int f (2) = If )70.6- (2), then 1, and fls not maxima! 
in M (p). 
The inverse h' : Xs,-+ P 	said to be the price multifunction. It follows 
from the equivalent expressions above that: 
(x) = {p e Ppix eh(p)} 
= {M (x) +*.fi- 	x €.4-1 (A)} 
= {p e PO is a maximal element of M(x) for 	. 
The price multifunction, therefore, associates with each bundle of com-
modities the (set of) prices at which the bundle will be demanded. This 
price, however, is also the most costly price for the agent in the choice set 
M(x) in P. The following property applies to both multifunctions, h and 
h' • 
Property 3.7.2. 
Given assumptions 3.5.1, 3.6.1 and 3.7.1, both the demand multifunction 
h : P -> X y and the price multifunction h -1 : X s,-, Ps, are non-empty, 
point-closed and point-convex. The value px of each element in the 
images is equal to 1, i.e., p. h (p) = h -1 (x)- x = 1. 
Proof 
By 3.5.1 and 3.6.1, for any pet 	(1)g. Pp , the sets M (p) nfi (A) and 
M(x)r) tfy7 1 (2) are non-empty (see property 3.7.1). As all sets M(p), 
M (x), (:1(2)  and tf s -, -1 (1) are closed and convex, so is their intersection. 
Further, p e M(x) implies that px 1 and pet'. p-1 (2) implies that 
px 1. El 
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The last property mentioned here and induced by assumptions 3.5.1, 
3.6.1 and 3.7.1, is that the agents will reveal their opinions about the 
elements in X, or P, in a consistent way. An input xe Xy is said to be 
revealed preferred to ye Xy , if there exists a choice set M (p) which con-
tains y, but from which x (possibly equal to y) is chosen, i.e., h -1 (x) n 
M(y) 4). This concept was introduced by Samuelson (1938), who con-
sidered this binary relation as being the only binary relation which is 
empirically verifiable and therefore meaningful. The consistency or 
`rationality' requirement relative to this relation : the weak axiom of 
revealed preference, can be deduced from the assumptions as a property: 
h' (x) n M (y) 	and h -1 (x) n h" (y) = 4, imply 11 -1 (y) n M(x)= 4), 
because 	(x) n M (y) 4) implies that x ?, y and h" (x) n h" (y) = (fi 
implies that xy; if h -1 (y) n M(x) were not empty, then y kx, which 
contradicts the first statement. 
Analogously, a binary relation revealing costing can be defined on the set 
of prices Ps, (compare Weddepohl, 1970, p. 38). A price pePs; is said to 
be revealed costlier than qeP, if there exists a choice set M(x) which 
contains q but from which p (possibly equal to q) is chosen, i.e., 
h (p) r M (q) 0 4). Again, properties of `revealed costing' can be deduced. 
The demand and price multifunctions, and all properties given above, 
are derived from the preference relations and given in property 
3.5.1, which relations are induced again by the assumptions 3.5.1, 3.6.1 
and 3.7.1. 
The reverse problem is just as interesting: is it possible to generate the 
preference relation or the costing relation (i.e. the unknown 
technology) from the (observable) demand or price multifunctions ? 
This question has been studied by many scholars (see Chipman e.a., 
1971), most of whom are concerned with determining the `integrability 
conditions' of the demand function. It has been shown that it is possible to 
generate a preference relation on Xy, or on Ps, with the propertjes 
given in 3.5.1, if one assumes that the demand or price multifunctions 
obey the properties of this section (3.7.1 and 3.7.2, the weak and strong 
axiom of revealed preference), analogues to assumptions 3.6.1 and 3.7.1 
(satiation and behavior) and, in addition, a generalized Lipschitz condi-
tion for h and h" to guarantee weak continuity (see Weddepohl, 1970, 
p. 134). The question can be theoretically answered for many cases; for 
these cases, `only' empirical problems of investigation remain to be 
undertaken. 
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4. Consumption and production 
of public goods 
4.1. THE CONSUMPTION MODEL 
Just as a production activity, a consumption activity can be considered 
as a process with an input and an output. The analogue to the production-
level function is called the utility function u: X-+ R„ , which assigns to 
each vector of quantities consumed a level of satisfaction. The consump-
tion model is a special case of the production model, because only the 
one-dimensional utility function is considered. The corresponding pro-
perties given in the previous chapter can be directly applied on consump-
tion. 
In particular, with each utility function a binary preference relation can 
be associated which is, under certain conditions, an ordering of the set of 
inputs (see sections 3.5-3.7). According to property 3.5.2, the consumer's 
taste or 'technology' can equivalently be described by means of a utility 
function or a preference relation on X ç  R:, for some dimension m: 
Property 4.1.1. 
Each consumer's taste can be described by a non-negative, monotone 
increasing, quasi-concave and continuous utility function, if and only if 
each consumer has a preference relation on the set of consumption 
bundles which is a non-negative, monotone, convex, continuous and 
complete preorder. 
It should be mentioned that non-negativity and monotonicity are not 
essential for the assumption or the property. This is introduced only to 
simplify subsequent arguments. 
The preference relation < on the consumption set X divides the 
consumption set in two parts, given some consumption bundle xe X: 
the set of consumption bundles which are preferred to x or equivalent to 
x, and the set of bundles which are not preferred to x. The first set is 
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called the upper-preference set and defined by: 
C(x):= {y Xlx y}. 
The boundary of an upper-preference set is called an indifference-curve 
and contains all commodity combinations from which the consumer 
derives the same level of satisfaction. 
This set is defined for every xe X and defines thus a multifunction 
C : X-+ X, called the upper-preference multifunction. The inverse of this 
multifunction is equal to 
C-1 (x) = {y eXiy x} 
Fig. 4.1.1. The preferred set at x, C(x), and its polar set,* C(x) 
The representation of the taste (or 'technology') of a consumer through 
a preference multifunction has some advantages in this approach. Firstly 
because the maxima] elements in a choice set M(p) can be represented 
by the intersection of two sets (see fig. 4.1.1), since all elements not in 
C(x) are preferred less than x. This representation is easily transposed in 
the dual space. Secondly, no reference at all is made to the level of utility, 
which is an artificial concept as utility is not a cardinal but an ordinal 
entity. 
The following assumptions will be made about the preferences of 
consumers, in terms of the upper-preference multifunction C : X —> X. 
Assumptions 4.1. (on consumers) 
4.1.1. The consumption set X, the effective domain of C, is convex. 
4.1.2. The consumption set X is preordered, i.e. 
XE C(X) and C[C(x)] g_ C(x). (See section 8.1). 
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4.1.3. The upper-preferred sets are convex, i.e. 
C is quasi-concave. 
4.1.4. The equivalence sets are thin, i.e. 
C(x)n C -1 (x) = Bnd C(x), for all x. 
4.1.5. All choice sets in both spaces have maximal elements, i.e., 
p e Bnd *C(x) implies that M(p)n C(x) # 4) and 
ye Bnd C(x) implies that M(y)n*C(x)# 4,, for all xeX. 
4.1.6. The preferred sets are nonnegative and monotone, i.e., C is 
nonnegative and monotone decreasing. 
Assumptions 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 are standard assumptions in the litera-
ture ; 4.1.4 implies that the preference sets are closed and that the con-
sumer is not satiated. It will be shown that this assumption makes the 
preference multifunction lower hemi-continuous. Assumption 4.1.5 is 
new; it restricts the class of preference preorderings by excluding prefer-
ence sets that asymptotically support choice sets, such as some C.E.S. 
functions. It permits however, preference preorderings which imply that 
some commodities are indispensable (or for which consumers are insa-
tiable) so that the consumption set is not closed in Ie (see section 3.6). 
These kinds of preference preorderings are excluded if one assumes that 
the consumption set is closed, which is usually done. 
Assumption 4.1.6 can be replaced by the condition that the upper-
preference sets are aureoled and that Xn—X5 {0}. The assumption 
4.1.6 is chosen here to simplify the arguments (and figures). 
For each consumer, a set of consumer's-prices P in g** can be derived 
from the preference relation .,5., on X, or the upper-preference sets C(x) 
in X. This is done in a similar way as the derivation of the set of input 
prices P section 3.5: 
P:= v {*C(x)lx e X} 
= {p e Fr* 13x e X: M(p) n Int C(x) = 0} . 
Again, just as the indifference curves in X generate the preference relation 
on X, so do they generate a costing relation * on P. A price p2 is 
said to be at least as costly as p i , or p l *p2 , if - given the amount to be 
spend - there exists a bundle x in the choice set M(p 1 ) which is preferred 
to every bundle in the choice set M(p2), i.e. p l e Bnd *C(x) and p2 e *C(x). 
Given a costing relation * on P, the upper-costing set with respect to 
pe P is defined by (see fig. 4.1.1) 
D(p):= {gePip ,.,* g} 
= (*C(x)lp e Bnd *C(x)} . 
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The costing relation ;.,* is thus a subjective relation, different for each 
consumer. If applied on private goods, as is done in this section, then the 
consumer will prefer the least costly price. Since p g implies that 
p <* g, this price is closest to zero. In another context, however, the 
costing relation ;5.,* will indicate priorities given to public goods (see 
section 5.2), and the consumer will indicate the highest priority (here the 
costliest price). It is for that context that the relation <* is introduced. 
The definitions and properties given in sections 3.6 and 3.7 can directly 
be transposed to the consumer model. It also can be noticed that the 
multifunction *C :  X-* P is derived from C: X X through the polarity 
operation defined in section 10.1. These multifunctions have the following 
property: 
Property 4.1.2. (continuity of preference mult(unctions) 
Let the consumer's upper-preference multifunction C : X X meet 
assumptions 4.1. Then both C and its polar multifunction *C :  X - P are 
continuous on X and graph-closed. 
Proof 
The lower hemi-continuity of C is shown as follows. Choose xe X, 
yEC(x) and an open set U containing y. Choose eC(x) such that 
eInt C(x). By assumption 4.1.4, )70 C -1 (x) and therefore xft cw. 
Call V:= Int C -1 (y); V is open and contains x. Since for all zeV : 
EC(z), it follows that C (z) n U 4) and that C is 1.h.c. by property 
8.2.2 (see fig. 4.1.2). 
Fig. 4.1.2. C 1.h.c., resp. not u.h.c. 
M(p) 
The upper hemi continuity of C follows from assumption 4.1.5: Choose 
xeX and a closed set M such that Mr1C(x)= 	Call U := X\M; 
U is open and contains C(x). As M and C(x) are closed; they are strongly 
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separated by a hyperplane, unless they are separated by an asymptotic 
support (see property 9.4.2.1 and fig. 4.1.2). In that case, M (p) n C (x) = (k. 
for p e Bnd *C(x). This case is excluded by assumption 4.1.5, implying 
that a y exists with M(p)nC(y) 0 but M(p)n Int C(y)= 4>. 
Call V := Int C(y), then x e V and for all zeV : C(z) U. Therefore 
C is u.h.c.; since C is point-closed, C is also graph-closed according to 
property 8.2.2.1. 
Analogous arguments can be applied to *C. 13 
Property 4.1.3. (On the consumers' price space) 
Let the consumer's preference multifunction meet assumptions 4.1. Then: 
1. The price set P is convex and completely preordered. 
2. The upper-costing multifunction D:P-->P is quasi-concave, non-
negative and monotone decreasing. A set of equivalent prices is thin, 
i.e. D(p)n D -1 (p) = Bnd D(p), for all p. 
Proof 
1. Convexity of P follows from the convexity of a polar set *C(x) by 
property 9.2.2.4. The upper-costing multifunction D gives a relation on P 
which is reflexive, since peD(p), and transitive, i.e. D[D(p)] g_ D(p). 
This is shown as follows. Assume that there exists a qeD(p) such that 
D(q) $ D(p); cp. fig. 3.6.2. Then there exist x and y such that 
p e Bnd *C(x), qe*C(x) n Bnd *C(y) and *C(y) $ *C(x). Thus 
qeBnd *C(x) n Bnd *C(y) and Bnd *C(x) 0 Bnd *C(y). Assumption 
4.1.5 and the definition of a polar set imply that M(q)nBnd C(x) 0 (/) 
and M(q)nBnd C(y) 4>.  Monotonicity (A4.1.6) and transitivity 
(A4.1.2) of C imply that Bnd C(x)nBnd C(y) 4>  and Bnd C(x) = 
Bnd C(y). This contradicts Bnd *C(x) 0 Bnd *C(y), by property 9.2.3.6. 
The relation is complete as D' (p)n D(p) = P. 
2. Since D" (p) = "Int D(p) and D(p) is convex, it follows that D-1 (p) 
is a concave set. Thus D is a quasi-concave multifunction by definition. 
Since for every x, Cl Cone C(x)= Rii! and, by property 9.3.2, 
0 + (*C(x)) = Cl Cone *C(x) = (R)?, = R", it follows that *C and 
therefore also D is non-negative and monotone decreasing. 
Since *C is continuous, so are D and D"; therefore, D(p)r> D' (p)= 
Bnd D(p). 13 
Finally, the demand multifunction h: P -› X for the consumer is defined 
by (see section 3.7 and fig. 4.1.1): 
h(p):= {xeli'l x is a maximal element of M(p) for } 
= {M(p)n C(y)lye*C' (p)} = M(p)n*D(p). 
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In the same way, the consumer's price multifunction 11 -1 : X P is equal 
to 
h -1 (x) := {pe Pip is a maximal element of M(x) for <*} 
= M(x) n *C(x). 
The consumer's demand- or price multifunctions give the elements which 
are equilibrium points for the consumer. They assign points which the 
consumer can obtain (in his choice set M) and wants to obtain (the best 
possible or maximal). This is expressed by the touching of two sets 
(see also fig. 4.1.1), one star shaped and the other aureole shaped: one 
determined by centripedal forces (the choice set) and the other by 
centrifugal forces (the preferred set). 
Since M(p),*D(p), M(x) and *C(x) are graph-closed and point-con-
vex multifunctions, the following property results from applying propet-
ties 9.2.2, 9.2.3 and 8.2.3 to the intersection of multifunctions: 
Property 4.1.4. (demand- and price multifunctions) 
Let the consumer's preference multifunction meet assumptions 4.1. 
?hen the demand multifunction h: P-> X and the price multifunction 
: X --> P are non-empty, graph-closed and point-convex; the value of 
the bundles assigned is equal to 1, i.e. p h (p) = h' (x)• x = 1. 
4.2. PRIVATE GOODS, PUBLIC GOODS AND EXTERNALITIES 
The consumption set X in the previous section was contained in an m-
dimensional commodity space. Since only one consumer (or economic 
agent) was considered, whether the consumption (or use) of a good 
might affect the well-being (or production) of other agents was not 
relevant. It is obvious that this aspect is extremely important in an 
economy with more agents, as it determines the operations which may be 
applied to commodities. Therefore, this point must be analysed before 
something meaningful can be said about social production and social 
consumption. 
The effect of the consumption (or use) of a commodity by one agent 
on the well-being (or production) of other agents is called an external 
effect or an externality of that commodity. When externalities are present 
in the economy, it is not sufficient for the commodities to be indexed by 
their physical properties, they must also be indexed by the economie 
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agent who is consuming (or using) the commodity. Thus. each consump-
(ion (or input) variable has three subscripts: x„,, stands for the consump-
tion of commodity k by household j as it affects the welfare of household i. 
This model has been already employed by Arrow (1969). 
A commodity space in which the goods are characterized both by their 
physical proporties (k =1, m) and the consuming (or using) agents 
(j=l, ..., h) is called a personalized commodity space, R". The dimension 
of the personalized commodity space and its dual space, the personalized 
price space, le", are equal to hm. It will be shown that, under suitable 
assumptions, the personalized commodity space (with dimension hm) can 
be reduced to the usual or impersonal commodity space with dimension 
m (see property 4.2.1). A consumption variable x ij in this space indicates 
the quantity of commodity k consumed by household j. Let for each 
consumer ieH, a consumption set XII g. Rhm be given, on which a 
preference ordering is defined. 
There are no externalities in the consumption (or use) of commodity 
k if each agent is indifferent to the consumption of another agent, i.e. for 
each ieH, Xkii = ykii implies that (xk, x) • • • Yraa)• In 
figure 4.2.1, the indifference contours of agent i are given for good (ki) and 
(kj). The price set, 12'1, and its indifference contours are derived from 
those in X'Y by a duality operation (see section 4.1 and the upper polarity 
operation in section 9.2). The sets are scaled such that zero is not an 
element of these sets. 
Fig. 4.2.1. Indifference contours in R" and lem* good k has no exter-






    
If the consumption (or use) of a commodity k has externalities (see fig. 
4.2.2), then these externalities may be personal or impersonal. If agents 
care not about which particular individuals consume (or use) commodity 
k, but only about total consumption by others, then commodity k has 
impersonal externalities. Thus, agent i is indifferent for (or has no opinion 
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about) two consumption allocations in which the quantities of consump-
tion are permuted over other agents. 
Fig. 4.2.2. Indifference contours if k has externalities 
 




Finally, a commodity k has a pure externality if agents have no opinion 
about the consumption of that commodity by another agent, i.e. xiji e X"! 
when j 0 i (see fig. 4.2.3). Such a commodity is said to have a pure exter-
nality as it leaves the possibility open for the same good to enter into the 
utility function of more agents (the usual definition of extemalities). 
Therefore, although nobody even realizes that another agent is consuming 
the same commodity as he is, he may greatly benefit from the consump-
tion of that other agent. A pure externality is by definition impersonal. 
The price set, P"i< , and the indifference contours in II< are derived by the 
upper polarity operation. Since XI< is one-dimensional in the subspace of 
personalized consumption of commodity k, it follows (see section 9.2) 
that 12'7 is h-dimensional in the subspace of personalized prices of k. When 
definitions for prices are used analogous to those defined above for 
quantities, then the following property follows: 
Property 4.2.1. 
There are no externalities in the consumption (or use) of a commodity k 
if and only if there are pure externalities in the prices of commodity k. 
There are pure externalities in the consumption (or use) of a commodity 
k if and only if there are no externalities in the prices of commodity k. 
If no goods have any externalities in an economy, then every agent 1 is 
indifferent between the bundle (x" , , xe, t) and the bundle 
(0, ..., xkii , ..., 0) in which consumption by other agents is put equal to 
zero. Therefore, from the point of view of consumer i, these bundles are 
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sufficiently identified by the variable Xkii , which can be reduced to xki . 
In this case, the dimension hm of the i-th consumption set X`Y in the 
hm-dimensional personalized commodity space can be reduced to in. If 
all goods have pure externalities in an economy, then xkii 0r1 and the 
dimension of XI' is equal to in. Thus, the following property is established: 
Property 4.2.2. 
If all goods in an economy have either pure or no externalities, then 
the personalized commodity space with dimension hm can be reduced to 
the impersonal commodity space with dimension m. 
The relation between Xi in Ir and rif in Rhm is expressed by the follow-
ing definition: 
Xi := Prol Xì f , where 
the 1-th projection of XII is done in the commodity space Rr, in which 
the quantities consumed by i are indicated. The effects of the 1-th con-
sumption on j can thus never be expressed in Rm (or 	but only by 
in 




Next, those characteristics of a commodity are defined which are based 
upon its technical or 'objective' properties of a commodity. A commodity 
is said to be exclusive if consumption (or use) by one agent excludes 
consumption by any other agent. In this case, total or social consumption 
is equal to the sum of individual consumption: x k = xiji ; and a specific 
quantity can be consumed either by one or by another agent. A commo-
dity is said to be collective in relation to an economy if all agents in the 
economy consume (or use) that commodity. In this case, total or social 
consumption is equal to the consumption of each individual: xk = xki ; 
63 
and a specific quantity of that commodity can be consumed by one and 
by every other agent in the economy. 
The `subjective' properties of a commodity attributed to it by the 
agents and the 'objective' technical properties are combined to define the 
following polar cases: 
A commodity is said to be a private good in an economy if it is an 
exclusive good without externalities. 
A commodity is said to be a public good in an economy if it is a collec-
tive good with pure externalities relative to the economy. 
It follows from property 4.2.2. that an economy with private and/or 
public goods can be defined in the impersonal commodity space. 
4.3. PRIVATE GOODS, PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
Two kinds of definitions of a private good need to be distinguished: firstly, 
model-oriented definition stating the conditions which permit application 
of a market-mechanism (the definition given in section 4.2); secondly, the 
institution-oriented definition stating as a condition that a market-
mechanism be used in the allocation of a commodity. 
Since the model-oriented definition is very narrow (most goods do 
have some externalities in consumption), the market can be applied either 
to a small set of economic goods giving an optimal allocation, or to a 
larger set of goods (which are not all strictly private goods) giving approx-
imately an optima! solution. The latter choice is made in economic life, 
as the costs of allocation-mechanisms are not zero. If the commodities 
deviate too much from the conditions set for private goods, then charac-
teristics are added (at some cost) to allow for treatment by a market, such 
as the exclusion of other consumers by means of fences, laws or morals. 
These costs belong to the category of transaction costs, to be defined 
below. 
Therefore, the institution-oriented definition is close (or equal) to the 
common sense concept of a private good, but if one wants to analyze 
the economic system and its allocation-mechanisms, one must use the 
model-oriented definition. 
An analogous situation can be found in the theory of public goods. 
For example, an institution-oriented definition of public goods bas been 
given by Buchanan (1968, p. 1): 'public goods are goods that people are 
observed to demand and supply through political institutions'. The 
pragmatism of this definition  is attractive as it suggests that if the sufficient 
conditions for action through political mechanisms were not fulfilled, 
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other mechanisms would be found. Definitions along the same line as 
those of Buchanan's have been given by Musgrave (1969, p. 125) and 
Barone (1912, p. 165). However, when attempting to analy ze which 
mechanism is best suited for the allocation of specific commodities in an 
economy, the model-oriented definition is to be preferred. 
The definition of a public good given above (section 4.2) is narrower than 
that given by Samuelson (1954, p. 387): `... collective consumption goods 
(xn+19 •••, Xn+m) which all enjoy in common in the sense that each 
individual's consumption of such a good leads to no substraction from 
any other individual's consumption of that good, so that x  
simultaneously for each and every i-th individual and each collective 
good'. This definition allows for positive external effects of some indivi-
dual's consumption on another's consumption, which is excluded in sec-
tion 4.2. The definition used here is, however, narrower than that later 
given by Samuelson (1966, p. 102) when he says: 'a public good is simply 
one with the property of involving a `consumption externality' in the 
sense of entering into two or more persons' preference functions simul-
taneously'. This definition corresponds with a commodity having an 
external effect in consumption, as defined in section 4.2. 
The definition of public goods given here implies a number of charac-
teristics on which public goods have been defined elsewhere, or which 
follow from other definitions. To be more specific: `indivisibility' of 
public goods is essential for Sax (1887), Bowen (1943, p. 27) and Drees 
e.a. (1968, p. 15); 'non-excludability of use (or consumption)' is an 
essential characteristic for Dorfman (1966, p. 248), Stevers (1967, p. 41) 
and Milleron (1972, p. 424). Both aspects are required by Johansen 
(1965, p. 17), while Foley (1967, p. 49) proposes `involuntary consump-
tion' as essential. These characteristics follow from the condition required 
here that a public good be collective, i.e. be consumed or used by every 
agent in the economy. 
Head (1962, p. 205) and Musgrave (1969, p. 126) add to this type of 
characteristic another one which is equivalent to pure externalities; they 
call it `external economies to an extreme degree', resp. 'non-rivalness in 
consumption'. This point of view lies close to Samuelson's earlier defini-
tion. 
A different approach is suggested by Arrow (1970). He states that the 
concept of public goods belongs to the more general one of `externality', 
which in its turn belongs to the broader category of `market failure'. 
Market failure, again, is not absolute: `it is better to consider a broader 
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category, that of transaction costs, which in general impede and in parti-
cular cases completely block the formation of markets. It is usually 
though not always emphasized that transaction costs are costs of running 
the economie system'. Transaction costs relative to the market-mechanism 
are, for example: the costs of implementing the exclusivity of consumption 
of private goods ; the costs of information needed to enter and participate 
in any market ; the costs of preventing externalities in consumption, such 
as disposal facilities. 
In general, I propose to define the transaction costs relative to some 
allocation mechanism as being the costs of adding characteristics to a 
commodity necessary to apply that allocation mechanism within the 
economie system. The transaction costs relative to a market of buying 
a refrigerator, for example, include time and money spent on information 
about alternatives, costs related with the exchange-commodity money, 
costs of ultimate disposal after consumption. It is not very hard to find 
examples in which transaction costs surpass the price of the commodity 
itself. Imagine the transaction costs relative to a market of an hour's 
broadcasting; or of police services in city-traffic. In such cases, it seems 
plausible to look for another allocation mechanism. 
On the other hand, transaction costs relative to a political mechanism 
can also be prohibitively high for many commodities. It was Hayek (1935) 
who draw attention to the tremendous communication and uncertainty 
problems related to the socialist organization. The costs of a bureau-
cracy will for a large part consist of the transaction costs relative to a 
political mechanism, and even then the real transaction costs might be 
higher. 
Tinbergen (1961) contends that the optimal organization of economie 
decisions is one of the main features in modern welfare theory. This 
statement can be made more specific by putting the following questions: 
1. how many and which allocation-mechanisms should operate within an 
economie system ? 
2. which commodities are allocated by which allocation-mechanisms ? 
The first question is relevant as the costs of any allocation-mechanism 
are not zero. Although under certain conditions and at certain costs, 
goods with external effects can be transformed into private goods or 
public goods, the production of many goods in an economie system 
depends on the availability of a suitable allocation-mechanism. The 
answer to the first question, therefore, directly influences the choice of 
individual consumers and their welfare; but the answer is hard to give, as 
one must compare the transaction- and disutility-costs of producing 
one bundle of goods with the transaction costs and the costs of the allo- 
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cation mechanism in producing another bundle of goods. It is still the 
only way to compare and valuate various economie systems for a given 
economy and its members. 
The second question can be solved by comparing the transaction costs 
of a commodity relative to the allocation-mechanisms in the system. 
But since these costs are hard to make explicit, it is not easy to judge 
whether a choice is socially efficient. However, before a decision is made 
to supply some good through the market-mechanism and the political-
mechanisms simultaneously, it is necessary first to analyze the over-all 
effects. 
Although the various allocation-mechanisms ought to be considered 
as being themselves public goods, the hypothesis to be made that all goods 
are either private or public makes it possible to ignore the costs of allo-
cation-mechanisms and the transaction costs. The restrictions stemming 
from the hypothesis are thus rather strong. 
4.4. SOCIAL CONSUMPTION AND SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
The definitions of private and public goods given in section 4.2 imply 
that the personalized commodity space can be reduced to the impersonal 
commodity space only when these goods are present in the economy 
(see property 4.2.2). 
Let Ir be the subspace of private goods and let R" be the subspace of 
public goods. Let consumer i's consumption bundle be (x i , zi)ER" + " for 
ie H, the set of consumers in the economy. Then social consumption 
in the economy is equal to (x, z)e R'" + ", where z = z i , for all i, and 
x = Zxi . The social consumption set X g I?" + " is equal to 
{ E (Proj,„ Xi), n (Prol, X,)} . 
iet! 	 ieH 
Since the utility functions are usually assumed to be index functions which 
are not comparable between consumers (ordinal utility), it is not possible 
to aggregate these functions to obtain social utility or social welfare. 
However, aggregation of the upper-preference sets over individuals is 
possible, if only the allocation that determines the upper-preference sets 
and the weight of each consumer in aggregation are indicated (see prop-
erty 5.4.2). In this way, a necessary condition for maximal social welfare 
can be obtained. 
The situation is different in production. The input and output of a produc- 
tion process are assumed to permit exact measurement and different 
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processes can therefore be compared and aggregated. Further, it must be 
stressed that criteria for the private or public character of commodities 
are to be found at the input side of a consumption or production process. 
It is the consuming or using agent who determines whether there exist 
external effects in the consumption or use of commodities by other agents. 
Whatever the character of the output of processes as inputs in the follow-
ing process, it will be assumed that these outputs are additive over the 
various processes. When the output of two production units is, for 
example, roads and smoke, then the output of both units together is 
equal to the sum of each (road and smoke) output, although both com-
modities are probably public goods. 
Two cases will be distinguished: production in an economy having only 
private goods, and the more general case of production in an economy 
having also (or only) public goods. In an economy with private goods 
only, the social production set Y is equal to the sum of the production 
sets yi of the various units j. It should be noticed, however, that this 
definition does not imply that the input-output multifunctions (see 
section 3.1) of the units can be added to obtain the social input-output 
multifunction f(x) := {y(—x, y)e Y}. For, assume that 
(x) := {y1( — x, y) e Y1) and 
(x) = {YI( — x, 	172) 
then the sum +1.2 is defined by (see section 10.1) 
+ƒ2) (x) := (x) + .f2(x) 
= {y1+ Y21( - x, Yi)E Y1 and (—x, 312)e Y2} - 
It follows immediately that the graphs are not equal: 
G(fI +h) G 	+ 2) = Y1 + Y2 = Y = G(ƒ) • 
The appropriate operation to perform on the individual input-output 
multifunctions to obtain the social input-output multifunction is the 
operation of disjunction, v, defined in section 10.1: 
(ƒ1 v f2)(x) := 	(x 1) + f2 (x2)13x 1 , x2 : x = x i + x2 } . 
Since G(fi v f2) = G(ƒ,)+ G(f2)= Yi + Y2 = Y = G(i"), it follows that 
f=fi vf2 , i.e. the social input-output multifunction is equal to the dis- 
j unction of the individual input-output processes: f := v J.  (For the 
jeF 
properties of disjunction under the inverse or duality operations, see 
chapter 10.) 
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The other approach is based on partition of the commodity space into 
private and public goods, valid for all participants in the economy. This 
includes inputs, outputs and intermediate goods in an economy with 
private and/or public goods. Since the input of public goods in a produc-
tion process is equal for all producers in an economy but the input of 
private goods will vary, a kind of production multifunction will be defined 
which associates for each producer the net output of private goods and 
the total output of public goods with the total input of public goods in 
the producer's production technology. The convention regarding to 
signs is (as in chapter 3) that inputs have negative signs and outputs 
positive signs. 
Therefore, let (xi , zi) := (xki , zu) be a vector in the commodity space 
indicating the quantities of private goods (k e M) and public goods 
(/eN) for producer jeF. The multifunction —> if" + "is called the j-th 
producer's production-multifunction if for each public good input zei?", 
the image set Yi (z) indicates the production possibilities for producer j. 
In fact, the producer can choose any point in yi (z), and so determine 
what quantities of private goods he buys and what quantities of private 
and public goods he sells. The input of public goods, z, is given for each 
producer. It is evident that if all goods in the economy are private goods, 
the dimension of R is zero and Y; (0) = Y, the production set defined in 
section 3.1. 
In an economy with both private and public goods the social production 
set Y(z), given the bundle of public goods, is equal to the sum of the 
individual production sets yi (z); i.e. Y(z) Yi (z). The composition 
JEF 
of the components of a social product vector and the allocation of the 
private goods can not yet be determined. Only the technically feasible 
alternatives in the composition of social output are given by Y(z). 
The corresponding production cost-prices for each producer with 
production set Y(z) are determined by the polarity operation on y i (z), 
as is done in section 3.3. The j-th producer's production-price-multi-
function R"—> R'" + "* is defined by 
*Yi (z):= [Y;(z)]. , for each z e R. 
This indicates the composition of cost-prices relative to producer j-th's 
technology when the input of public goods z is given, so that the value of 
output (producer's turnover) is at the most equal to 1. These prices are 
still personalized prices as they are uniquely determined by the j-th 
producer's technology. 
The social production-price set *Y(z) is determined by the multi- 
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function *Y : R" Rtn + "* defined by: 
*Y(z):= [Y(z)]*_ = [ E Yi(Z)r_ , for each z . F 
This multifunction is the polar of the social production-set multifunction 
Y(z) (see section 10.1) and determines the social cost-prices of each 
commodity in the economy when the input of public goods z is given, so 
that the value of output (net national product) is at the most equal to 1. 
These prices are impersonal prices and are scalar multiples of the per-
sonalized prices in * yi (z); the values of the scalars t. determine the 
income distribution ovei the producers, or better, the contribution of each 
producer to the net national product. This follows from the following 
property (based on property 9.3.4.1): 
Property 4.4.1. 
If for each ze R" the production sets Y(z) are closed, convex and contain 
zero, then 
*Y(z) = [ 	yi (z)]*_ = n [Y; (z)]*_ = n *y., (z) . 
jeF 	
iF 	 iF  
The {Ai} follow from the definition of convex intersection (see definitions 
in sections 8.3 and 9.3): 
fl *Ir•(z) := {q 3q; e *Y; (z), 31; e [0, 1] : 
JF 
	
IA; = 1 and q = Af rij , Vj e F 	• 
Until now, the input of public goods z has been accepted as given by the 
individual producers. But each producer has a definite opinion about 
what is the 'best' composition of the public goods vector z, which 
co-determines his set of production possibilities Yj (z). This opinion is 
expressed by the adjoint multifunction of the producer's production 
multifunction, Yi * : R" + "* -+ R"*, defined below, and is based on the 
prices of his decision parameters: the net output of private goods and 
total output of public goods. 
The j-th producer's (public-goods) benefit multifunction Y j * : 121" + "* 
R"* is the adjoint of his production multifunction Y, defined by (see 
also section 10.1): 
Y,*(p, q) = {ri lVz e R",V(x, y)e yi (z): ri z px+ qy — 1} . 
This indicates in which direction expansion (or, rather, change) of the 
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various components of the public goods input vector is most profitable 
for the j-th producer. 
The public-goods producer's benefit multifunction Y* : M'n* --> Ir* is 
the adjoint of the social production multifunction Y = E Y. It gives 
JEF 
the weighted average of the producer's valuations ri , the weights being 
equal to each producer's contribution to the net national product when 
maximized at prices (p, q). This follows from the following property 
(derived from property 10.4.6.1): 
Property 4.4.2. 
If the producer's production multifunctions Yi are convex cone-interior 
processes having the same orientation (defined in section 10.4), then 
y* := [E lir+ + 
j eF 	jeF 
	
where -- 	q) := U ça Y.i* (Pi qi) jeF 	 ki 
 
2; e [0, 1] : IA; = 1, and 1 
(p,q) = )J (1); , q;), Vj e F . 
 
Thus, with each social cost-price s ystem (p, q) of private goods and 
public goods can be associated a set of vectors of valuations of public 
goods inputs, as valuated by the production side of the econom y. 
A similar valuation of the public goods input should also be given for 
the consumption side of the econom y. Its formulation, however, requires 
aggregation of consumers' upper-preference sets which cannot be done 
without defining equilibrium in the economy. 
4.5. AN ECONOMY WITH LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS 
In the previous section it was assumed that a public good xk can be con-
sumed or used by each agent in the economy : xki = xk for each iE Hu F. 
This assumption can be weakened b y introducing consumption collec-
tivities in the economy for each good, which determine the extent of 
public use for each good. A subset of agents in the economy is called a 
collectivity. An economic good k is said to be a local public good relative 
to a collectivity Gij Hu F, if it is a private good in the econom y for all 
agents except those within the collectivity, for whom it is a public good. 
The collectivity Hkh is called the h-th consumption-collectivity with 
respect to local good k; the index set of consumption-collectivities with 
respect to local good k is indicated by Hk = {1, ..., h, ..., lik), and the 
71 
h-th consumption-collectivity of which agent i is a member is indicated 
by Hkhi (see fig. 4.5.1). 
It follows from the definitions that for each local good k, the set of con-
sumers H is partitioned in consumption-collectivities {Hkk}: 
U Hkh = H and 	n Hkh = . 
h e Hk 	 he Hk 
The number of consumption-collectivities for good k, hk , is equal to 
the cardinal number of the set Hk ; this number is equal to the number of 
consumption-units of local good k supplied by the producers {xkk}. 
Examples of consumption-collectivities (with examples of their local 
goods) are: households (furniture); parishes (church); suburbs (shopping 
centers); cities (fire protection); sport clubs (play-grounds); theater 
visitors (movie); subscribers (information); the United Nations (inter-
national law and order); etc. 
For each member i of a consumption-collectivity Hkh , consumption is 
given by: xki  = x kh • 
Fig. 4.5.1. Consumption-collectivities of local public good k 
H = Hkl u 142u 143 
Hk = {1, 2, 3} 
hk = 3 
In an economy with local public goods, social consumption is defined as 
being equal to the summation of consumption by collectivities: x k := 
E xkh , for every k. 
keHk 
From the definitions given above, it follows that private goods and 
public goods are extreme cases of local public goods. Let k be a private 
good, then: 
— each consumer is equal to a consumption-collectivity, 
i.e. Hkhi = Hki = {i}, for each i; 
— the set of consumption-collectivities Hk equals H = {1, ..., h} ; 
— the number of consumption-units fik equals h ; 
— social consumption equals xk = E xhi . 
ieH 
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Let k be a public good, then: 
— the set of consumers is equal to the consumption-collectivity, i.e. 
H khi = Hki = H; 
— the set of consumption-collectivities Hk equals {1} and contains one 
element, i.e. lik = 1; 
— social consumption equals x k = xki , for each ie H. 
The social consumption set X of the economy is obtained through the 
following aggregation of individual consumption sets X1 : 
1 X := (X 1 , • • • , Xk 3 • • • , Xrps) 3(X1i , 	Xki , 	X„,i)e X 3Hkhi = H kh ç  H: Xkh = Xki 	and 	xk = E 
k E Hk 
It can be easily seen that these definitions comply with those given in 
section 4.4. 
Analogous definitions hold for the inputs of local goods in a production 
process. 
The collectivity Fki• is called the f-th production-collectivity for local 
good k, if k is a private good in the economy for all agents except for the 
producer-members of the collectivity, for whom input k is a public good. 
The index-set of production-collectivities is indicated by Fk = {1, ..., 
f, fk}, and the ƒ-th production-collectivity for input k of which 
producerj is a member is indicated by 
Again, the set of producers F is, for each local public input good k, 
partitioned in production-collectivities {Fkf}. Their number, jk , is equal 
to the number of production-units of good k, which is an intermediate 
product by definition. 
Examples of production-collectivities (with examples of an associated 
local public goods) are: 
joint insurance agreements (covering disasters); 
shopkeepers' combinations (attraction of buyers); 
unions (indivisibility of labor); 
associations of registered professions (quality of product); 
corporations (economies of scale); 
integrated concerns (control of raw and intermediate material); 
agglomerates (profit stabilization); 
hotel chains (reservations). 
It should be emphasized, however, that none of the examples perfectly 
meets the requirements of the definition of a local public good. Even if 
the 'objective criteria' of private goods (exclusivity) and public goods 
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(collectivity) are met, then the `subjective criteria' are hard to accomplish. 
The input of local public goods determines the set of production possi-
bilities for each producer. To this extent, the definition of the production 
multifunction Y given in section 4.4 can also be applied here. However, 
since local goods do not permit addition of the individual multifunctions 
to obtain the social production multifunction, it is preferable to use the 
input-output multifunction f : R"--> 1?" to describe the j-th producer's 
technology. 
For the case of an economy with local public goods, the social input-
output multifunction : R" --> R" is defined by: 
f(x) = E fi (x , • • • , Xki , • • • , X) 3F kf = Fkf : Xki Xkf 
j e F Xk = E Xkf 
J e Fk 
The social production set Y is then defined by 
Y;= {y—xly ef(x)} . 
Finally, an economy with local public goods e is given by: 
8 	{115 (X .,•••■ i, Ai 7 Hkhi); F3(.6 7 F kn); we Rn} • 
and} 
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5. Equilibrium in economies with 
private and public goods 
5.1. THE VALUATION REPRESENTATION OF AN ECONOMY 
The preferences of consumers as well as the technology of producers are 
usually expressed as relations on the commodity space in which quantities 
are given for each commodity (see sections 3.1 and 4.1). However, if a 
common constraint is given, such as the value in which a bundle of 
quantities has to be mapped, then the relations characterizing consumers 
and producers can also be expressed in terms of the linear mappings, 
such as the prices. This (mathematical) operation is called a duality 
operation (see section 9.2). In this way, information about the economy 
in terms of quantities is carried over into information in terms of prices 
or valuations. If it is possible, through the duality operation, to restore 
the original information in terms of quantities, then no information is 
lost during the transformation processes. In this case, the economy repre-
sented in terms of quantities can be considered as a representation in 
terms of prices, and vice-versa. This means that one can express properties 
of individual agents or of the economy either in quantities or in valua-
tions, which ever best suits the set purpose, and translate these concepts 
into the other space. 
Since in the case of private goods the conflict of interest between agents 
is concentrated on quantities, the most natural definition of equilibrium 
will be given in the quantity space (although translation in terms of prices 
is possible). On the other hand, in the case of public goods the conflict of 
interest between agents concentrates on the valuations ; in this case it is 
therefore natural to define equilibrium in the price space. 
Let the distribution economy (introduced in section 2.2) 
e= {H, (Xi , 	2e); F, (Y3); WERm+1, 
be defined by a set H of consumers, each having a preference relation on 
his consumption set, and some weight Ai ; a set F of producers, each 
having a typical production multifunction 	; and a vector of initial 
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resources w partitioned in private goods: w m e/r, and public goods: 
wiv e R. 
Let the economy in the price space, 
e* := {H, (Pi , 	, Ai); F, (*yi); (w)* g /C1+11 , 
be defined by a set of consumers, each having a costing relation on his 
set of consumption-prices Pi (see section 4.1), and some weight A i ; a set 
F of producers each having a production technology expressed by 
cost-price multifunction *Yi ; and a hyperplane (w)* indicating the prices 
corresponding with the initial resources of private and public goods, and 
corresponding with the vector w in e. 
The economy e* is said to be a polar economy of e if the sets and rela-
tions in R" 4 ' are derived from sets and relations in R"" by means of 
the polarity operation *, defined in sections 9.2 and 10.1 (see section 4.1 
and 4.4). 
The polar economy e* is said to be a valuation representation of the 
economy e if e is also a polar economy of e*. The following property 
follows directly from the definitions of Pi , and *Y1 given in sections 
4.1. and 4.4, and from the properties of reflexive sets given in section 9.3: 
Property 5.1.1. 
Let e* be the polar economy of the economy e defined above. e* is a 
valuation representation of e if and only if: 
1. The upper-preference sets C, (x)are aureole-reflexive for each i and 
for each xeXi , i.e. they are closed, convex, aureoled and do not con-
tuin 0; 
2. The production sets Y, (z) are star-reflexive for each j and for each 
zEDom (1;), i.e. they are closed, convex and contain 0. 
Important properties of the concepts in e and e are invariant under 
the polarity operation *. Consider the following conditions on concepts 
in e*. 
Conditions 5.1. For each consumer ie H: 
5.1.1. The price set Pi = Dom (13 1) is convex. 
5.1.2. The price set Pi is completely preordered by 
5.1.3. The costing relation 7 is convex. 
5.1.4. The indifference sets are thin. 
5.1.5. All choice sets in Pi and generated by elements of P i have maximal 
elements. 
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5.1.6. The costing relation 	is monotone and Pi Rr. 
The following property can be derived from property 4.1.3: 
Property 5.1.2. 
Consider the distribution economy e and its polar economy e*. The 
assumptions 4.1 are satisfied for each consumer in e if, and only if, the 
conditions 5.1 hold in e*. 
This property also holds if assumption 4.1.6 and condition 5.1.6 are 
simultaneously omitted. Similar properties can also be derived for pro-
duction: see properties 5.1.1.2, 9.3.1 and 10.2.5. If a producer's multifunc-
tion Yj is monotonously increasing, then his cost-price multifunction *Irj 
is nonnegative. It is evident that if all production sets are star-refiexive, 
and assumptions 4.1 (or conditions 5.1) are satisfied, then the polar 
economy e* is a valuation representation of e. 
One of the virtues of a valuation representation of an economy is that 
one can prove properties of the economy in the quantity space or in the 
price-space, whichever is most appropriate in the given circumstances. 
This property of a valuation representation has been used, for example, 
by Weddepohl (1972, 1973a) to formulate a rather simple proof of the 
existence of an equilibrium for a private goods economy in the price space. 
In order to compare definitions of the same concepts in the quantity 
space and in the price space, the definitions given in chapter 2 for a private 
goods economy E1 ce are translated for its polar economy Er e e*. 
Let El := {H, (Xi , 	ij; Y; R"} be a distribution economy for private 
goods only, with a set of H consumers, each having a consumption struc-
ture following the assumptions under 4.1 and a positive weight 1 in the 
income distribution; the production is given by a social production set 
which includes the vector of initial resources and which is closed and 
convex, and which also contains zero and the non-positive orthant. 
According to property 5.1.1, this economy has a valuation representation: 
-- {H, (Pi , 	, ij; Q; R"t } . 
For this economy, the following property can be derived from properties 
5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 9.4.3.2: 
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Property 5.1.3. 
Let the economy El have a valuation representation Er and let the reces-
sion cone of the social production set, Y(w), given w, be such that 
0 + Y(w) n R = {0} and Int Y(w) n R0 then the following four 
concepts are defined equivalently by (E I ) and by (Er): 
An allocation 	y) in EI is an attainable state or a feasible allocation 
if and only if one of the following conditions held in E 1 , resp. Et: (see 
also fig. 5.1.1) 
(Ei) xi e X; and Exi = ye Y ; 
(Et) M1 (x) E Pi , and 	Mi (x) = M(y) 2 	. 
An allocation (x„ y) is an efficient allocation if and only if 
(E I ) xi e Xi and Exi = y e Bnd Y ; 
(Et) Mi (x) Pi and 
H(y) supportingly separates A mi (x,) and Y*• 
Therefore, if (xi, y) is an efficient allocation, then there exists an arbitrary 
income distribution {ij, and prices {p i , p} such that 
(E,) Xi E M (pi) and Exi e M (p) n Bnd Y; 
(Et) pi eH(xi) and 'ti pi = p e H(y) n Bnd Y*; 
where 1 is an income distribution, i.e. Z > 0 and E1 , = 1. 
An allocation (x„ y) is a Pareto optimum in E l if and only if it is an 
efficient allocation and there exists a price p with income distribution 
such that: 
(E1 ) the choice sets M i (p; ij support C1 (x1) in xi ; 
(En the choice sets Mi (xi) support *C1 (xi) in pi = plXi . 
The income distribution required for a Pareto optimum need not to be 
equal to the one which is given in E„ resp. E. If both are equal, however, 
then the Pareto optimum is a competitive equilibrium, which permits 
decentralization of consumption and production decisions on the basis 
of a price vector: 
A state vector (x1 , y, p) in El is said to be a competitive equilibrium in El 
if and only if either: 
(EI ) H(p) supportingly separates ECi (x) and Y in y; or: 
(Et) H(y) supportingly separates h' *C1 (x 1) and Y* in p. 
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Fig. 5.1.1. A competitive equilibrium in the commodity and price spaces 
This condition is equivalent to, resp.: 
(EI) a. M,(p; A i) supports Ci (x,) in x•, for each i; 
b. H(p) supports Y in y; 
c. y = Ex i ; or: 
(ED a. M(x,) supports *C; (xi) in pl , for each i; 
b. H(y) supports Y* in p; 
c. p = A lp,, for each I. 
It follows that a competitive equilibrium results in an allocation in which 
(a) all consumers are in equilibrium, (b) the producers are in equilibrium 
and (c) the market is in equilibrium. Each of these conditions can be 
expressed by means of choice sets in the quantity space, such as M (p ; 
or choice sets in the price space, such as M(xi). The second alternative, 
however, has hardly any economic significance; this is in contrast to the 
case of public goods. 
5.2. EQUILIBRIUM IN AN ECONOMY WITH PUBLIC GOODS ONLY 
The first definition of equilibrium in an economy with public goods was 
presented by Lindahl (1919). His idea was to extend the competitive 
equilibrium by introducing personalized prices, the sum of which prices 
was to equal the production price. These personalized prices were to play 
the same role as market prices for private goods and thus generate 
`demand' multifunctions for public goods. Equilibrium was then estab-
lished if the demand for a public good by consumers was equal for all 
consumers, at individual prices the sum of which was equal to the produc-
tion price (see fig. 5.2.1). 
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Fig. 5.2.1. Equilibrium 'clemand' for a public good by two consumers 
x = x,(17y= x2(p2) 





Lindahl's equilibrium concept (defined below) is thus an extension of the 
competitive equilibrium defined in section 5.1. Mathematically, this 
extension follows naturally ; from the economic point of view, however, 
many problems arise as these personalized prices are supposed to be given 
for each consumer, or should be revealed by the inverse demand multi-
function. 
The rationality of consumers, according to which they are supposed to 
reveal their individual demand for private goods, i.e. the best and cheapest 
for each, prevents the consumer spontaneously revealing the price he 
should, in reality, pay for a public good supplied in the economy. 
Therefore, another concept of equilibrium is defined here and called 
a public equilibrium. The idea is that the private and public sectors can be 
separated, each having in principle its own prices and its own concept of 
rationality in behavior. The income distribution for private goods is 
usually expressed by differences in the individual choice sets, and the 
`income' distribution for public goods can be expressed by the weights 
given to each personalized price, those prices being chosen from a choice 
set which is equal for all agents. This means, for example, that personal-
ized prices need not necessarily be considered as taxes through which 
public goods are financed, but may also be considered as a kind of vote 
— though a complex one (see table 1.4.1). 
An economy will thus be partitioned here in terms of consumers' 
decisions about the allocation of commodities. Two standards of value, 
two income-distributions and two allocation mechanisms will be intro-
duced, for each level one. 
On the level of private goods, a competitive equilibrium is determined 
via a market-mechanism, given the income distribution {1m, } in terms of 
money. On the level of public goods, a public equilibrium is determined 
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via a referendum-mechanism, given the weight distribution {An in terms 
of votes. 
This partition of an economy into a level of private goods and a level 
of public goods is inconsistent with the concept of a Lindahl equilibrium, 
precisely because this concept is an extension of a competitive equilibrium. 
Thus, the allocation of public goods should be determined via the market-
mechanisrn, given an income distribution {,i i} for both private and public 
goods in terms of money. Since this solution contradicts the assumption 
of individual rationality, other mechanisms have been proposed (see 
section 6.4) which have — presumably — better performance characteris-
tics and also arrive at a Lindahl equilibrium, although the income distri-
bution changes during the process to allow for compensatory payments. 
The allocation, however, with its changing income distribution, should 
be called a Pareto optimal allocation, rather than a Lindahl equilibrium. 
It follows from the dual conditions for a Pareto optimum in a convex 
economy with public goods (see property 5.2.1.2), that with each Pareto 
optimum a Lindahl equilibrium can be associated if the income distribu-
tion is adapted. Therefore, the set of Lindahl equilibria generated by all 
possible income distributions is equal to the set of Pareto optima. 
Since the concept of a Lindahl equilibrium is connected with an initial 
distribution of resources, or with a given income distribution, the con-
clusion follows that no satisfactory allocation mechanism has been 
designed via which a Lindahl equilibrium can be obtained. 
It should also be noted that Foley (1970) has shown that the Lindhal 
equilibrium is an element of the core of an economy. This is true if the 
extemal effects are impersonal and fall under some restriction of indivi-
dual property rights, as has been indicated by Starrett (1973). 
In this section, the public equilibrium for an economy with public-
goods-only will be defined and its existence will be proven. Formally, a 
public equilibrium is equivalent to a Lindahl equilibrium, but for reasons 
indicated above, another name is preferred. Another reason is that people 
can only be compensated individually when at least one private good is 
present in the economy. The situation in an economy with public-goods-
only is therefore principally different from the situation in an economy 
with public and private goods. 
Consider an economy E, with h consumers, each characterized by a 
consumption structure, f producers, each having a production multi-
function Yr and n public goods with initial resources w eR": 
E2 := {H, (Xi 	, ij; F, (Y); w e R"} . 
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The polar economy is then: 
Et = {H, (Pi ,;.,5,? , 2i); F, (*Yi); {w}* g R"} 
A state vector (x, p,  p) is called a Lindahl equilibrium for E2 if: 
(a) the choice sets M(p; ). i) support C, (x) in x, for each i; 
(b) the hyperplane H(p) supports 	(w) in x; 
(c) P = 
A state vector (x, p i , p) is called a public equilibrium for the economy 
if (see fig. 5.2.1): 
(a) the choice set M(x) supports *C, (x) in pi , for each i; 
(b) the hyperplane H(x) supports ( -̀i *Yi (w) in p; 
(c) P = lAiPi • 
Before analyzing the properties of a public equilibrium, the relation 
between the two equilibrium concepts is established by the following 
property: 
Property 5.2.1. 
Let the economy E2 have a valuation representation Et, and let the reces-
sion cones of the social production set Y := Ly(w) and of the social 
consumption set X := nXi be such that 0 + Yne X = {0} and 
Int Y n X 00. Thea: 
1. A Lindahl equilibrium is equivalent to a public equilibrium. 
2. An allocation x is Pareto optimal in E2 if and only if there exist an 
income distribution 	such that 
(a) the choice set M(x) supports *C, (x) in pi , for each ieH; 
(b) the hyperplane H(x) supports Y* in p; 
(c) P = niPi • 
3. The equilibrium prices are related by pf" = 
Proof: The economies E2 or Et meet the conditions of properties 5.1.1 
and 5.1.2 and are thus representations of each other. Property 9.4.3.2 can 
be applied, from which it follows that (in the case of a public equilibrium): 
H(x) supportingly separates C* (x) D.,C7(x) and Y* := * Yi (w) in 
p, if and only if: 
H(p) supportingly separates C(x) = ?)27 1 C, (x) and Y= Ey(w) in x. 
The first condition gives a public equilibrium. The second condition 
can be rewritten as: 
(a) M(p) supports C, (x) in x, for each i; 
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(b) H(p) supports Y in x; 
(c) P = lAiPi• 
Substitution of/3 1 = pflAi in the conditions (a) and (c) gives conditions of 
a Lindahl equilibrium, because M(pf12 i)= M(pf'; 
The property under 2, finally, follows from the application of the 
duality operation, implying that there exists a distribution {i,} such that 
M(p i) supports Ci (x) in x, for each 1, H(p) supports Y in x, and 
p = Zp 1 . See also properties 5.1.3 and 5.4.2. 13 
Fig. 5.2.1. A public equilibrium, with A i = 1 2 -= 0.5 
The behavior of economic agents is supposed to be such that each 
consumer chooses the best element in the choice set M(x) := {p ien 
pi x < 1} according to the preference relation on P. If the preference 
relation ;1` on Pi is related with public goods, it will be called a priority 
relation on the set of public goods prices, instead of a costing relation 
which is defined on the set of private goods prices. For example, let 
:= {1 public transport; 1 public road; 1 the police service}, each unit 
being defined in terms of quantities for the consumers (compare also 
table 1.2.1). Let the production prices, i.e. the marginal expansion, be 
given by = {0.5; 0.3; 0.2}. 
If the weighted valuations of consumers are equal to 
fi = 	pi = {0.2; 0.5; 0.3), 
then 15-q = { —0.3; +0.2; +0.1}, 
implying that contraction of the public transport sector and expansion 
of the private transport sector should be pursued in order to obtain an 
equilibrium. Probably, this starts an iterative process (see chapter 6). 
If, however, fi = {0.7; 0.1; 0.2} because fuel has been rationed or private 
driving has become too expensive or dangerous, then the reverse trend 
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must be pursued. Evidently, if p = then is to be considered an equili-
brium state of public goods. 
The rationality of consumers in the case of public goods can be com-
pared with the rationality of voters. It is, of course, possible to over-
emphasis certain public goods and to refuse to reveal individual valua-
tions. But over-reporting some prices implies under-reporting other prices. 
Since consumers do not know a priori how the other agents will vote, 
their best strategy is true revelation of their preferences. 
The following definitions give some precision to these ideas. 
The price multifunction pi : Xi -->Pi was defined in section 4.1 by 
pi (x):= {pi e Pi lpi is a maximal element of M(x) for 
The social benefit multifunction p : X---› P, where X := nX and P := n i P, 
is defined by: 
P(x):=DiPi(x)• 
The social cost multifunction q: 	rk, where Y := ZY(w) and Y* := 
(21* yi (w), is defined by 
q(x):= {ij E Y*I4x = max px, for p e Y*} . 
The excess benefit multifunction r:Xn Y —› P— Y* is defined by: 
r (x) := p (x)— q(x). 
Therefore, the allocation x in E2 is a public equilibrium if and only if 
r(x)= {O}. 
Next, let the economy E2 be specified by the following assumptions: 
Assumptions 5.2. 
On consumers (see also assumptions 4.1): 
1. The consumption sets Xi = Dom (C,) are convex; 
2. is a complete pre-order relation on X,; 
3. The upper preference sets C,(x) are convex; 
4. The indifference sets C,(x)nCi- '(x) are thin; 
5. All choice sets in Xi and Pi have maximal elements; 
6. The consumption sets' closure equals the non-negative orthant, i.e. 
Cl X, = R, and 	is monotone, i.e. x y x iy. 
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On producers (see also section 3.2): 
7. The production multifunctions y i : R".„ -+ IC are point-convex, point-
closed, upper-bounded, and monotone increasing multifunctions, such 
that yi (0) = R1 and 0e Int Y(z), for z 0. 
On behavior (see also section 3.7): 
8. All agents choose maximal elements in their choice sets. 
The following property can be deduced from properties 5.1.1-5.1.3 and 
section 9.2: 
Property 5.2.2. 
Let the economy E2 meet the assumptions under 5.2. Then: 
1. EI' is a valuation representation of E2 ; 
2. the price sets Pi are completely preordered by the convex priority 
relation ;1` ; 	t is monotone and Cl Pi = .1?; the indifference sets 
D i (p)r)D -1 (p) are thin; 
3. the production cost multifunctions t}' are point-convex, point-
starred, point-compact and non-negative, if the input is non-zero. 
Relative to the price multifunctions, the following can be said: 
Property 5.2.3. 
Let the economy E2 meet the assumptions under 5.2. Then: 
1. the prim multifunctions pi (x) and the social benefit multifunction 
p(x) are non-empty, graph-closed and point-convex; the value 
p(x)x=1; 
2. the social cost multifunction q(y) is non-empty, point-convex, point-
compact and u.h.c. on X; the value q(y).3,. . 1. 
3. the excess benefit multifunction r(x) is non-empty, point-convex and 
graph-closed; the value r (x) • x_ ._  0. 
Proof 
1. The alleged properties of the individual price multifuncti ons are 
derived from property 4.1.4. According to properties 8.2.3 and 8.3.3, 
they are invariant under the operations of scalar multiplication and 
addition. Since the weighted sum is taken, the value remains equal to 1. 
2. Since ij e Y* is a continuous real valued function (in Y) and Y* is a 
constant (i.e. continuous) and compact multifunction, the multifunc-
tion q(x) is point-compact and u.h.c. according to the maximum 
theorem (property 8.2.4). Since Y* is compact and convex, q(x) is 
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non-empty and convex. Since xe Y implies that qx I, for all qe Y*, 
it follows that q (x)• x 1. 
3. From properties 8.2.3 and 8.3.3. El 
The value r(x)• x = 0 if and only if x is an efficient production, i.e. 
x e Bnd Y. Therefore, if r(x)• x> 0, then xe Int Y and x is neither efficient 
nor Pareto optima! (see fig. 5.2.2). An efficient production does not, 
of course, imply a public equilibrium (see fig. 5.2.3). The excess benefit 
vector r(x) indicates the direction in which the commodity bundle should 
change in order to minimize the value of r(x)• x and to come closer to a 
public equilibrium. 
Fig. 5.2.2. An inefficient bundle x Fig. 5.2.3. An efficient disequilibriumx 
The economy E2, its definitions and its assumptions are consistent, as is 
shown by the following property: 
Property 5.2.4. 
If the economy E2 satisfies the assumptions under 5.2, then a public 
equilibrium exists. 
Proof 
The proof is based on the Kakutani fixed point theorem (see property 
10.2.1). In order to apply this theorem, sets must be constructed which 
meet the conditions of the theorem. This is done as follows: Choose 
f e Int 2i Y n X This bundle z exists as ,,> 0, 0 E Int Y and Cl X, = 
Then for all zeCr 1 (2 1), p i (z) 1 Y*, or /l ip i (z)0 Y* , implying that 
P(z)= ZIJP(z)0 ir* 
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The set Xi := C(,) Y is compact, convex and non-empty (see fig. 
5.2.4), and contains all equilibrium allocations. 
Fig. 5.2.4. 
Next, choose zeX such that C(2)r Y= 4). Thus a feasible allocation 
must belong to Ci' (i j). Since z Int Ci (2i) implies that pi (z)eC ,(2,), it 
follows that z is feasible only if pi (z)e Int * C 
Since p i (z)0,17 1 Y* implies that p (z) = E1,p 1 (z)4Y* and therefore that 
z is not an equilibrium allocation, it follows that z is optimal only if 
pi (z)e Y*• The set Pi := *Ci (2,) (-) Y* is compact and convex, as 
*C, (11) and A -1 Y* are closed and convex, and 2 and Y* are bounded 
(see property 5.2.2); the set P i is non-empty, as Y n C(5) = 	implies 
that Int Y* n *C; (z) 	(see property 9.4.4) and contains all equilibrium 
prices. 
The restrictions Pi : X i —>P i of the price multifunctions pi : X. —) Pi are 
non-empty, point-closed, point-convex and u.h.c. (see properties 5.2.3.1 
and 8.2.2.2), and so are (see property 5.2.3): 
: X 	where 1 = nX and P = niPi ; 
tTj : 	Y*, and 
: X 	— Y*). 
Define the multifunction : (P— Y*)  -+1 by: 
2(r) := {xei I rx = min ry, for yei}. 
Then 2 has the same properties as 4, as the same reasoning can be 
applied (see 5.2.3.2). 
Finally, define the multifunction w from (P— Y*) x1 into itself, by 
w(r, x) := F(x) x i(r). The set (P— Y*) x 1 is non-empty, compact and 
convex because both (P— Y*) and 1 are also non-empty, compact and 
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convex (see properties 8.2.3 and 8.3.3). The multifunction w is non-empty, 
point-closed, point-convex and u.h.c. because i and k" are also. Therefore 
all conditions of Kakutani 's fixed point theorem (property 10.2.1) are met, 
and w has a fixed point (i.", ije w(?, i) = (k) x 
Since 5c' ei(?) implies 	Frc for all x ei and Fe ?() implies i0 
(by property 5.2.3.3), then ix0, for all zei, or ÎEX 	If 
e 	such that i0, then k- e 13nd Ci (i i)n.X, which cannot be an 
equilibrium by construction. If 7. e i (5) such that 	0, then q () i" <1 
implying that 5c" e Int Y and is thus inefficient and not an equilibrium. 
It follows that ?e i.(5) such that = 0. Therefore, there exists an e X 
such that for some p i e(5) and ge .700 : = 
Finally, it will be shown that the state vector (5c", fit,  ij) is a public 
equilibrium for E,. This is true if fi i ()Z i) p 1 (2) and 4(g) q(ij. 
Since pi oz) = M(2) n er (50 n 2' Y*, for k- ei g_ X, and pi (k")= 
M(A)ne(5), the first inclusion follows. Therefore, the choice set M(d) 
supports each GIM in p i . Since 400= M(50 n Y*, for 5e e X, g Y and 
q("2)= M(.k-)n Y*, the second inclusion follows. Thus the hyperplane 
H(i) supports Y* in ij. Since "ij = ni fi i , the conditions for a public 
equilibrium are satisfied. 
Finally, it should be noticed that the first proof of the existence of a 
Lindahl equilibrium for an economy with only public goods has been 
given by Milleron (1969). He applied a theorem of Debreu (1959) to an 
economy constructed in the dual space, under standard assumptions 
except for a priori given production prices. 
Independently, Ruys (1970) has used the same idea to prove the 
existence of a public equilibrium for a more general economy. In his 
1971 and 1972 papers, a simpler proof was substituted for the application 
of Debreu's theorem, using the properties of polarity operations. 
5.3. EQUILIBRIUM IN AN ECONOMY 
WITH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC GOODS 
The Lindahl equilibrium was defined in the previous section for the 
economy E2 with public goods only. Although it is formally correct to 
do so, this certainly does not accord with the idea that a Lindahl equilib-
rium is an extension of the concept of a competitive equilibrium in an 
economy with private goods. In this section, an economy will be defined 
with both private and public goods, and an appropriate definition of a 
Lindahl equilibrium will be given. 
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The operations used in obtaining the social production set and the 
social upper-preference set in the equilibria defined thus far, are depen-
dent on the characteristics of the commodities. If the inputs are private 
goods, then addition is the appropriate operation for aggregation, and 
convex intersection is suitable for upper-preference sets whenever public 
goods are considered. This is true if the economic goods are represented 
in the impersonal commodity space, which is allowed according to 
property 4.2.2. 
In an economy with both private and public goods, two operations are 
necessary for aggregation. This creates awkward mathematical problems 
which should be avoided, if possible. The way out of these problems is 
to define the economy in the personalized commodity space, rather than 
in the impersonal commodity space (see section 4.2). Two approaches 
are possible, dual to each other. 
Firstly, Foley (1970) applied the device of personalizing the public 
goods subspace to establish the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium. This 
enabled him to formally consider all commodities as private goods and 
apply a well known theorem of Debreu (1962). The other approach is to 
personalize the subspace of private goods and to formally treat all com-
modities as public goods, for which all consumers have a price. This idea 
was originally expressed by Arrow (1970) and has been used by Bergstrom 
(1971) to generalize the concept of a Lindahl equilibrium. 
Both approaches will be shown here, and the last approach will be used 
to prove the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium for an economy meeting 
the assumptions under 5.2 (see property 5.3.3). 
Let E3 be an economy with m private goods and n public goods. There 
are h consumers each having a characteristic consumption structure and 
income fraction, and/. producers each having a production multifunction 
defined on the subspace of public goods, such that the bundle of initial 
public goods, wN e K', determines the set of production possibilities. The 
bundle of initial private goods, wm e/e, is given separately: 
E3 := {H, {X i , 	i , Ai } ; F, {Y./}; (wm , wN)} . 
The allocation {(xmi , x,), yi} and {(pm , pk), q} of quantities and prices 
in E3 and its polar economy El' is said to be a Lindahl equilibrium for E3 if: 
(a) the choice sets M[(pm , ,); 1] support Ci (xmi , xN) in (xmi , xN), for 
each i; 
(b) the hyperplane H (q) supports Y := E yi in y; 
(c) y = (Exmi , xN) and 
q = (p, Zpki). 
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For every consumer i, therefore, (xmi , xN) is a maximal element for 
of his choice set Mi , and producers are assumed to maximize their 
profits, i.e. to work efficiently. 
Although public goods in the economy are supplied to both consumers 
and producers, only consumers are considered in determining the 
benefit price of public goods. When producers need a public good in 
order to produce a bundle of consumption goods more efficiently, they 
will decide to buy or make such a public good. Since this good will also 
be available for consumers, the 'free supply' will lower the benefit price 
for them if the commodity so supplied was at all desired. This approach 
of neglecting public goods necessary for production expresses the attempt 
of consumers to decide about the final allocation, while it does not 
preclude such extra public goods-inputs if efficiency criteria allow for 
them. 
A different approach is followed by Fabre-Sender (1969) and Milleron 
(1972), who explicitly introduce these inputs — and their prices — in their 
definition of a Lindahl equilibrium. 
It should also be noted that public goods needed by producers for an 
efficient production which have a negative benefit for consumers (such 
as pollution) can be considered as inputs in the production process. The 
opposite of these inputs (e.g. clean air) is the public good produced by 
choosing another — more expensive — production process and consumed 
by consumers, just as the opposite of labor-time is equal to the consump-
tion good 
Further, some institutional specification about the income distribution 
{Ai} in E3 should be made. If one wants to base the behavior of producers 
on `individual rationality' (see section 1.4), and introduce a system of 
private ownership in E3 then the resources and property shares of enter-
prises should be divided over consumers. Each income A i is then equal to 
the value of resources and shares possessed by consumer i, and depends 
on the prices to be determined. This dependence is not essential for the 
analysis. 
The character of public goods implies that the upper-preference sets of 
consumers cannot simply be added, as is the case when all commodities 
are private goods. However, by personalizing the commodity space, it is 
possible to define an `extended economy' in which the operation of 
addition can be applied to all relevant sets, even if the commodities are 
public goods. By means of this device, a public equilibrium can be for-
mally represented by a competitive equilibrium in the extended economy. 
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This is shown for the economy E2 for public goods only, defined in the 
previous section. 
Consider the following economy: 
:= {H, (Ai", 	sr, A•); YN }, where 
{(0, 	, xi , . , 0) e Rh" j x i e Xi} and 
YN : = {(x1 , 	xi , 	xh)e Rh" 1 We H: 	x and x e E yi (w)} . 
The economy n is said to be a public goods extension of E2. From the 
definition of a public good given in section 4.2, it follows that in an 
economy with public goods only, defined in a personalized commodity 
space, the individual consumption sets have at most the origin in com-
mon. This is also true for the sets X7 in EP21 . The relation between zi"` in 
X7 and <7* in n is given in section 4.2 and in fig. 4.2.3. 
The following property of a public equilibrium in £2 can be established: 
Property 5.3.1. 
Let (x, {p i}, p) be a state in E2 and ({x7}, xN, pN) be a state in n such that: 
Proj i = Proj i xN = x and Proj i, = 2. ip i , for all ie H. 
Then (x, {p i}, p) is a public equilibrium in E2 if, and only if, ({x7}, 
pN) is formally a competitive equilibrium in E. 
Fig. 5.3.1. A competitive equilibrium for public goods in E. 
Proof 
1f (x, {p i}, p)is a public equilibrium in E2, then: 
(a) M (p i) supports C(x) in x; 
(b) H(p) supports Y := Iy(w) in x; 
(c) P= niPi. 
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Choose , 14' and pN in El, resp. in Er, such that the conditions above 
are met. Then: 
(c') xN = 	Y N . 
Further, since for all yN e YN it is true that ptlyN = (1 tPi, • • • , 2hPlt) • 
(y 1 , yh) = 12 ip i yi =py 1, and this equality is also true for xN, it 
follows that (b') H(pN) supports 17, in xN . 
Finally, since for all 	e ei' (xN) it is true that p'y = (2 114, • • • , AnPh) • 
(0, 	, y i , ..., 0) = 	Â,, given (a) above, and this equality is true 
for xN, it follows that 
(a') M(pN ; ij supports C/L*1 (x') in 'el, for all i. 
The conditions (a'), (b') and (c') imply that ({4}, xm , pN) is a competitive 
equilibrium. 
The converse statement follows immediately from the reduction of 
• into E2 obtained by projecting the sets in Rh" into R. Ei 
The `competition' in E has no economie significance because exchange 
of the personalized commodities x7 will (and can) never take place. Only 
its formai correspondence with the definition of a competitive equilibrium 
is relevant. 
Next, the device of personalizing private goods will be shown to permit 
use of the operation of convex intersection of all upper-preference sets, 
which operation has been used for a public goods-only economy (see 
section 5.2). Thus, a competitive equilibrium can be formally represented 
by a 'public equilibrium', as will be shown for the economy E 1 with 
private goods only. 
Consider the following economy: 
• := {H, (XM, 	, ). i); Ym}, where 
• := 	x 	x XL x ... X Xh , on which set the preference relation <i`f 
is defined by: 
(4, ..., 4, ..., 4,) <r (4, ..., 4, ..., 4) if and only if 4< L 4, for 
< on X1 ; 
Ym := {(x 1 , 	X,j E Rhm IZX = x and xe Y}. 
The economy EM is said to be a private goods extension of E l . Compare 
also section 4.2 and fig. 4.2.1 on private goods. The following property 
of a competitive equilibrium can be established. 
Property 5.3.2. 
Let ({xL}, x, p) be a state in EI and (xm, (pin, pm) be a state in Elf such 
that: 
Proj, xm = x„ Proj 1 p =p  and Proj, M = p = 
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for each ieH. Then ({xj, x, p) is a competitive equilibrium in E, if, and 
only if, (xm, {p7}, pm) is formally a public equilibrium in E. 
Fig. 5.3.2. A public equilibrium for private goods in g< 
Proof 
If (z a , x, p) is a competitive equilibrium in El , then: 
(a) M(p; 	supports C(x1) in xi ; 
(b) H(p) supports Y in x, and 
(c) x = 
Choose xm, {pr} and pm such that the above conditions and those 
outlined in the definition of Eli" are met. Since pr'i e C*(xm), andpr.pM = 
0, for i j, it follows that 
(e) 1Pif =Pm. 
For every ym e Ym it is true that 
pMyM = (p, ..., p) • (y„ 	yh) = Epyi = py•g 1, with equality for 
ym = xm . Thus: 
(b') H(pm) supports Ym in x m. 
Finally, for any given ieH it holds that ym E Cr (xm) implies 
.1 Ym = (0, • 	pi, 	0) • (yi, .•., yh)=PlYi = AÏ 1 PYi _k 1, 
with equality for ym = xm. Therefore 
(a') M(pr) supports Ctf(xm) in xm, for each 
Conditions (a'), (b') and (c') imply that (xm, {pr}, pm) is a public 
equilibrium in E. The converse statement is easily verified by projecting 
the personalized commodity space into Rm (see fig. 5.3.3). El 
In fig. 5.3.3, x, = 1/3x and x 2 = 2/3x; this corresponds with p, = 3p and 
P2 = 3/2p, or p = 1/3p, = 2/3P2. The scalars, A i , thus represent the 
income distribution and determine the allocation of x over the individual 
consumers, just as in economy E. 
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Fig. 5.3.3. A competitive equilibrium in E l 
C2 (x 2) 
   
ECi lx; 1 
     
     
       
        
It can be repeated that the equilibrium in El"- is called 'public' for 
mathematica' reasons only. The personalized commodities are not public, 
as they do not meet the conditions of public goods. It is now possible, 
however, to prove the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium for the economy 
E3 with both public and private goods in a rather simple way, because the 
same operations of aggregation can be applied to both private public 
and goods. 
Consider the private goods extension Elf of E3 , defined by: 
:= {H, (XI', 	A i); F, (Y7); wm e R" ± "}, where 
: = 	x . . . x Xmh X XNi , 
Xmi , resp. XNi being the image of X. under the projection 1+ " —> , 
resp. K" + "-->R". On Xtf the preference ordering < is defined as follows: 
(X111 5 • • • 5 Xkh 5 4i) <'ilf (Xin 5 • • • 5 4 h 9 Xili) 
if and only if (xki , .4) i (4i , 4) for 	on Xi , for every ieH. 
ir,f (wig) := {(xmi, • • xmh, xN) E R"+ "i(Ixmi, xN)E ir; (wri)} • 
Property 5.3.3. 
If the economy E3 satisfies the assumptions under 5.2, then a Lindahl 
equilibrium exists in E3 . 
Proof 
Construct the private goods extension E. This economy is formally 
equal to E2 . Since the assumptions 5.2 are equally valid in M{, as can be 
easily seen, property 5.2.4 can be applied. Thus there exists a public 
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equilibrium (xm, {p7}, pm) in E. Since pYe 	(xm) and pm =-- 	f , 
it follows that: 
xm = (xmi , • • • , XMh x)J), pit = (0, • • • ,Pmi 3 • • • 3 1:), PNi) and 
--= (Pm, • • • , Pm, PIO = 	9 • • • dl'APM h 3 APNJ • 
Further, the Lindahl price for public goods is defined by p := 
Projection of Eh3f into the impersonal commodity space Ir+ " gives 
the following results: 
M(p'1) supporting CIf  (xm) in xm implies that 
(a) M(pmi , pNi)=M[(pm , Ai); ij supports Ci (xmi , xN) in (xma , xN), 
for each ieH. 
Since H(pm) supports .Erl(wN) in 1y7 := xm, and pmxm =pm Exmi + 
PNXN = Pmxm+pNxN, it follows that 
(b) H(pm , pN) supports 1Y; (wN) in (xm , xN). 
Finally, from pm = 1201. and the definition of Yif (wN) it follows that 
(c) pN  = PNi = Epkii and xm = Exmi . 
Thus the allocation ((xmi , xN), yi} and «pm , pki), (pm , pN)}, which 
exists, satisfies the conditions of a Lindahl equilibrium in E3 . 
As a corolary of this property it follows that the economy E1 has a com-
petitive equilibrium when the assumptions 5.2 are satisfied. 'This corolary 
can also be deduced from properties 5.3.2 and 5.2.4: 
Property 5.3.4. 
1f the economy E1 satisfies the assumptions under 5.2, then there exists a 
competitive equilibrium in E 1 . 
Finally, it should be mentioned that Roberts (1972) has shown the 
existence of a Lindahl equilibrium for an economy with a continuum of 
agents. 
5.4. A TWO-LEVEL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM 
The duality approach is not at all essential for the theory underlaying a 
Lindahl equilibrium, as can be deduced from the previous section. The 
device of extending the commodity space permits the application of tools 
which are constrained to the commodity space. The only advantage of the 
duality approach in the Lindahl theory is to be found in mathematica' 
arguments. 
It has been stressed in section 5.2 that the definition of a public equi- 
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librium depends directly on instruments supplied by the duality theory. 
The agents have choice sets in the price space and are supposed to choose 
the maxima] price in those sets. Since no relation exists with a private 
commodity, and the direct influence of some agents' decision on his 
own well-being is infinitesimal, this assumption on the behavior of agents 
is not too restrictive. Examples for which this approach makes sense are 
a (city-) council or a parliament which have to decide about the composi-
tion of a bundle of public goods, under the restriction that the amount to 
be spent is given and that the decision have no influence on the level of 
private goods and their prices; i.e., when the economy can be assumed to 
contain only public goods. 
In this section an attempt will be made to develop an equilibrium 
concept in which decisions are made on two levels separately: the level of 
public goods and the level of private goods. An income distribution is 
given or determined for each level, generating individual budget sets for 
private goods and fixing individual weights for the price set of public 
goods. These distributions may be equal, but need not necessarily be. The 
composition of allocation between the two levels and within each level 
determines the production prices. These production prices can be used 
to determine whether the composition within each level is such that the 
benefit prices equal the cost prices, and between both levels such that 
production is feasible and efficient. Such a state will be called a two-level 
price equilibrium. 
Thus, the consumers have two distinct choice sets: one for public goods 
and one for private goods. These choice sets are linked through the 
social production set, which can be composed of individual production 
sets. 
Consider the economy E3 in section 5.3 and replace the income distribu-
tion {2 i} by two distributions, {A mi} and {ANi} for private goods and 
public goods respectively. Each distribution consists of positive fractions 
adding up to 1. This economy E4 is c,alled a two-level economy and is 
defined by: 
E4:= {H, {Xi , i , Ami , ANI}; F, {l'i}; (wm , wN)} . 
Let A :=[{(xmi , xN)}, {yi}, {(pm , ppm)}, q] be a state in E4 . The share 
of private goods in this allocation is defined by a := pm Exmi , and the 
value of public goods is equal to 1 — p = EpNi xN . Thus 0 p _. 1. Two 
upper-preference sets are defined by A; one in the private goods subspace 
and the other in the public goods subspace: 
Cmi (xmi , xN) := {x e Fe 1(x, xN) e Ci (xmi , xN)} 
CNi(Xmi , XN) := {X E IC 1(x m i , X) E Ci (Xmi , XN)} . 
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The state A is said to be a two-level price equilibrium in E, if: 
(a-1) the allocation at the level of private goods is a competitive equilib-
rium; 
(a-2) the allocation at the level of public goods is a public equilibrium; 
(b) the allocation of inputs in production between the two levels 
maximizes profits of the production sector; 
(c) the prices of outputs are equal to market prices for private goods 
and to social benefit prices for public goods; 
the social supply of commodities equals social demand. 
Formally, if: 
(a-1) the choice sets M(pm ; pAmi) support Cm ,(xm ,, xN) in xmi , for all 
ie H, given p = I -pNxN ; 
(a-2) the choice sets M(xN ; 1 -p) support Cl (xmi , xN) in pNi , for all 
ie H, given u = Epm xmi ; 
(b) the hyperplane H(q) supports EY; (wN) in y := 	; 
(c) q = (pm , LINipNi) and (ixmi , xN) = y+ (wm , wN). 
According to this definition, consumers choose a maximal element from 
their budget set of private goods, given a bundle of public goods. The 
budget set of the i-th consumer is determined by his weight, 2„ 1 , in the 
distribution of the value of private goods, p. Consumers also choose a 
maximal element from the price set of a public goods proposal, 
M(xN ; 1 - p), given their bundle of private goods. 
The bundle of private goods chosen is an equilibrium choice if the 
given bundle of public goods has a cost price equal to the weighted 
average of the benefit prices, D.NipNi • And the chosen price of public 
goods is an equilibrium choice if the given bundle of private goods is a 
choice from the budget set of private goods. 
The share of private goods in the economy, p, and the value of public 
goods, 1 - p, is defined by these equilibrium vectors. 
Just a description of an equilibrium is not enough for the description 
of the procedure necessary to arrive at such an sub-optimum. In a private 
goods economy, demand and supply are adjusted through fluctuations in 
the proposed market prices, and in a public goods economy, costs and 
benefits are adjusted through fluctuations in the public goods proposal. 
In the economy E4 these mechanisms remain valid, but the share of 
private goods, ji, has also to be adjusted. 
Since the consumption decisions are divided into two levels (note that 









to the same criterion, viz. efficiency or profit, adjustments of the share 
of private goods must be made through the production sector. Such a 
function will be defined below. 
A solution similar to the two-level price equilibrium has been proposed 
by Drèze (1974) for an in\ estment model under private ownership, in 
which uncertain events are (local) public goods for the owners of a firm. 
A two-level price equilibrium is more realistic than a Lindahl equilib-
rium, for the following reasons: 
(a) it permits separation of decisions according to the level of external 
effects of the commodities considered; 
(b) it permits `weight' or `income' distributions for consumers which are 
different at each level; 
(c) all choice sets do not depend directly on the individual chosing. 
It is quite evident that in most societies economic decisions are organized 
in such a way that all these three points are realized. 
The cost of this approach, however, is that a two-level price equilibrium 
need not be Pareto optimal. It belongs thus to the class of `second best 
solutions'. Pareto optimality can be obtained under special conditions, as 
mentioned in properties 5.4.3 and 5.4.4. 
An allocation of quantities is Pareto optimal if and only if all agents 
individually and aggregated are in a state of equilibrium. In that case 
there exists a hyperplane supportingly separating the suitably aggregated 
production sets and upper-preference sets. 
A two-level price equilibrium A in E4 implies a state of equilibrium for 
all individual agents and for the production sector, but not necessarily 
Fig. 5.4.1. A two-level price equilibrium A which is not Pareto optimal 
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for the consumption sector, which may benefit from a shift in the shares 
given to the levels of private and public goods (see fig. 5.4.1). 
In order to show this, the class of economies {E4} will be somewhat 
restricted to obtain an equivalent definition of a two-level price equili-
brium in terms of supportingly separating hyperplanes in the quantity 
space. 
Property 5.4.1. 
Let the economy E4 satisfy the following conditions: 
1. The upper-preference sets Ci (x) are aureole-reftexive for each iEH and 
xe X, , i.e. they are closed, convex, aureoled and do not contain 0. 
2. The production sets yi (w) are star-reftexive for each jeF and WE 
Dom( Yi), i.e. they are closed, convex and contain 0. 
3. The social production set Y(w) and the social consumption set X have 
an interior point in common and their recession cones have only the 
origin in common. 
Then the state A :=[{(xmi , xN)}, {yi}, ((pm , pNi)}, q] is a two-level price 
equilibrium for E4 if and only if the hyperplane H(q) supportingly 
separates the sets {Wmi (xmi , xN) x CNi(Xmi, XN)} and Y:= (w) 
in (Exmi , xN). 
Proof 
Conditions 1. and 2. imply that the polar economy E: is a valuation 
representation of E4, according to properties 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. 
Construct the economy Em4 := {H, {Xmi, mi, 	F, {1;}; wm} 
from E4 by intersecting the sets X, resp. yi in ir +" with the affine subset 
{(u,v)ER'" + "iv = xN}, and by calling the images of these sets under the 
projection on K", 1m1 and Ymi , respectively. 
Conditions (a), (b) and (c) of the definition of a two-level price equi-
librium are equivalent to the following condition in Em4 (see section 5.1): 
the hyperplane H(,pm ; supportingly separates Ermi (xmi , xN) and 
Ymi in Exmi . 
Similarly, the economy EN4 is constructed by fixing the private goods 
components xmi and ym; Then the conditions (a), (b) and (c) in EN4 are 
equivalent to (see property 5.1.4): the hyperplane H(x; 1 — p) support-
ingly separating the sets EANi *CNi (xmi , xN) and ni. :.(zyNi)i. in 
L1NipNi . According to property 9.4.3.2 (which can be applied, given 
condition 3. above), this is equivalent to the condition that the hyperplane 
H(ZANiPrii ; 1 —  p) supportingly separates the sets CNi(Xmi, XN) and 
YN in xN . 
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Therefore, if state A is a two-level price equilibrium in E4 , then the 
hyperplane H(q) = H(pm , Efl.NipNi) supports the set {ICmi (xmi , xN) x 
CNi (Xm„ XN)} in (ixmi , xN), from the arguments given above. 
Further, H(q) supports / yi (w) in the same point via condition (b) of the 
definition. Since Ym x YN Y, the hyperplane H(q) supportingly separates 
the sets {ECmi (xmi , xN) x CNi (xmi , xN)} and Y. 
For the converse, conditions (b) and (c) of the definition follow imme-
diately, and conditions (a) after dividing the economy into Em4 and EN4 
according to the rules described above. E3 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality of an allo-
cation in E4 can be formulated by means of a supportingly separating 
hyperplane if a correct operation of aggregation is defined. Since the 
upper-preference sets have to be added in one direction and convex-
intersection is required for the other direction, the desired operation can 
be compared with the operation of partial addition of sets, defined in 
section 8.3. 
Property 5.4.2. 
The allocation A : = Rxmi , xN)}, y] in Eg is Pareto optimal if, and only if, 
there exists an income distribution {} for public goods and there exist 
prices ij such that the hyperplane H(ij) supportingly separates the 
social upper-preference set 
C(A; 	:= {(zm , zN)e X 3(ymi , INiyN)E Ci (Xmi , XN), such that 
zm = Lymf and zN niYr r, for all 
ie H  
and the social production set Y in (ixmi , xN) =.y. 
Proof 
Suppose that A is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists a Pareto superior 
allocation A' such that for some consumer heH it is true that (ximh , x'N) e 
Int Ch (Xmh , XN), for all i EH : (fme , x')e Ci (xmi , xN), and (Ix'mi , x;<)e Y. 
It follows that Int C(A) n Y which excludes the existence of a hyper-
plane separating C(A) and Y (see property 9.1.1). 
Conversely, if H (q) does not supportingly separate C (A) and Y, then 
either H(q) strongly separates C(A) and Y, or H(q) intersects one or both 
sets. In the first case, the allocation A is not feasible. In the second case, 
there exists a Pareto superior allocation A'. El 
It follows immediately from properties 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 that a two-level 
price equilibrium A is not necessarily Pareto optimal. From the same 
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properties it can be deduced that a two-level price equilibrium is Pareto 
optimal if, for example, the preferences for public goods and private 
goods are perfectly complementary, i.e. if C(A; ,1j= {1Cmi (xmi , x,)x 
(c%,1 -1 CNi (xmi , x,)}. This assumption is not so realistic in a (small) 
neighborhood of the equilibrium allocation. 
To assess the significance of the share of private goods p, resp. public 
goods (1 - p), in the budget sets used in defining a two-level price equi-
librium, it is interesting to formulate conditions under which this equi-
librium reduces to a Lindahl equilibrium. 
Property 5.4.3. 
Let the economy E4 satisfy the three conditions given in property 5.4.1. 
If the income distributions in Eg are equal for public goods and private 
goods, i.e. 2mi = Ni2,  = 2.„ for each ie H, and if the share of private goods 
is personalized, i.e. pi e {pm xN , j pm , pNi)E (Xm , XN)}, then a two-
level price allocation satisfies the conditions of a Lindahl equilibrium and 
is thus Pareto optimal. 
Proof 
Conditions (a-1) and (a-2) can be replaced by: the choice sets M(pm ; 
supporting Cmi (xmi , xN) in xm „ and the choice sets M(xN ; 1 -p a) sup-
porting Cgi (xmi , xN) in pNi . Due to property 9.4.3.2, the last condition is 
equivalent to: the choice sets M[2. ipNi ; (1- p i)ij supporting CNi (Xmi , 
XN) in xN . 
Since p i is chosen such that ( 1 pm , pNi)e C*(xmi , x,), the hyperplane 
H(2i-1 pm , pNi)= H[(pm , A ipNi); 	supportingly separates 	(pm ; 
x (1- p i)23} and Ci (xm„ xN). Therefore, the budget set 
M[(pm , A ipNi); ij= M[(pm , pf-.; i); ij corresponding to the above hyper-
plane supports the set Ci (xmo xN) in (xmi , xN), for all ie H. 
Conditions (b) and (c) of a Lindahl equilibrium are identical with those 
of a two-level price equilibrium. EI 
From property 5.4.3 it can be deduced that if the share of private goods jz 
can be chosen such that there exist personal shares p i satisfying the condi-
tion: 
m = ( .11 	
N
= 	for all i e H , 
Pi 	1- pi  
then the two-level price equilibrium is Pareto optimal: 
Property 5.4.4. 
Let the economy E4 satisfy the three conditions given in property 5.4.1. 
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If the social share of private goods jz can be chosen such that theie exist 
individual shares p i in the equilibrium allocation satisfying the equality: 
= 	 ) for all i e H , 
1—t 2.Ni 
then the two-level price equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 
One method of obtaining Pareto optimality is, therefore, to give a higher 
weight in the private goods income distribution (or lower weight in the 
public goods weight distribution) to a consumer who has a relatively high 
individuel share of — and preference for — private goods (or low share of 
public goods). 
Further, for every bundle xN of public goods in the economy Eg an 
equilibrium allocation in the subspace of private goods can be determined 
through the market mechanism. This is expressed by the multifunction 
a: YN, nl+ , where YN , := ProjN YrR, and Ym , := Projm Y n 
13fi : Ha%) supportingly separates (xN) and a (xN):= {{ 	m x  mi} 	„, 
(Xmi XN) in Exmi • 
Similarly, given an allocation of private goods (xmi), an equilibrium 
bundle of public goods in the corresponding subspace can be determined 
through the referendum mechanism. This is expressed by the multifunction 
b: 	YN , , defined by: 
The existence of a two level equilibrium in E4 can now be shown under 
rather restrictive conditions. 
Property 5.4.5. 
Let the economy Eas satisfy the assumptions 5.2. Assume also that the 
multifunctions a(xN) and b({xm,}) are graph-closed and point-convex. 
Then there exists a two level price equilibrium. 
Proof 
Consider the multifunction c from n+ X YN into itself, defined by 
c({xmi}, xN) := a(xN) x b ({xmi}). The assumptions 5.2 imply that both 
multifunctions are non-empty on their respective domains and that these 
domains are compact, convex and non-empty. Since a and b are graph-
closed, they are point-closed and u.h.c. (see property 8.2.2). The condi- 
b ({xmi}):= {xN H(xN) supportingly separates *f 
and Ea.,,„ *CN,(x m ,, xN) in pN • 
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tions for the existence of a fixed point are thus fulfilled (see property 
10.2.1), and there exist an allocation x ({xmi}, xN) such that {xmi} e 
a(xN) and xN eb({xmi}). The prices corresponding to this allocation are 
{Ni} and pm . Choose p e(0, 1) and call pm := ppm , and pNi := (1— p) fiNi . 
The state A :=[{(xmi , x)}, y, {(pm , pNi)}, q] is a two level equilibrium 
if H(q) supports Y. 
Suppose that H(q)n Int Y (1). Then qy>1 and qst Y* (see fig. 5.4.2). 
Since Oe Int Y, the set Y* is compact. Further, since q m = pm supports 
Ym =f(x,) and qN = pN support YN =J.-1 (Xm), and there exist a positive 
vector in Y* there also exist non-negative scalars a and fl such that 
(aqm , 13q,.) := 4 maximizes 4x on Y. 
Fig. 5.4.2. Infiating public goods prices and defiating private goods prices 
from p to p 
Call := apm xm = ap and pN , := PpNi, for each ie H. It is evident that 
Zjx = aqm xm +fiqN xN =oem+P(1—p)= it+(1-11)= 1. Now: 
(a-1) M(pm ; 	supports Cmi (xmi , x,„) in xmi ; 
(a-2) M(xN ; 1— ri) supports C ; (xmi , xN) in 13Ni; 
(b) H(4) supports Y in 	xN), and 
(c) =-- (M , 12N1PNi)• 
Therefore, the allocation [{(xmi , x,)}, y, {(pm , 15,,, i)}, 4], which exists, 
is a two-level price equilibrium. Cl 
The proof indicates simultaneously the weakness and the strength of the 
concept, since equilibrium can be obtained by proportionally inflating 
prices at one level and proportionally deflating prices at the other level, 
once the equilibria on each level have been determined. Whether this 
equilibrium is also Pareto optimal depends on the social upper-preference 
set. 
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A two-level price equilibrium belongs to the class of second best solu-
tions. In a problem of second best, allocations are considered optimal 
which are not necessarily Pareto optimal. A rather confusing debate 
about the theory of second best was begun by Lipsey and Lancaster 
(1956) on one hand, and Davis and Whinston (1965) on the other. It has 
been observed by Guesnerie (1973) that the relevance of second best 
solutions for welfare economics is increasing, because in those cases not 
only the physical or technological constraints are taken into account, but 
also non-physical constraints such as the conditions imposed by allocation 
mechanisms or procedures. However, a general formulation of the second 
best problem does not seem feasible, according to Bohm (1967, p. 314), 
to the extent that one wishes to obtain general results, in particular, 
general guidelines for optimum economic policy. Each model should 
therefore be considered with this in mind. 
An allocation mechanism for arriving at a two-level price equilibrium 
is given by the referendum mechanism, defined in section 6.5. 
5.5. FINANCING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Public goods in an economy are supplied through a collective decision, 
but the cost of these public goods must also be shared by the agents in 
an economy. What is meant by a `collective decision' in a decentralized 
economy has been discussed in the preceding sections. In this section a 
description will be given of four models each of which solves the financing 
problem in a characteristic way. The first solution is complete correspon-
dence between individual benefit and individual cost, given the wealth 
distribution, i.e. the Lindahl approach. The second, a model of Foley's 
(1967) is one in which taxes are individually determined, but no use is 
made of the individual prices of public goods. In the other models, the 
direct link between individual benefits and costs at the public level is 
completely cut: one by Fourgeaud (1969), based on a system of national 
accounts of private goods with production and redistribution operations, 
and the model given in section 5.4 in which two kinds of prices are used 
so that the individual price of public goods only indicates the individual's 
benefit. 
As long as only private goods exist in the economy, it is easy to finance 
the allocation in the economy. The market mechanism guarantees that 
somebody deciding to supply himself with a specific quantity, must at 
the same time pay his share in the cost of production, which share depends 
only on the quantity demanded. The concept of a competitive equilibrium 
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demonstrates that social production costs exactly equal the sum of shares 
paid by the consumers. 
The Lindahl solution is formally an extension of a competitive equi-
librium. However, the share paid by a consumer also depends on the price 
at which the consumer valuates the public good supplied, which valuation 
is determined by the benefit the consumer receives from the public good. 
If a consumer is behaving rationally, in the sense of minimizing his cost, 
it is not at all sure that he will reveal the true price. Since consumers tax 
themselves in revealing the individual prices of public goods, it is quite 
probable that the prices revealed will be too low and that the public 
goods will not be adequately financed (if produced at all). 
Foley (1967) has suggested that the government in an economy makes a 
public goods proposal via a system of individual taxes {-c 1}. For an equi-
librium state he requires that the public sector proposal cannot be 
turned down by any other through the political mechanism. Using the 
unanimity rule for the political mechanism, he defines a public competitive 
equilibrium as consisting of a feasible allocation ({xmi}, xN), a price vector 
p and a tax system {zi} with pN xN = Er, such that: 
(a) M(pm ; 2— r) supports Cmi (xmi , xN) in xmi . 
(b) H(p) supports Yin (Zxmi , xN). 
(c) There is no public sector proposal 	{ii}) at prices p, so that for 
every i there exists 541i with (5-cmi , xN) and pm 5-cmi 
pm xmi 
However, since {T i} may represent any tax system, it is formally equal to 
the distribution {' Ni} mentioned in property 5.4.2. Therefore, the set of 
public competitive equilibria is equal to the set of Pareto optima when 
only the public level is considered. This has been noticed already by 
Milleron (1972, section 11.4), who concludes that it is an interesting 
concept for characterizing Pareto optimal solutions without introducing 
personalized prices. It is left to political mechanisms, however, to deter-
mine a proposal for public goods and individual taxes that will be sus-
tained by the collective rationality. 
Under assumptions which are slightly stronger than the assumptions 
under 5.1, Foley has shown that there exists a public competitive equi-
librium if taxes are proportional to individual wealth and if the taxation 
rate is uniform, i.e. if T i = (1— "02 i with (1— =pN xN . (The same sym-
bols are used as in section 5.4, which means that the value of the bundle 
of resources possessed by the i-th consumer, pm xmi , has been substituted 
for 2. i .) 
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With each public sector proposal (xN , {z ip a system of personalized 
prices {pk i} can be associated such that pN = Epki and z i =14.1i xN , for 
each i. It also follows from the assumption just mentioned that Ai —zi = 
pA i , for each i. Therefore, with each public competitive equilibrium 
under a uniform proportional income tax rule, an allocation ({xmi}, xN) 
and a price system (PM,  {gi }) can be associated such that 
(a') M[(pm , ni); A i] supports Ci (xmi , xN) in (xmi , xN). 
(b') H(p) supports Y in (Exmi , xN). 
(e) P = (Pm, 114i)- 
This allocation is a Lindahl equilibrium. 
Complete separation of individual benefit from a bundle of public goods 
supplied and the individual cost of that bundle (given some distribution 
of wealth), is accepted by Fourgeaud (1969). Since his model comes close 
to the descriptive models usually given in textbooks about public finance, 
it is also a useful model for comparing various approaches and definitions. 
Fourgeaud's economy consists of the usual consumption structure 
(Xi, Ai), a production multifunction Ymi : —■ R".„' for each pro-
ducer and a production multifunction ZN : R".4.1 —> Rni. for the state. A 
complete preordering is defined on the range of ZN. Prices exist only 
for private goods: the value of commodities supplied by the govemment 
is equal to the value of the input of private goods. This point of view is 
also accepted in the national accounts. 
Further, the following system of redistribution and taxation rates is 
given in the economy: indirect taxes on the value added of private com-
modities, a (which may vary over commodities); direct taxes on net 
profits of firms, 00 , and on income, distribution of net profits of 
firms over consumers, Osi ; and social transfers, s i . 
The assumptions are summarized by Fourgeaud in table 5.5.1. 
Next, let A i be the i-th consumers net income to be spent on private 
goods and A, the government's income to be spent for its own consump-
tion. Then: 
= ri — 'Ji ri — ctpm wmi and 
= 	s, . 
n is evident that EA i + ite = PM ( YM wm). 
Fourgeaud's conditions for equilibrium can be formulated as follows: 
(a) M(pm ; A i) supports Cmi (xmi , zN) in xmi , for each i. 
(b) For all im eM(pm ; Afd it is true that Int [ZN (fm) n CN,(zN)] = 49 and 
	
for zm E MAF,/ ; 	it is truc that zN EZN (zm). 
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Table 5.5.1. Fourgeaud's system of national accounts 
expenditures income 
firms consumers 	state firms 	consumers 	 state 
1. production 
consumption 
E Pm Ymi 
J 







1 00 ( 1 — CC)PmYMJ 
J 
ctPm(Ym+ Wm) 
ri 00 (1 — CL)pm ym j 
J 
E fiiri 
E Ou(1 — c)Pmym, 
I, 
E s, 
profits of firms 
social transfers 




Pm Ym  PmYm 	 E ri 	 ra 
(c) H[(1—a)pm ; (1—a) (I2 i +1,)] supports {E Ymi (zN)+wm} in ym + wm . 
(d) ym +wm = zm +Exmi . 
These conditions imply that consumers as well as government choose a 
maximal element, given their respective budget sets of private goods. 
Each firm maximizes profit according to the post-tax-prices. If the indi-
rect taxes (a) vary over the commodities then Pareto optimality is not 
necessarily realized, even in the subspace of private goods. It is evident 
that this equilibrium need not be Pareto optimal if the public goods are 
also considered. 
Since Fourgeaud's description of the economy is based upon the system 
of national accounts, an appropriate context is provided for comparing 
some definitions and concepts. 
Firstly, it is not necessarily true that the government (the public sector) 
produces only public goods in the sense used in this book. This problem 
can be solved by considering zm as representing the net consumption by 
the government. 
Secondly, what is meant by public expenditures ? If these are equal to 
the taxes received (= r9), then social transfers are also included, which 
transfers are spent, however, on private goods. The amount spent on 
public goods is equal to 1.9 , although in this case the fact of redistribution 
itself is considered a costless public good. 
The same kind of problem arises in determining consumers' income. 
If this is said to be equal to the amount received (= ri), then the taxes paid 
by firms are not considered to be paid on behalf of owners or consumers. 
If it is put equal to the amount the individual consumer can spend on 
private goods (= Ai), then the consumer is completely disengaged from 
the finance of public goods. 
The crucial question is: who has to finance the public goods level (c.q. 
sector)? 
According to Fourgeaud's model, the public sector (r9) is partly 
financed by firms, 	+00 (1 — a)]pmymp and partly by consumers, 
Since social transfers are also financed by the same 
sources, nothing more can be said about who finances the public goods 
level (A9). The (real life) solution is found between the extremes: either 
by shifting all value added to consumers and thereafter taxing or redistri-
buting the incomes, or by shifting all value added to the government which 
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determines individual budgets {2,} and the public goods value {1,}, 
according to some agreed rules. 
Since the model given in section 5.4 — the economy E 4 with a two-level 
price equilibrium — also allows for decentralized consumer decisions and 
prices on the public level, an atternpt will be made to analyze the above 
question for the economy E4 . 
Firstly, it has been noticed that enterprises have to pay duties for public 
goods which improve their production and efficiency. These effects have 
been implicitely taken into account above, but can also be explicitly 
treated as has been done by Kaizuka (1965) and Fabre-Sender (1969). 
Further, it remains necessary for the production side of the economy 
that all (marginal or competitive) prices be known, in order to attain an 
efficient allocation in which no productive forces are wasted. 
It is, however, not necessary that the income distribution be determined 
according to the price or productivity of the production factors owned 
by consumers. A complete separation of income distribution and produc-
tivity is, at least theoretically, possible, as well as a complete separation 
between the determination of a bundle of public goods and the financing 
of that bundle. 
Two important constraints are present which limit the degree of separa-
tion: the problem of equity and the problem of incentives. 
Both problems depend on human values, views and motives and are 
historically and culturally determined. If people are motivated to work 
only by an increase in their own share of commodities (and if some other 
conditions are satisfied!), then the Walrasian exchange economy can be 
considered as solving the incentive problem. 
The equity problem can be solved only if some group of people (for 
whatever reason, e.g. insurance) is willing to accept a change in the in-
come distribution without producing less. However, if some group 
thinks that the burden is too heavy, or is going to 'take it easy' for any 
other reason, then the economy starts to get in trouble. 
Therefore, the income policy of a govemment should take both prob-
lems into consideration. And it seems that more detailed studies about 
what is considered fair and rewarding for various groups of consumers 
and producers can hardly be missed. 
The considerations above are more easily realized in a distribution 
economy than in an exchange economy. The actual situation, however, 
is a mixture of both although it is so that the distribution economy gives 
a better description of an economy in which acquired rights are declared 
inviolable. 
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Finally, it should be noted that important contributions to the theory 
of taxation have recently been made by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), 
Mirrlees (1971, 1972) and Baumol (1972), among others. This theory is 
closely connected with the theory of second best, as has been pointed out 
by Hahn (1972). 
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6. The organization of economic 
decisions 
6.1. ALLOCATION MECHANISMS 
One of those concepts which intuitively have an obvious meaning, but 
are hard to define rigorously, is that of decentralization. Decentralization 
is a property of an organization set up to achieve a specific goal. In an 
economy this is done to arrive at an allocation of commodities over 
producers and consumers. 
In real life, this problem is solved, and the organization which is used 
to realize an allocation is called an economie system. Economists have 
developed models of economic systems, e.g., the competitive market 
economy. These models can often be identified by the rules through 
which an allocation is attained and are therefore called mechanisms or 
processes for resource allocation, in short, allocation mechanisms. A well 
known example of such an allocation mechanism is the competitive 
market mechanism guided by the tátonnement process, as developed by 
Walras (1877). 
Political economists, however, did not only try to describe the economic 
system, they also tried to adapt or even to change it. This attitude is 
conspicuous in the works of the socialist writers of the nineteenth century. 
The Marxian revolution in economic theory was not so much directed 
towards improving the existing economic system and mechanisms, but to 
replacing it by another system based on collective ownership of the means 
of production. This revolution was based on analysis of the productive 
forces in society, which forces belong to what is called here the environ-
ment of the allocation mechanism. 
The socialist viewpoint that an economic system can work better 
without private enterprise or competitive market prices and with central 
planning, evoked the famous 'socialist controversy' in the 1930's. This 
debate focussed the attention of economists on the properties of alloca-
tion mechanisms and on the requirements they made on the economic 
environment. 
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It was Pierson (1902) who first denied that socialism could abolish the 
value of exchange of productive services, even if it did away with the 
prices of these services. He wondered how socialism would organize 
distribution without determining the exchange-values of different goods 
in terms of prices. It was the statement of von Mises (1920), however, 
that socialism made rational calculation and allocation impossible, which 
really started the debate. 
The answer of Lange (1936), specified by Lerner (1944), was that in a 
socialist system the formal principles of the tátonnement process, based 
on marginal prices, could be applied just as well as in a competitive 
socialist economy. But the resulting allocation might be quite different. 
This solution for the socialist system had already been given by Barone 
(1908). He introduced a Ministry of Production which was supposed to 
take over the role of the market in a capitalist system, by adjusting 
imputed prices of productive services. He thus showed that `prices' are 
not conceptually bound to the institution of a market. 
Solutions for the calculation problem in a socialist system were not 
proposed until Taylor (1929) suggested an approximation process. He 
distinguished commodities in terms of primary factors and final prod-
ucts. For any given vector of factor-prices, product-prices are set so 
that they equal the cost of production. If the resulting demand does not 
equal supply, then factor-prices should be corrected according to the 
observed excess-demand. This procedure, however, is valid only under 
strong assumptions on the economy. 
Other dimensions of the problem were indicated by Hayek (1935, 
1945). His doubts about the socialist system were concerned not so much 
with the formai problems as with the practical problems. In his opinion, 
the main task of an economic organization was adaptation to an autono-
mously changing environment. It was simply impossible that 'the knowl-
edge of particular circumstances of time and place' of individual con-
sumers and producers could be communicated to a centra! agent. 
He also wondered who should valuate and accept the risk involved in 
decision-making. Further, he mentioned the role of incentives in an 
economic organization (1935, p. 234). Since an economie optimum 
implies 'the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, 
for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know', the 
problem of the construction of an economic organization is primarily 
the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality' (Hayek, 
1945, p. 520). He therefore strongly favoured a decentralized allocation 
mechanism. 
Although all aspects important in the design of allocation mechanisms 
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were mentioned in the socialist controversy, further analysis began only 
recently. One approach in this analysis is based on the statistical theory 
of decision-making and is formulated in terms of the `theory of teams': 
J. Marshak (1955), J. Marschak and Radner (1972). The other approach 
is based upon the analysis of iterative procedures in programming and 
game theory and on the adjustment processes of a market mechanism. 
Its main virtue so far is the development of concepts for analyzing allo-
cation mechanisms, as has been notably done by: Hurwicz (1959, 1972), 
T. A. Marschak (1959, 1968), Malinvaud (1967) and Camacho (1972). 
This last approach, which will be followed here, tries to develop 
performance characteristics of proposed allocation mechanisms. It is 
evident (nowadays) that a given allocation mechanism works satisfac-
torily only in a specific class of economics. Such a class is defined by facts 
(assumptions) over which no agent in the economy has control and is 
called the environment of an allocation mechanism, e.g. technology, 
preferences. 
Therefore, it should first be analyzed whether a certain allocation 
mechanism is suitable for the given environment, and second, which of 
the feasible allocation mechanisms has the best performance charac-
teristics for that environment. When the problem is so defined, it is clear 
that an allocation mechanism can be considered as a (scarce) public good. 
Feasibility can be determined objectively, optimality is a matter of 
taste. In order to make a choice possible, it is necessary to define concepts 
which permit comparison of the performance characteristics. Some 
results are given in the following section. 
6.2. CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION 
Decentralization is apparently a relative concept. It depends not only on 
the framework in which it is used, but also on explicitly naming the terms 
for which it is used, viz. with respect to decisions or to information. 
The first attempt to formalize the concept of decentralization with 
regard to information was made by Hurwicz (1959). The model has been 
later improved (Hurwicz, 1972) and can be described as follows (with 
minor changes). 
An allocation mechanism (or economic process, or planning procedure) 
consists of two phases. In the first phase, the economie agents exchange 
messages (proposals, indices, prices, bids, plans). In the second phase, 
these messages are translated into actions and into an allocation. 
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For the first phase the language M in which communication between 
agents takes place must be specified, and a set of response rules F relating 
information received to information sent. The second phase consists of a 
set of outcome functions G, determining the allocation on the basis of 
the information assembled. 
Let the set of agents be H := (1,2, ... , h} in which agent 1 is, for 
example, a government. Each agent has knowledge about its own environ-
ment e i ; a complete specification of the environment is given by 
e :=(e 1 ,..., eh). Messages are emitted by each agent i in a sequence of 
stages t, denoted by me M. In each stage the message produced is written 
mt := (mr, , 	mi,). The iteration starts with m °, to be followed by 
m2, 	and ends with mT. 
For each agent i and stage t, a response rule :ExMt —>Mis defined 
and written as 
:= fit (e; mo m i , 	 t = 1,2, ... T, 
:= Me)• 
Similarly an outcome function gi : M —› A is defined, where A is the set of 
feasible allocations, 
a := g (mr) and 
ai := g i (mT) = Proj i g (mr) 
The response rules can make use of accumulated information. According 
to the theory of communication (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), all infor-
mation about the given environment can then in principle be transmitted, 
if only T is large enough. Most models, however, have response rules of 
the first-order type, i.e. triti =f (  e; mt-i). 
Another simplification is obtained if the response rules are constant 
over time, orfixed, i.e. fi =fil , for t 1. The Walrasian allocation mecha-
nism for example, does possess the simplifying properties just mentioned. 
Comparison with the conceptual framework used by Malinvaud (1967) 
gives the following results. In his allocation mechanism (called planning 
procedure) the language consists of two symbols: m l eMi , the set of 
indicators emitted by the central agent, and mie M2 , the set of proposals 
sent by the individual agents j. The response rules are fixed and cyclical, 
as the procedure is a dialogue between center and individuals, i.e.: 
=f, for t even (called adjustment rule) 
j3 =fl for t odd (called response rule). 
The start of the procedure is given byƒ or by J .  The end of the proce- 
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dure is determined byfT,  by which the plan or allocation can be deter-
mined. 
An allocation mechanism or decision procedure is thus specified by the set 
{H, Mi , fi , gi } indicating for each agent ie H, the language Mi , the 
response rules.fi and the outcome rule g. 
Hurwicz (1959) calls a (first-order) allocation mechanism informa-
tionally decentralized if it has the following characteristics: 
(a) privacy: no unit has direct information about the internal structure of 
the other units, i.e.,if e and é are such that ei = ë 1 , then fi (e; m)= 
fi (é; m). 
(b) self-relevance: each unit specifies only the possible effects on itself, 
i.e. if (e; mf), resp. (e, Wi') result in mr, resp. rit', with gi(mT) gi(jFiT), 
then fi +1 (e; mt) =fr (e; 
(c) anonymity: each unit is concemed only with the aggregate effects of 
other units on itself, i.e. if In' and 1W are such that the messages of 
any two agents other than i are permuted, then " (e; mr) = 
fr 1. (e; wit). 
In his 1972—paper, however, Hurwicz calls an adjustment or allocation 
pi ocess informationally centralized if, at some stage of the process, at 
least one of the participants comes into possession (inferred or granted) 
of all relevant information concerning everyone's environment and 
everyone's prospective actions. This definition is also given by Pikkemaat 
(1969). A process is informationally non-centralizedif such a concentration 
of information in one agent's hands cannot occur. 
Using Hurwicz' model, the following definitions are given here to for-
malize the concept of decentralization in relation to information and 
decisions. 
Assume that the message Frir contains at least enough information for 
every agent i so that his response function gives the same value as if the 
agent were in possession of the environment of all agents. This does not 
imply that the agents know e through tri', nor that the agents need to 
know e to make a correct decision. It only indicates that enough relevant 
information is transmitted. 
An allocation mechanism is called informationally feasible if it generates 
a final message MI. with the property that for each ieH, fr (ei ; iiiT)= 
fr (e). It follows that an informationally centralized procedure as feasible 
by definition. 
An allocation mechanism {H, M 	g j is called informationally 
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efficient with regard to language M, if it is informationally feasible and if 
the sequence of messages {nzt} is such that any other allocation mechanism 
{H, M f g.} with iïg_m, and iï m for at least one agent i, is not 
feasible. 
This definition requires that, given a language and a description of 
what information is relevant, no more information is transmitted than 
is strictly necessary. Which language is preferted and what information 
is relevant depends on other aspects, such as the complexity of the lan-
guage and the privacy or anonymity it guarantees, the communication-
costs and the time needed. In principle it is possible to define a preorder 
on the set of languages, such that an informationally optimal allocation 
mechanism can be chosen. 
Comparison between two informationally feasible allocation mecha-
nisms is possible if information can be translated from one language into 
another, and vice versa. The allocation mechanism {H, Mi , A, gi} is said 
to be informationally more decentralized than {H,111 1 , J,gi} if both 
are feasible and if the messages {nat} can be deduced from the messages 
{jij}, and the converse is not true. 
It follows immediately that an informationally inefficient (but feasible) 
allocation mechanism is informationally more centralized than an infor-
mationally efficient procedure. Presumably, if an allocation mechanism 
exists with the three characteristics given by Hurwicz (privacy, self-
relevance and anonymity), then any other comparable procedure not 
having these properties is informationally more centralized. This conjec-
ture is based on the fact that 'personal' information can always be made 
'impersonal', but not vice versa. 
An allocation mechanism is said to be informationally decentralized 
if all more decentralized mechanisms known are not feasible. 
The following concept of decentralization is related to decisions or 
authority. Let A i be the set of imaginable actions or decisions open for 
agent i in the economy. The multifunction D,: MT indicates the 
choice set D i (mT) of agent i for every in" i.e. after all information has been 
transmitted. The multifunction d i is called the delegation multifunction: 
if the choice set consists of one element, then the delegation is reduced 
to an order. 
The decision or choice of agent i is determined by the decision or 
outcome function di :E1 x A1 1. -+ A i , indicated by di (e i ; mT). It is also 
required, of course, that di (ei ;mT)eDi (m T), for all ieH and mTeMT. 
The allocation mechanism is operationally feasible if the decisions 
(d1 , correspond with a feasible allocation in the economy. 
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An allocation mechanism or decision procedure is now specified by 
P—= {H,M i , fl , Di , d,}. 
In order to define a criterion for decentralization, the structure of 
delegation is described as follows. Let tri' be the final message in a decision 
procedure P. The set of agents which have a choice set strictly contained 
in the choice set of agent j is called the set of subordinates, i.e. S(j) = 
{ieHjDi(rtzT) D i(mr, )1. The set of agents which have a choice set 
strictly containing the choice set of agent j is called the set of governors, 
i.e. S(j) := {ieHlDi (mr) Di (mi's ij The agents can be individuals 
or bodies consisting of more than one individual. 
An allocation mechanism P is operationally more decentralized than P 
if both are feasible and if the choice sets for all agents in P contain the 
choice sets for the same agents in P, i.e. if Di (mT) Di (mi), for all ieH. 
An allocation mechanism is said to be operationally decentralized if all 
more decentrafized procedures are not feasible. 
An allocation mechanism P is operationally centralized if there exists 
an agent, say 1, to whom all other agents are subordinated and whose 
choice set contains the choice sets of all other agents, i.e. S -1 (1) = 4) and 
Di (mT) U Di (MT). 
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Two extremes can be defined. An afiocation mechanism is totally 
centralized if it is operationally centralized and the choice sets of all agents 
i EH, not being the central agent, have only one element, i.e. D i (mT) is a 
singleton for each i 1. The allocation mechanism is totally decentralized 
if it is operationally feasible and if no agent has a governor, i.e. 
S'(i) = 4), for all iell. 
Combining the two decentralization concepts, it can be said that an allo-
cation mechanism is decentralized if it is both informationally and opera-
tionally feasible and if a more decentralized procedure (for either aspect) 
is not feasible. 
The feasibility condition in the definition implies that cases can be 
found which are operationally centralized, but stil! decentralized. For 
example, if only public goods are present in the economy, then a central 
agent is required to take a decision, but this decision can be based on an 
informationally decentralized decision pi ocedure. 
Informational feasibility (inter alia, also costs, time, etc ) fimits central-
ization of an allocation mechanism and operational feasibifity puts a limit 
to decentralization, given the same environment. Therefore, if the envi-
ronment is such that no great transmission of information is required, then 
a more centralized procedure seems to be most efficient and appropriate. 
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Closely related with an informationally decentralized procedure is the 
problem of true revelation of information. If, for example, agents are 
taxed on the basis of the information about their own preferences, than 
it is hard to believe that they will reveal correct information (as has also 
been pointed out by Samuelson, 1954). 'This is the reason why the 
Lindahl equilibrium concept has in practice a very limited significance. 
A similar problem related with operationally decentralized procedures 
is the problem of implementation of an optimal allocation. Both problems 
are connected with the question whether or not it is in an agent's interest 
to behave according to the rules of a given allocation mechanism, this 
is generally called the incentive problem. An allocation mechanism is 
incentive-compatible if the assumed rationality of agents sustains the 
behavioral rules of the mechanism, viz. the rules about revelation of 
preferences and about implementation. Incentive-compatibility is an 
important feature of an allocation mechanism and is very hard to estab-
lish. Even a perfect competitive market mechanism is not incentive-
compatible (see Hurwicz, 1973, p. 24). 
The market mechanism is a well-known example of a decentralized 
decision procedure in a classical environment. Consider the economy 
E, (in section 5.1) and the decision procedure P = {H, M, J, D i , dj. 
The language M consists of bundles in R" and price-vectors in R"*. The 
response functions are demand functions : R"* —> R" for demanders and 
price-adaptation functions gi : R"--> R"* for suppliers, correcting prices 
proportionally to excess demand. The outcome functions are the demand 
functions when equilibrium prices are attained. This procedure P has 
been called a tátonnement process by Walras (1874), because the market 
scans various prices until the equilibrium prices are found. 
Property 6.2.1. 
Let the competitive market mechanism in the economy E I be defined by a 
tátonnement process and assume that this process is convergent. Then 
this process is informationally feasible and non-centralized and opera-
tionally totally-decentralized. 
Proof 
Informational feasibility follows from the fact that at the final message, 
with equilibrium prices all agents are able to choose a bundle which 
belongs to a Pareto optimal allocation, and no additional information 
can change this allocation without harming some agent. Since no central 
agent exists, the process is informationally non-centralized. The process 
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is operationally decentralized as any enlargement of a choice set (budget 
set) contradicts an equilibrium condition. Total decentralization follows 
from the absence of a central agent. EI 
The convergence assumption for a tátonnement process is by no means 
superfiuous. Several authors have tried to establish convergence for an 
acceptable class of environments. The studies of Arrow and Hurwicz 
(1960) and Uzawa (1961) have resulted in sufficient conditions for con-
vergence of a certain kind, but these conditions are rather restrictive. 
It should be noted that the market mechanism implies that all informa-
tion about other agents (their preferences, technologies and resources) 
is transmitted through prices and excess demand. It is assumed, however, 
that these data are costless and equally available to all agents. This 
assumption is acceptable only for simple and stable markets. 
In the following two sections an outline is given of some characteristic 
procedures for classical and non-classical environments (see also Ruys, 
1971b). 
6.3. PROCEDURES WITH A SOCIAL PREFERENCE ORDERING 
The allocation mechanisms which have been proposed as alternatives to 
the competitive market mechanism are almost always more centralized 
than the market mechanism. The preference of socialist authors for 
central planning was motivated mainly by their conception of consump-
tion and of the social ownership of production factors. But particularly 
non-socialist authors designed planning procedures: firstly for the classical 
(convex) environments and later for non-classical environments with 
external effects and increasing returns. 
The allocation mechanisms treated in this section are all operationally 
centralized, i.e. there exists a central agent or a central board which 
ultimately determines the allocation. For this reason allocation mecha-
nisms are also called planning procedures. 
Informationally, however, these procedures are decentralized. Until 
recently, most of the procedures developed assumed central knowledge 
of consumer preferences. In these cases, social preferences are given, or 
represented by a social objective function, and the information about the 
technologies of producers is dispersed over all non-centra! agents. 
Starting with these kinds of procedures, the following three approaches 
can be distinguished with regard to the language used by agents: 
(a) the central agent transmits data (indices) in terms of prices, and the 
other agents respond with quantitative propositions. 
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(b) the central agent gives quantitative indices to other agents and 
receives price-propositions from those agents. 
(c) both variables are sent and received. 
The first approach was suggested by economists who realized that a 
central agent can formally replace a market and simulate all operations 
that take place in markets. The most specific suggestions were given by 
Lange-Lerner (see section 6.1) and analyzed by Arrow and Hurwicz 
(1960). In their case the central agent revises prices according to the 
tátonnement process, which is mathematically represented by a gradient 
method. The principle of tátonnement has some serious drawbacks, as 
has been demonstrated by Negishi (1962) and Malinvaud (1967). Firstly, 
for convergence quite restrictive assumptions are needed, but even then, 
the utility derived at each subsequent stage is not necessarily monotone 
increasing over time. Further, there is no guarantee that when the proce-
dure is stopped at a finite stage, the excess demands are zero and the 
plan is feasible. These features are intrinsically related with the tátonne-
ment procedure. 
Therefore, other methods have been analyzed which have better 
performance characteristics. Dantzig and Wolfe (1960, 1961) have 
developed an iterative procedure of information exchange between center 
and other agents, in which decisions are based on linear programming. 
If, in a convex environment, the center applies the programming method 
rather than the tátonnement method, then the allocation obtained at each 
iteration is feasible and the procedure is monotone in the sense given 
above. This approach has been extended by Baumol and Fabian (1964) 
and by Malinvaud (1967). 
The generalization given by Malinvaud is based on accumulation of 
information. At every step the center leams more about the production 
set of each agent. Messages sent by the center are detennined by response 
rules which are no longer first-order rules (see section 6.2), and thus 
deviate from the usual planning or allocation procedures. Since the center 
is gradually building up a picture of each production set and must 
solve at each stage a mathematical programme, an enormous computer 
capacity is needed. 
The difficulties involved in defining the concept of decentralization are 
clearly shown for this procedure. Since the center is gradually informed 
about the individual environment of all agents (their production sets), 
and since the decision about the allocation or plan is made by the center, 
Malinvaud's procedure is both informationally and operationally 
centralized. On the other hand, it meets the characteristics required by 
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Hurwicz for an informationally decentralized procedure, and it is also 
called decentralized by Malinvaud. This is formally in accordance with 
the definitions given in section 6.2 if the procedure is cut off before all 
relevant information is transmitted to the center, as will be the case in 
practice and as is implicitly assumed by Malinvaud. However, Malinvaud 
has used the term 'clecentralized' to indicate initial dispersion of infor-
mation. 
The second approach — see (b) above — turns on sending quantity mes-
sages from the center to the agents, and price messages from agents to 
the center. Some authors (as Hurwicz, 1973, p. 7) contend that this 
approach appears to be more in line with many observed planning 
practices. The planning practice in a socialist economy has inspired 
Kornai and Lipták (1965, p. 143) to develop an allocation mechanism 
called `two-level planning', in which the center assigns allocations and the 
agents (sectors) compute and transmit shadow prices. 
The model of Kornai and Lipták can be summarized as follows. Let the 
economy consist of f sectors, each having a polyhedral production set 
depending on the allocations yi assigned by the center: 
Xi (yi):= {xi e R" IA, x i 5_ yi} . 
Total allocations of resources and directives to the sectors are equal to 
o := .ry i ERm . The objective function consists of maximizing the value 
of activities x=[x,,..., xf]eRf" at prices p = [p i , ..., pileRf", which 
prices are foreign exchange returns of the corresponding activities. 
Let A :=[A,,..., Af] be the activity matrix of the economy, and 
y = [y„ yr] the allocation of y over the sectors. 
The objective of a sector is to maximizep i xi over Xi (y i) and the objec-
tive of the center is to allocate -330 such that the sum of sector profits is 
maximized. If the optimal allocation j  is found, then 
E max pi xi , over zi e Xi (5 i), = max px, over xe X, where X= 
xj.)1Ax 90}. This implies that the center can solve the activity 
problem of the whole economy through an optimal allocation of resour-
ces and directives, .P. 
The optimal allocation of resources and directives is derived via the 
following planning procedure. 
The dual problem for each sector is: min qiyi , over q i eQi , where 
Q i := {q i eR"ki A l. >pi}. Let Q :=[Q,, 	Qf] 12ƒ" and 0 + Q be 
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the recession cone of Q. Then the set of resource allocations from which 
the center must choose is defined by Y := {(y i , 	I ye(0+ Q) and 
= Yo} • 
Now, at each stage t, the center sends message f' and the sectors the 
message 4' , calculated as follows. The center determines such that f?' 
maximizes ly over yE Y and yt such that y' = [(t — 1)/rift -1 +(1/t)r. 
The sectors determine "41 such that e minimizes qjit over qe Q and qt 
such that 4' = — 1)/t]' 1 +(1/t)tt. 
This strategy defines a fictitious play method for a polyhedral game 
(Y, Q) with solution 
-455 = max min qy = max px = 
yeY qeQ 	xeX 
Kornai and Lipták have shown that the procedure is convergent 
(although not finitely) to the optimal allocation of resources and direc-
tives, Y". The prices -4 are such that ij, = ij0 for each sector i, and 40 
minimizes qoyo over {q0 qo A p}. 
They also contend that the computational requirements are much 
easier to meet than those involved in computing the central programmes 
in the procedure outlined by Dantzig and Wolfe. The speed of conver-
gence, however, is rather slow. Truc revelation is guaranteed if the sectors 
have to pay the prices which they report to the center. The procedure is 
informationally and operationally non-centralized, since the center does 
not need to know the Ai to decide about xi . However, the center is sup-
posed to known Y and thus 0+ Q i, the sets of resources indispensable 
for each sector. 
Another example in the second approach is proposed by Weitzman (1970), 
who has desigmed an allocation procedure dual to the one given by 
Malinvaud (1967), mentioned above. The center builds up a picture of 
the production sets through accumulation of information received from 
shadow prices. The procedure has the same properties as Malinvaud's 
procedure, except that feasibility is only attained in the limit. 
In the class of economies in which only information about production 
is dispersed, the third category of allocation procedures - see (c) above - 
contains messages with both price and quantity information. 
The extra information can be used in a classical, convex environment 
to improve performance characteristics. E.g., Younes (1972) lets the 
center indicate prices and an output neighborhood, in which costs are 
minimized. Presumably, the procedure is then faster and easier to com-
pute for the agents. 
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But some mixed procedures are also appropriate for non-classical 
environments. Heal (1969, 1971) considers an economy with increasing 
returns. The center assigns input-quantities to each firm and determines 
output-prices. The firms report output-quantities and marginal produc-
tivities of inputs. The center adjusts inputs according to the `excess 
productivity' of firms and equals the output-prices to the marginal social 
valuations. The firms respond by raising (not maximizing) output-value 
via substitution of outputs. 
Because the response rules are continuous in time, the procedure is 
monotone convergent, although the center adapts a gradient method. 
In addition, all functions have finite partial derivatives and are differen-
tiable. 
Aoki (1970) has proposed a procedure for an economy with public goods. 
The center assigns the quantities of public goods to be supplied and the 
prices of private goods. The firms transmit marginal productivities of 
public goods and net demands for private goods. The response rules are 
based on a gradient method for the center and programming methods for 
the firms. Under rather strong assumptions, the procedure is monotone 
convergent, exactly as the Arrow-Hurwicz process mentioned above. 
Procedures handling an economy with public goods and individual 
preference orderings are treated in the next section. 
6.4. PROCEDURES WITH INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE ORDERINGS 
The problem with a social preference ordering is its construction. Unless 
one delegates this to a single central planner, one is always confronted 
with Arrow's famous 'impossibility theorem'. Arrow (1951) has shown 
that no rule or procedure exists for deriving a social preference ordering 
from a given set of individual preference orderings, given some weak 
conditions. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to design and analyse alloca-
tion mechanisms which directly relate individual preferences and the 
(final) allocation in the economy. 
Just as in the previous section, three kinds of procedures will be distin-
guished: one in which the center uses prices to inform the other agents, 
one in which quantities are sent by the center, and one in which the 
center's indicators are both prices and quantities. All models given here 
include public goods. 
A procedure suggested by Lindahl (1919) for attaining an equilibrium in 
an economy with public goods belongs to the first kind of approach. 
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Lindahl's solution has been specified by Johansen (1963) and by Malin-
vaud (1971), whose model will be given here. 
Let the economy consist of 2 agents and 2 commodities: the public 
good, which quantity will be denoted by z and the private good, con-
sumed in quantities x 1 and x2 by the two agents respectively. An alloca-
tion is said to be feasible if z, x 1 and x2 are non-negative and if the sum 
of these quantities is equal to a given number w. 
Each agent i has a preference ordering 	on the commodity space R 2+ , 
which is extended to the private goods extension R3+ in fig. 6.4.1. Let each 
agent i have an income Ai and let the prices of the commodities be equal 
to 1. The price of the public good is to be paid by both agents together, 
each share being p i . 
The `demand' for public goods can then be expressed as a function of 
prices and the intersection of the two opposedly drawn demand curves 
(see fig. 5.2.1) defines the equilibrium prices fl1,  /52 and the equilibrium 
supply of the public good = 2 1 = 22 . 
Such an equilibrium can be represented in a three dimensional com-
modity space (see point C in fig. 6.4.1). In this space, the two indifference 
curves have a cylindrical shape orthogonal to each other: the continuous 
lines indicate the intersection of these curves with the set of feasible 
allocations. 
Fig. 6.4.1. Lindahl equilibrium with one private and one public good: 
C=(il , £2, 2) 
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The budget constraints for each consumer are: 
xi +p i z = 2 1 	and 	x2 +p2 z = A2, 	with 
Pi +P2 = I 	and 	xi + x2 + z = w. 
In this model, the following procedure is defined. 
Language 
The center indicates individual prices to be paid for public goods, 
and the agents propose quantities of public goods, z. 
Start 
The center determines an income distribution 2. i and initial prices p? 
(in fig. 6.4.1, p? = p?= 0.5). 
Iterative response rules 
The agents determine their optimal consumption bundle (xti, z) and 
propose z ì to the center (in fig. 6.4.1, allocation A is proposed by 1, and 
B by 2). 
When the two proposals do not coincide, the price is raised for the 
agent requesting the higher quantity and correspondingly lowered for the 
other agent, i.e. when zt, then p;.+ 1 = a(z— 4) and p' 
A— a (?, —z). 
End 
The center determines the quantity of public goods if both proposals 
coincide, i.e. 2 = = z72. (allocation C in fig. 6.4.1). 
It has been noted by Malinvaud (1971, p. 102) that this procedure is 
unfair to the agent who most needs public consumption, because the 
other agent's demand is taken as the starting point in the adjustment rule. 
As can be seen from fig. 6.4.1, the process is supposed to start at point 
B instead of point A, both being feasible with the initial income distri-
bution and prices. Here after, price corrections lead to — for example — 
point C. If the path from B to C is continuous, then the utility received 
by agent 1 will not decrease further; but it is agent 2 who benefits from 
the procedure. 
The procedure is also not satisfactory regarding the correct revelation 
of preferences, since both agents will benefit individually from under-
reporting their demand. 
A completely different approach has been suggested by Bowen (1943). 
He also defines an optimal supply of public goods by the condition that 
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the sum of the marginal rates of substitution equals the marginal cost of 
a given public good. To solve the problem of measuring marginal rates of 
substitution, he puts forward a procedure (called `voting') under the 
following assumptions: 
1. All agents actually vote and express a preference which is appropriate 
to each agent's individual interests. 
2. The cost of a public good is known and constant for each unit supplied. 
3. The cost of a public good will be divided among all agents according 
to a given distribution of taxes which may depend on income e.a., 
but not on the quantity and composition of public goods supplied. 
4. The curves of individual marginal substitution are distributed according 
to the normal distribution. 
The procedure runs as follows: 
Language 
The center indicates individual tax rates, t i , and the unit cost of each 
public good, pN . The agents report quantities of public goods, xNi . 
Start 
The consumers determine their optimal consumption bundle, given the 
budget constraint: pm xmi +tipN xNi At . The vector xNi is reported to 
the center. 
End 
Foi each public good k EN, the center determines the modal (or average) 
demand, which quantity is called a Bowen equilibrium supply. 
A Bowen equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto optimal, but its costs of 
information gathering are evidently much lower than the costs of other 
procedures proposed in this section. Bowen's approach has been empiri-
cally investigated by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). They introduce 
the following extra assumption: 
5. In each economy the median of the quantities demanded is equal to 
the quantity demanded by the citizen with the median income for that 
economy. 
Bergstrom and Goodman have analyzed expenditures on several munici-
pal public goods (general expenditures, police expenditures, and parks 
and recreation) for 826 municipalities in the U.S.A. with populations 
between 10,000 and 150,000 in 1960. Multiple regression was used to fit 
a function of the form: 
log E = c+ a log n + 3 log ? + e log S'" + Efli Xi . 
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The symbols are defined as follows: 
E : Expenditures of a municipality on a specified category of municipal 
service. 
n : The number of households in a municipality. 
? : The tax share of the citizen with the median income. 
: Median income in a municipality. 
X.: Descriptive social and economic variables for a municipality. 
According to Bergstrom and Goodman, under assumptions 1-5, a 
municipality's expenditure can be used as an observation of the quantity 
demanded by one of its citizens whose income is 17> and whose tax share 
is 
The model of Drèze and de la Vallée Poussin (1971) belongs to the 
second kind of procedures, i.e. to those with quantities as indicators. 
The economy E = {H; (Xi, ui, ij; f(x) 0} contains one private good 
and n public goods: x = (xm , xN)eR 1+" . The utility functions, resp. pro-
duction functions, are strictly concave — resp. convex — and continuously 
differentiable at least three times, and have non-negative partial deriva-
tives U k , resp..ƒ;, for ie H and k =0,1, ..., n. 
Define the (individual) prices as follows: 
qo := 1, the price of the private good. 
qk (x) : =1,Y.f '0 , for k =1, ..., n. 	q N (X) = k 1 (X), • • • q n (x)]. 
pki(x):= u'iklu;0, for k =1, •.., n. pi,,,i(x)= [pii(x), 	pn i(x)]. 
Further, it is also assumed that Xi= I 	and p,(0, xN) = 0, 	for all i, 
k and xN e R'', . The procedure can now be defined as follows: 
Language 
The center determines the allocation (x 0 , , xN , x0), consisting of a distri-
bution of the private good over the consumers, the supply of public goods 
and the total supply of the private good. The consumers announce 
personalized prices for public goods pNi(x), and the producer announces 
the costs of public goods N (X). 
Start 
The initial allocation (x3, x?,„ xg) at t =0 is assumed to be a feasible 
programme satisfying ,f(x°) = 0. 
Response rules 
The agents determine the marginal rates of substitution at xt and the 
corresponding prices pNi (xt) = :pǸi and q N (Xt) =: qtiv , for t 0. 
The center adjusts the allocation to conform the rules: 





If 	=EPNi (XT)= = q N (xT), then the allocation xT is (Pareto) 
optimal and is also a Lindahl equilibrium (cfr. the remarks in section 5.2). 
The adjustment process consists of a tátonnement (or gradient) process 
for commodities and a redistribution process of private goods, X oi . This 
redistribution consists of two terms: the first term compensates the 
consumer for the adjustment of public goods and the second term divides 
the surplus received from the information exchange. The procedure is thus 
always advantageous to all consumers. 
Further, since consumers are taxed according to the personal prices 
they announce, under-reporting of the pN i is likely. But consumers are 
also compensated according to this information, which might lead to over-
reporting. Drèze and de la Vallée state that these strategies define a game 
which has a strong equilibrium property, i.e. a Nash equilibrium for 
group rationality, if and only if people reveal correctly. 
Finally, convergence of the procedure has been shown. For the existence 
of a solution, reference has been made, by Drèze to a theorem by Henry 
(1972), who was inspired by this problem. 
The procedure can be extended to m private goods, where xm denotes the 
(m — 1) dimensional vector exclusive of the numéraire, by defining the 
following response rules: 
Scmi = 	— qtm; •*141 =	EPtNi- qtN . 
3.CO = 	(qt I qtN) 	f 3.C1,1) • 
5C0i = 	(I', 	VCMi, 11,) 	 1 5CNI 2) • 
This is not just a minor extension, however, since private goods are treated 
in the same way as public goods, which undoubtedly has negative effects 
upon the true revelation of preferences, as has been pointed out by 
Milleron (1972, p. 475). 
Another procedure in this category has been proposed by Ruys (1970) 
for an economy E2 = {H; Gri , ; Y} with public goods only. The 
procedure is also based on a tátonnement process, guided by the `excess 
benefit' function r (x) :=Epi (x) — q (x). 
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Language 
The center indicates quantities, x, and the other agents propose prices, 
p, and q. 
Start 
A feasible bundle of public goods, x °, is announced by the center. 
Response rules 
The agents determine the optimal prices pi (xt)=: pl and g(xt)=: g', for 
each t 0, according to the price multifunctions defmed in sections 3.7 
and 4.1. 
The center determines the excess benefit rt =Ex— q', and the bundle 
xi +1. = a(xe firt), where a is chosen such that x' 1  efficient, and I3 is 
chosen such that Ir (x".1)1 5 Ir(x)l. 
End 
The equilibrium bundle is attained if r(x1")= 0. 
The center thus determines a new bundle of public goods only if the 
distance from what is considered optimal at the new stage, is smaller than 
the distance from what was considered optimal at the previous stage. 
The determination of fi may therefore require some intermediate exchange 
of information. 
Convergence of the procedure depends on the behavior of the excess 
benefit function. Conditions have to be imposed in order to preclude that 
the only bundle fulfilling ir (xt +1)1 Ir(x')I is the bundle with r(x'')1= 
I r(x1)I0 0. 
1f the adjustment rule is continuous, i.e. k := (dxi ldt, 	dx„Idt)= 
fir(x), then continuity and lower boundedness of r(x) is required, 
together with a gross substitutability condition. A theorem of Arrow and 
Hurwicz (1960) then implies global stability in the system = fir(x). The 
gross substitutability condition in the finite increment version, with 
quantities rather than prices in the argument, can presumably be defined 
by: there exists z 1 such that px` x' and p4+ 1 = 4 imply 
rk (xt +1 ) rk (x'), for all public goods k =1, ..., n. 
Since consumers do not have to pay taxes according to the prices they 
announce, they will certainly not under-report their valuations pNi On the 
other hand, over-reporting one public good implies the under-reporting 
of one or more other public goods in the price vector pNi , since total 
value pNi xN = 2, and 2  are fixed for each consumer. Therefore, if 
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consumers have no information about the prices of other individuals, 
the best strategy may well be true revelation of preferences. It is assumed, 
of course, that the n commodities considered are public goods for all 
participants, and that proposals are defined, for example, in terms of 
'improvement of roads' and not 'improvement of that road'. 
Finally, a model by Malinvaud (1972) will be described in order to 
illustrate the third kind of decision procedure, in which both prices and 
quantities are indicators from the center. 
The economy E= {H, (Xi , u i , 2.,); F, (1;); (wm , wN)} contains m 
private goods and n public goods. The consumers ieH are characterized 
by twice differentiable utility functions ui defined on Int Xi . The produ-
cers je F are characterized by the production multifunctions Y indicating 
net output yi for each bundle of public goods xN . This technology is 
assumed to be represented by the twice differentiable functionfi , meeting 
the constraintƒ; (yi ; xN) 0. 
The following notation is adopted: x i := (xmi, xN), 
x := (xm , xN) = (Exmi , xN) 	and 	w := (wm , wN). 
Demand is equal to supply if: x = 
Individual prices are determined by marginal valuations and expressed 
in terms of the first private good, the numéraire. It is assumed that the 
partial derivatives with respect to the numéraire, u 1 andro , be positive 
for each consumer and producer. Then: 
p1 (x) := for 1 = 2, ... , m + n . 
gij (y; ; xN):= (21:dayi)/ƒ11 , for / = 2, ... , m + n . 
pki (yi ; xN):= — (Dfi/axk)/ , 	for k = m + 1, 	, m + n . 
At each stage t = 0,1, ... the price vectors are defined by 
:= (P`mi, lim):= [ 1 , P 2i(xp, • • • , P,,,+,,,i(x»] • 
q; := (gtm; , gki):= [ 1, q2i (y .;; 4), 	, qm+ J u r; , xiD] . 
Pki:= [Pm+ 1, itVi; xtpt), • • , Pm+ n, ;(31;; xtly)] • 
The procedure runs as follows: 
Language 
The center indicates uniform prices for all commodities q, a bundle of 
public goods xN , and an income distribution for private goods p i . 
The consumers indicate their optimal consumption of private goods 
xmi , and their valuations (marginal willingness to pay) for public goods 
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pmi • The producers announce their optimal net output yi , and their 
valuations (trade-off coefficients) for public goods 
Start 
The center announces an equitable bundle of prices q°, and public goods 
4. Producers determine yy and an income distribution p? is chosen such 
that =._ ai ko o_ o o X qNxid. 
Response rules 
Consumers and producers determine optimal consumption bundles Jemi 
and net outputs yti. This implies that «Ir = //mi , for all consumers, and 
that qi = qti , for all producers. Next, they determine their valuations 
ptivi and p Ǹ; for public goods. 
The center adjusts the indicators as follows (superscripts t are omitted): 
iN = b(EpNi +Eppo —qN), with b>0. 
4 = b(x—Ey; — w), except for the numéraire: 4 1 = 0. 
= [ —PNIXN+ 4MXMd+ 11EPNi+EPNj + qN)XN + 4 (x -EY - w)l• 
End 
If at stage T, ir = 4r = = 0, then the allocation (xD i , 4, yl) is a 
Pareto optimal equilibrium. 
The central adjustments are based upon a tátonnement process for prices 
and for the quantities of public goods, and on a redistribution process of 
incomes for private goods. The redistribution consists of: a compensation 
for changing indicators, and a distribution of social profit from dimi-
nuition of excess benefit (changing social benefits), resp. excess demand 
(changing social costs). The procedure is thus made equitable for all 
consumers. 
The procedure is also feasible at each stage t, and converges locally to a 
Pareto optimal equilibrium. 
6.5. MULTI-LEVEL ORGANIZATION 
The previous two sections have given an outline of several allocation 
mechanisms and procedures which can be found in the literature. 
In this section a procedure will be proposed for arriving at a two-level 
equilibrium, as defined in section 5.4. In addition, an attempt will be 
made to generalize this procedure for an economy with local public 
goods. This will make a multi-level organization of information exchange 
and decisions necessary. 
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The procedure for two levels is based on the existence in the economy 
of a market for private goods and a referendum mechanism for public 
goods. A referendum is an institution which receives information about 
individual valuations of a bundle of public goods and determines a 
bundle of public goods which equalizes aggregate or social benefit to 
social cost. 
The center in the economy consists of two independent institutions: 
the market and the referendum. The procedure is described as follows. 
Language 
The center indicates prices for private goods PM'  quantities for public 
goods x N , and the share of private goods p in the economy. 
The consumers announce their individual demands x m „ and valuations 
pNi . The producers propose net production vectors yf . 
Start 
The center indicates a feasible 4 and p° such that 0<p° <1. Then 
 = s  	(1 	 (22: p and .Z:=—p)2Ni . 
Response rules 
1. Equilibrium wit/zin levels 
At each stage 1, the market mechanism generates an equilibrium for 
private goods (.4 1), 4), such that H (Af ; p°) supportingly separates 
f(4-1 ) and Ecmi (x,m,, 4-1) in 4. 
At each stage t, the referendum mechanism generates an equilibrium 
for public goods (4, (p), p Ǹ), such that H(%; 1— po) supportingly 
separates (1— tio) *j.- (x.- is ) and Egi *c„, i (xtm-ii, 4) in p'N . 
II. Feasibility between levels 
At stage t = 1, 3, ... , the market indicates prices p , consumers deter-
mine their consumption .4 0 and producers determine the net output of 
private goods and the production possibility set of public goods. At stage 
t = 2,4, ... , the referendum indicates quantities 4, based on the valuations 
pNi and PNJ  proposed by consumers and producers, with quantities of 
private goods fixed. A sequence of prices and quantities is chosen which 
converges: . . . , 4,, , . . , 4 , pri • 
III. Income redistribution between levels 
The center indicates prices p := (plf , p) to the producers who maximize 
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profits over their complete production sets. The producers propose 
9 e Y. If 9  y := (4, 4), then p9>1 and the center determines 
q :=((xpro /3p) such that qy =1 and qf 1 for all p e Y. (See also fig. 
5.4.2.) This is done by an iterative procedure in which at each stage s, 
the center proportionally lowers all prices at which producers can make 
more profit, by lowering the share of income, p ° resp. (1 —IP), to ce p° 
resp. 133 (1-1.P), until q3 := (cc 	, 133 pl) is such that q39 = q8y = 1. Then 
the center indicates q', the producers propose 	until no production 
vector can be proposed with qry = 1 and q' ji >1, for some 9E Y. 
End 
The center indicates a bundle 4 of public goods, a price vector prf of 
private goods, and a production share := cqz° of private goods. The 
corresponding allocation [{(4", 4)}, y r, {(prf, pNi)}, qr] is a two-level 
price equilibrium. 
The total procedure consists of three partial procedures. The properties 
of the partial processes under I have been mentioned in sections 6.3 
and 6.4. Although it can be said that the process under II is similar to 
an actual (one stage) decision process in some economies, the process is 
convergent only under rather restrictive conditions. From the mathema-
tical point of view, this is certainly the weakest part of the procedure. The 
incentive and communication requirements, however, are minimal. 
Convergence of part III of the procedure is easily verified. It can be seen 
that if redistribution does not takes place, another bundle will be produced 
and equilibrium within the levels will be disturbed. Since redistribution 
via the lowering of an income share is hard to perform, it is easier to 
obtain the same result by increasing some prices more than others, 
which implies infiation. 
It is evident that the procedure is not centralized (informationafiy or 
operationally). On the contrary, since a more decentralized procedure 
is not feasible, the procedure is decentralized. 
The concept of a two-level price equilibrium and the procedure pro-
posed above can be generalized for an economy with several local public 
goods (see section 4.5). Let the economy Es be defined by: 
Es := {H, (X-1, 	F, (Y); Gij , (.1ij , 
in which Gij denotes the set of agents in referendum j collectively using 
commodity k. The set Gk is the set of referendums for k, which simul-
taneously is the set of participants in the market for commodity k. It 
follows immediately that commodity k is a private good if Gk= H and 
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Gki = {1}, and that commodity kis a public good if Gk = {1} and Gki = H. 
The weight distribution within is given by Aji , i.e. Dl» = 1 for ie Gki . 
The income distribution between referendums relative to good k is given 
by 2ij , i.e. EAki = 1 for je Gk . 
Assume that there exist three levels in the economy: 
1. a referendum for the set N of public goods, i.e. for all keN, Gij = GN , 
for which the net product share AN is given: AN =EAki =DI" for ke N. 
2. g referendums for the set L of local public goods, i.e. for all kEL, there 
exist referendums Gki = GLi , j = 1, ..., g, for which the net product 
share ALi equals: LJ = nk,, keL. 
3. a market for the set L of local public goods and the set M of private 
goods, in which all agents (referendums and individuals) can buy and sell, 
given the income distribution ALi and Ami = Ami =EA„,, for keM. 
A three-level price equilibrium is defined to be the allocation [(xmi , 
xN), y, (pm , pm , pNi), q] in the three-level economy Es , such that for each j: 
(a-1) the choice sets M(pm ; Ami) support Cmi (xmi , xL; , xN) in xmi , with 
ie GL,. 
(a-2) the choice sets M(pL ; ALi) support (r CLi (xmi , XLJ , xN) for ie GLi , 
in xLi . 
(a-3) the choice sets M(xLi ; AL;) support e i (xma , XLJ, xN) in pLi , for 
each ie G/4 . 
(a-4) the choice set M(xN ; AN) supports Cgi (xmi , xLi , xN) in pNi , for 
each ieH. 
(b) = (Pm, PL, PN)  with pi, =EAjipLi , for iE Gid , and pN =EajipNi, 
for ie GN . 
X = (Xm , XL , XN) with xm =Exmi , for ie H, and XL =Exki , for 
i = 	.• •, 9. 
(c) the hyperplane H(q) supports Y in X. 
Thus conflicts of interests between agents (individuals for (a-1) and 
councils for (a-2)) over quantities are brought into equilibrium on mar-
kets, and conflicts of interests between agents over valuations (see (a-3) 
and (a-4)) are solved in referendums. Referendums will respond on 
decisions made at a higher level, since the public goods supplied are 
available to all lower levels (see fig. 6.5.1). On the other hand, referendums 
will respond on `decisions' of markets at a lower level, in order to obtain 
an equilibrium in which collective benefits are equal to collective costs. 
This interdependence is expressed in fig. 6.5.1. 
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Fig. 6.5.1. Uniform quantities via referendums, and uniform prices via 
markets in a three-level economy 
quantities prices 
PN PL Pm IXN 
XN 	XLi PL Pm 
XN 	XLi 	Xmi Pm 
level 
public 
local public (je GL) 
private (ie H) 
The production sector is assumed to supply all commodities at marginal 
prices. An enterprise, however, can be considered as being an economy 
itself with an internal structure as given above (see also section 7.1). The 
bigger an enterprise is, the more that enterprise produces public goods 
(if only employment), and the more it consumes public goods. It becomes 
an agent which is not controlled (at least not completely) by consumer 
markets and referendums. On the contrary, big enterprises can accumulate 
power by controlling consumer markets and referendums. It is clearly 
of interest to consumers (and also to enterpi ises) to develop mechanisms 
which direct the enterprise to its only goal: that of producing a bundle 
of commodities which society considers optimal. 
The two-level procedure described above can, in principle, also be applied 
to a three-level economy. The sequence of messages, on which basis the 
levels can determine their optimal programmes, becomes: xt,„ x", 
pri j- 2 , ptt- 3 , xtN+ 4, • .. . If feasibility between the levels is attained, redistri-
bution of income shares between the levels may be necessary. At an equi-
librium distribution, a two level price equilibrium is achieved and all 
agents can choose optimal elements from their choice sets. 
Again, in principle, the three-level price equilibrium can be generalized 
to a multi-level price equilibrium for an economy with more than one level 
of public goods. The philosophy of a multi-level organization is based 
on the existence of economic units regulating the supply and demand of 
(local) public goods. Internally, a referendum mechanism determines a 
cooperative equilibrium; externally, it accepts the market mechanism 
assigning a competitive equilibrium allocation. This implies that local 
public goods are marketable, i.e. comparable, replicable or exchangeable, 
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just as private goods. Thus, the flexibility and efficiency of the original 
competitive economy is coupled with the stability and interdependence 
associated with public goods. 
One of the main virtues of the multilevel organization is the distribution 
of choice sets (power) over many economie units. Although a national-
economie mechanism (and choice set) is needed for public goods, this 
mechanism can be restricted to public goods only. Decentralization is 
possible to that level which is just high enough to include all agents 
affected by some economie good. 
The equity problem can be separated into the problem of income distribu-
tion between consumers for private goods, the problem of income distri-
bution between units for (local) public goods, and the problem of weight 
distribution within the referendums determining (local) public goods. 
(See also section 5.5). The third problem is rather new in economie theory, 
as was pointed out in section 1.2. But if a democracy is defined as being a 
system of assigning a bundle of public goods such that each participant 
has an equal weight in the determination of the social benefit of that 
bundle, then the referendum mechanism is democratie if the 2 , are 
uniformly distributed. Thus, a `one man, one vote' system can be 
obtained. 
A necessary institutional condition for this multi-level organization is, 
of course, the existence of markets and referendums at appropriate levels. 
But an appropriate attitude (or ideology) on the part of economie 
agents is also needed for competitive and cooperative behavior in the 
sense used here. 
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7. Extensions 
7.1. BETWEEN VALUES AND RESOURCES 
The environment in which public goods are defined need not of course, 
coincide, with a national economy. The extent of public goods produced 
can be larger, so that a supranational organization is required, or smaller. 
It also is possible that commodities are public, relative to a set of 
consumers only, or public, relative to a set of producers only. 
An organization in which public goods of the second type are supplied 
is an enterprise or a concern. Commodities such as: research and develop-
ment, general management, sales promotion, maintenance and repair-
shop, computing and accounting services, can often be considered as 
public goods supplied to the various production sectors within an enter-
pl ise. The economy with public goods then coincides with the enterprise, 
and the 'consumers' are the various sectors which have their own 
preferences about the inputs of public goods, derived from their techno-
logy (see section 3.5). Which bundle is optimal for those sectors in an 
enterprise can be determined by a referendum mechanism, in which the 
weight distribution depends on each sector's contribution to gross 
profit. 
The increasing extent and complexity of modern enterprises makes 
comparison between national economies and enterprises occur more 
often. In many cases, an enterprise can be considered as an economy, 
and models or concepts developed in economic theory can be applied to 
enterprises (see also Verheyen, 1965). If only for this reason, a certain 
convergence between political economy and business administration 
will take place, presumably. 
On the other hand, although the formal structures of enterprises and 
national economies may become more similar, the interpretations will 
still show a great dissimilarity. In a national economy, the emphasis is 
on the consumers who want to determine a bundle of public goods on 
basis of their own preferences and value judgements. The consumers 
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together are sovereign, and the central agent referred to in the referendum 
mechanism is not a government with its own, or even derived preferences, 
but purely a computing and executing institution. This interpretation 
fits in perfectly with the ideas developed by Rousseau (1762). The referen-
dum mechanism constructs a `volonté générale' of a commonwealth with 
universal suffrage. The central agent expresses this will of the sovereign, 
and executes its decisions without infiuencing the decisions at all. 
In practice, however, the central agent consists of various institutions: 
e.g. a parliament determining the general will of the people, a govemment 
executing this will, and a judiciary safeguarding the rules. Each institution 
has its own preferences, and infiuences the outcome. The `sovereign' is 
called to the polls with voting papers that hardly leave room to express 
sufficiently the voters' individual preferences about a certain bundle of 
public goods. This, or another, political system stil works satisfactory if 
it is an equilibrium between the information — and time — consuming 
solution of Rousseau's pure democracy, and the alienating solution of an 
autocratic system. Such a consideration, however, belongs to political 
science. In this study it has been shown — from the economic point of 
view — that an allocation mechanism exists by which consumers' 
sovereignty can be realized, also when public goods are present in the 
eco no my. 
The economies E described in chapters 2 and 5 are defined in the quan-
tity or commodity space. It has been mentioned in section 1.3 and shown 
in section 5.1, that a dual economy or a valuation representation E* can 
be associated with the economy E. This dual economy E* is only another 
representation of the same economy and related with E through a formai 
duality operation. This duality relation connects three concepts: 
t E* : the nominator system 
• E : the real system 	 (7.1.1) 
4. 1 : the denominator (resources). 
The duality operation * can also be given a wider interpretation: viz. a 
process of development. The first process is compared to dialectic 
materialism, a process from resources and a real system into a new system: 
'In a system constituting a whole there appear contradictions which 
prevent the system from remaining in a changeless state. The contradic-
tions in the system induce changes leading to a readjustment which makes 
the contradictions disappear. But these very changes open the way to new 
contradictions which, in turn, induce new changes — etc. As a result, 
wholes can never remain in a changeless state; they must change con- 
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stantly. The changes, however, show a definite direction; in other words: 
they represent a process of development. In the course of development, 
individual wholes combine into more complex systems, into wholes 'of 
higher order' which exhibit new properties and new modes of action 
hitherto not encountered. Thus, in the course of dialectical development 
new properties (new `qualities') and new modes of action (new laws of 
behavior) come into being.' Oskar Lange (1962), p. 1-2. 
According to dialectic materialism, new systems with higher qualities 
are generated by existing systems. The nominator system E* in (7.1.1) 
can be interpreted as such a new system. It is, however, also possible to 
interprete E* as a new system of valuations caused by E. For example, 
shortages or bottle-necks can stimulate producers to change their pro-
duction technologies (Schumpeter, 1913), or stimulate consumers to 
change their preferences (Meadows, 1972). The process v : E*` +1 is 
called a materialistic process, because it departs from the system E of 
lower order. 
The second process, w: E*` —> Et+1 , from a system of higher order (the 
nominator system) into a system of lower order (the real system), is an 
inverse of a materialistic process and called a finalistic process. This 
process takes place if, for example, an existing system of valuations and 
capacities generates a real system using resources and possibilities present 
in the environment. The formulation of declarations by the United 
Nations, or of economic policies is based on the existence of such pro-
cesses (see also Cobbenhagen, 1943, and Dalmulder, 1950). When a new 
system has thus been realized, it becomes a resource for a new fase in the 
development. 
Any real system arises from the tension between an existing nominator 
system, and an existing denominator. An economy is thus a product of 
an existing system of valuations and productive forces, and the resouices 
(or capital) left over from, or built up during previous stages. 
Both processes refer to qualitatively different systems, but establish 
relations between elements in these systems via the same denominator 
(see diagram 7.1.4). These relations are called nominal relations. Mate-
rialistic processes induce centrifugal forces in these relations, developing 
new qualities. Finalistic processes embody valuations into a seizable 
reality, using the centripetal force of the imperfect, but mouldable 
denominator. 
Which system, E or E*, is of higher order, can be deduced from the ana- 
lysis of the contradictions within each system. The contradictions can be 
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resolved by a state of equilibrium, denoted by "é or P. If è* indicates the 
direction of development for the resolution of the contradictions in E, 
then E* is the system of higher order. The state or element è* in E* gives 
the values or norms of the whole considered. These values arise from 
countervailing forces within each system. Suppose that these counter-
valling forces in an economie whole are the consumption and production 
farces, denoted by C and P. Then the valuation relation between C and P, 
resp. C* and P*, results in the state è*: 
system E*: 
system E : 
é* C 	P* 
è* c 	p 
(7.1.2) 
In an economy, this equilibrium state or value system "é* can be a set of 
prices or valuations which guide the decisions of the agents in the systems, 
so that their physical needs are also in a state of equilibrium. 
Finally, the contradictions between nominally different forces, and 
between the two systems should be resolved. The relation between C* and 
P, resp. P* and C, is called a dependence relation and results in the state "é. 
In the example used here, both actual consumption and actual production 






Although all elements are equivalent in the system of relations, and can 
be subjected to change, it is the element "é in which one is usually interested 
when a whole system is studied. In order to estimate in which direction 
change will take place, it is necessary to analyze the forces that cause the 
change. It is conjectured here that every force is an element in the whole 
system, related to all other elements. These forces generate new values 
and a new reality, by which — in turn — the forces are changed. The 
elements and the relations are composed in diagram 7.1.4, which diagram 
can also be found in Ruys (1963). 
In this conception, an equilibrium or an outcome è is a realization of a 
relation between values and resources. These three elements belong to a 
whole, together with the contradicting or countervailing forces which 
determine the equilibria. As long as each change in an element induces 
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changes in other elements, the whole is (continuously) changing, or in a 
state of non-stationary motion. 
Diagram 7.1.4. An economy as a changing whole 
If the systems E and E* are representations of each other (see section 
5.1), then the nominal relations are in equilibrium and the whole is in a 
state of equilibrium or of stationary motion. 
7.2. THEORY OF MOTION 
Let Q be a set of eight elements {x, li = 0, ..., 7}, and let * be a function 
from Q x Q in Q, whose value * (x 1 , .x.;) is also denoted by xi *xi . The 
pair (Q, *) constitutes a set of elements together with a set of relations 
between elements and is thus a system. 
The system (Q, *) is called a whole if it satisfies the following axioms: 
7.2.1. The associative law holds, i.e. 
(x i *xj)*xk = xi *(xj *xk), 	for all xi , xi , xk eQ. 
7.2.2. There exists an identity element x 0 , i.e. 
xo *xi = xi *xo = xi , 	for all x i e Q . 
7.2.3. Each element is its own inverse, i.e. 
xi *.xi = Xo, 	for all z i eQ. 
7.2.4. The commutative law holds, i.e. 
xi *xi = xi *xi , 	for all x„ xieQ. 
7.2.5. The inverse of * is a multifunction *': Q —> Q x Q, such that 
7 	 7 
U * - 1 (xi) = Q x Q 	and 	n ._,. (x1)=4,. 
1=0 	 1=0 
It follows that a whole (Q, *) is an Abelian group. The relation defined in 
Q is transitive, reflexive, symmetric and complete (see section 8.1), and 
thus an equivalence relation in Q. Axiom 7.2.5 implies that any ordered 
pair belongs to the relation. 
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An example of a whole is the set 
{0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1)}, 
together with the operation *, which is defined to be addition in a num-
ber system modulo 2, e.g. 
(1, 1, 1)*(0, 0, 1) = (1, 1, 0). The identity element is (0, 0, 0). 
It is conjected here that any closed system in motion can be defined in 
terms of elements and relations, such that a group isomorphism between 
that system and (Q, *) can be established, providing that the identity 
element x0 is not defined in the system and plays a formal role in (Q, *) 
only. 
A representation of such a system, or a whole is given in fig. 7.2.1 (see 
also Sawyer, 1962, p. 201). 
Fig. 7.2.1. Representation of a whole 
100 	110 	010 





8. Basic mathematical notions 
and notations 
8.1. SETS, RELATIONS AND MULTIFUNCTIONS 
The introduction and definition of concepts in this chapter provides a list 
of symbols and outlines the notions and properties to which reference is 
made in this study. 
Let A be a set of elements; the set B is called a subset of A, denoted by 
B .g A, if each element of B belongs to A, i.e. ae B implies ae A. The set B 
is called a proper subset of A, denoted by B c A, when Bis a subset of A 
and A is not a subset of B, i.e. BA and A B. 
The difference between two sets A and B is defined as being the set of 
elements which belong to A and not to B, i.e. the set A\B := {aeAlastB}. 
The empty set is denoted by 
Let A be a set, M a set of index numbers and {A I ie M} a family of 
subsets of A. The union of the sets A i is defined as being the set of elements 
which belong to at least one A i , i.e. U A i := {aeAl3iEM : 
ieM 
The intersection of the sets A i is said to be the set of elements which belong 
to all A i 's, i.e. n A i := {ae AIV ie M : ae A i } If the index set M contains 
ieM 
171 elements, then the cartesian product of the sets A i is said to be the set 
of all ordered m-tuples, i.e. n A i := A,x A 2 x 	x A„, 
teM 
ViEM: 
Let A be a set; the set of all subsets of A is said to be the power set of A, 
and denoted by 7(A). 
Let A and B be sets. An ordered pair (a, b) is called an element of the 
cartesian product of A and B, i.e. (a, b) e A x B. A (binary) relation R is 
defined as being a set of ordered pairs, i.e. R :={(a, b)laE A and beB} 
A x B. The set D(R) := {ae A I 3beB : (a, b) E R} is called the effective 
domain of the relation, and the set R(R) := {beBI3aeA : (a, b) E R) is 
said to be the effective range of the relation R. 
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d, d a, d 
a, C 
c, d 
C, C d, c 
b, b 
a, a 
a, d b, d c, d d, d 
C, C a, c 
a, b b, b 
a, a 
b, d d, d a, d 
C, C b, c a, c 
c, d 
c, b b, b a, b 
a, a 
a, d c, d b, d d, d 
a, c b, c C, C 
a, a 
a, b b, b 
The inverse of the relation R is defined as being the set 1? -1 
{(b, a)I(a, b) e R} gBxA 
Let R,g_AxB and R2 _BxC be relations; the set R2 R, 
{(a, c)I3beB: (a, b)e R, and (b, c)e R2 } g. A xC is then called the 
composition product of the relations R, and R2 . 
The relation R is said to be a relation in a set A if D(R)= A and R(R) A. 
The following properties of a relation R in a set A are defined: 
R is transitive, or an ordering relation in A, if RR R; 
R is reflexive if {(a, a)jae A} R; 
R is symmetric if R = 	; 
R is a-symmetric if RnR' = (l); 
R is anti-symmetric if Rn12 -1 {(a, a)laeA}; 
R is complete if 	= A x A. 
Let R be a relation in A; instead of (a, b) E R, we can then also write a b. 
If a relation R in a set A is defined, then this set is said to have the follow-
ing properties: 
A is partially preordered if R is transitive and reflexive; 
A is partially ordered if R is transitive, reflexive and anti-symmetric; 
A is completely preordered if R is transitive, reflexive and complete; 
A is completely ordered if R is transitive, reflexive, anti-symmetric and 
complete. Examples are given below, in which R may be interpreted as a 
preference relation in a set S consisting of four elements {a, b, c, d}. 
R 1 : partial 
	
R2 : partial order 	R3 : complete 	R4 : complete 
preorder preorder order 
The set S := {a, b, c, d} is: partially preordered if R, is defined in S; 
partially ordered if R2 is defined in S; completely preordered if R3 is 
defined in S, and completely ordered if R4 is defined in S. 
A relation R in a set Ais said to be an equivalence relation if R is transitive, 
reflexive and symmetrie. An equivalence class of a preordered set A is the 
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subset {bEA 1(a, b) e RnR-1 , for some aeA}. An example of an equi-
valence class is the set {c, d} g S with relation R 1 , or {b, c} g S with rela-
tion R4 . A relation R in A is called a strict ordering relation if it is transitive 
and a-symmetric. 
Let R be an equivalence relation in A; instead of (a, b)ER, we can also 
write a-b. If R is a strict ordering relation, then we can also write a-< b, 
instead of (a, b)eR. 
Let A be a set partially preordered by the relation R. The element ae A 
is said to be a maxima] element of A if (a, b)e R implies that (a, b)eR-
For example, the elements b, c and d in S with relation R 1 are maximal 
elements of A, since neither (b, a) (b, c) and (b, d) nor (c, a), (c, b), (d, a), 
(d, b) belong to R 1 ; but both (c, d) and (d, c) belong to R 1 . Let A be a 
preordered set and let B g. A; the element aeB is a maximal element of B 
if and only if one of the following statements is true: 
1. a b implies b— a; 
2. a b or a b; 
3. a -< b implies bit B . 
The element ae A is an upper bound of B g_ A, if be B implies that (b, a)e R. 
A minimal element of a set, resp. a lower bound, is defined as being a 
maximal element, resp. an  upper bound, for the inverse relation R j . 
Let A be a set partially preordered by the relation R; the element ae A 
is said to be a maximum or greatest element of A if beA implies that 
(b, a)ER. The element ae A is called a minimum or least element of A if 
be A implies that (b, a)E R -1 . An example of a least element of the set 
S = {a, b, c, d} above is the element a under relation R2 , R3 or R4 . 
A maximum of a set is always a maximal element of that set. If a set A 
is completely ordered, then a maximal element of A is also a maximum 
of A, which maximum is unique and denoted by max {A}. In that case a 
minimum is denoted by min {A} . 
Let l and Y be sets. A multifunction Ffrom a set X into a set Y is a relation 
defined on X x Y, i.e. FgXxY. The multifunction F assigns to every 
xeD(F) a set in R(F) defined by f(x) := {y1 (x, y)eF}; therefore the 
multifunction is also represented by the rule j" and the sets l and Y, and 
denoted byf: X-4 Y. This convention will be followed here. A multifunc-
tion is also called a correspondence, a multivalued function or a set-valued 
function. 
Let f: X-+ Y be a multifunction. The graph off is defined as being the set 
G(f) := {(x, y)E X x Ylyef(x)} = F. 
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The effective domain, resp. effective range, off is said to be the sets 
D(f) := {xe XI f(x) 4,} = D(F); 
R(f) := {ye Y I : y ef(x)} = f(X) = R(F). 
The image of a subset A ç X under the multifunctionf is said to be the set 
f(A) := {f(x)I x e A} . 
The inverse off is called the multifunction 	: Y--> X defined by 
:= {xlyef(x)}, for all yeR(f). 
The inverse-image or counter-image of a set B Y under f is said to be 
the set 
(B) = (y)lyeB} = {x}f(x)n B 0 0}. 
The upper inverse of a set B Y underf is the set 
f + (B) := {xlf(x) B} . 
A multifunction f: X-* Y is said to be a function from X into Y if 
(x, y)e G (f) and (x, z)e G(f) imply that y = z. One can associate with 
every multifunction f: 	Y a function f: X -> n(Y), by setting 
J(x) := f(x) for every xeX. If f : X--> Y is a function, then f (y) 
{x I y =f(x)}; the functionf is said to be univalent, or a one-to-one func-
tion, if f -1 is also a function. 
Let X := X, X X2 X ... X Xn , the cartesian product of n sets X.; the 
projection of X on X, is said to be the multifunction Proj k : X—* Xk 
defined by 
Projk (X) : = {Xk E 	 Xk, 	X„) E X} . 
It should be noted that Proj i [G(f)] = D(f) and Proj 2 [G(f)1 = R(f). 
Let P be a property of sets. A multifunction f: X-> Y is said to be 
point-P iff(x) has the property P for each xeX. 
The logic of propositions can be represented and visualized by set-
theoretical symbols, applied on the following Boolean algebra of sets; 
see also fig. 8.1.1. Let A be the set of all elements considered; the set 
P A consists of those elements for which the statement p is truc (P is a 
circle), and Q A consists of those elements for which the statement q is 
true (Q is a triangle). The propositions 'p and q', 'p or q', 'p g' and 
p •z> q' are then true in the shaded subsets of A: 
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Fig. 8.1.1. Subsets of true and false propositions 
p and q 	p or q 	p q 
	 q 
It follows, for example, that 'p and q' is always true if and only if 
Pr1Q= A; and that `pg' is never false if and only if P g Q. 
It can also be seen from the above figures that, 'not (p or gr is equi-
valent to `(not p) and (not gr ; 'not (p and gr is equivalent to '(not p) or 
(not gr ; 'p q' is equivalent to `(not p) or q'; etc. 
8.2. CONTINUITY OF MULTIFUNCTIONS 
Let R be the set of real numbers, and let R" := R, X R2 X ... X R„, the 
cartesian product of n sets R. The following operations are defined on 
elements in R", which are denoted by x := (x 1 , x2 , x„):= [x 
addition 	 x+y:=[xi +yd; 
scalar multiplication: 	 ax :-= [axi], for some a eR. 
The set R", which is closed under the operations of addition and scalar 
multiplication, is called a real linear vector space. 
Let f: 	—> R" be a multifunction; f is said to be a linear transforma- 
tion if f(x + y) = f(x)+ f(y) and f(ax)= af(x). 
The set R" can also be endowed with a topological structure by defining 
a metric on R". The following operation is therefore defined on elements 
in R": inner product: <X, y> := E x iy i . 
The real linear vector space R" with this standard Euclidean inner pro-
duct is called the real Euclidean n-space. 
The Euclidean norm or length of a vector is defined by 
lx1 := 
This norm induces a metric in R", which is called the Euclidean distance 
function: 
d (x, := ix — yl = 	[xi — Yi] 2 ' 
The symbol R" will be used to indicate the metric space consisting of the 
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real Euclidean n-space and the Euclidean distance function. All sets in 
this section are subsets of R". 
Let e > 0 be a scalar and xeR"; the set 
B(x; e) := {y e R"I d(x, y) 5 e} 
is said to be an e-neighborhood of a point x, or a ball with center x and 
radius e. Let X R"; then the set 
B(X; e) := U {B(x; e)ix e X} 
is called an e-neighborhood of X. 
A point xeX is called an interior point of X, if a neighborhood B(x; e) 
exists such that B(x; e) ç  X. Let X be a subset of Yç  R"; the interior of X 
relative to Vis then defined as being the set 
Int y X := {xe YI 3e>0: B(x; e)nYg X}. 
A set X is said to be open in Y, if Int y X = X. 
A set X _g_ Y is said to be closed in Y if its complement, Y \X, is open in Y. 
If a set X is open or closed relative to R", the concepts are simply called 
open or closed, and the suffix R" in the symbols omitted. 
The intersection of all closed sets containing a set X is said to be the 
closure of X: 
x := {B(X; s)18>0} 
= {xlVe>0: B(x; e)r-IX00}• 
It follows that a set X is closed if Cl X = X. It can be proven that any 
intersection of a class of closed sets is closed, and that the union of a 
finite number of closed sets is closed. 
The concepts of open and closed sets can be introduced equivalently in 
terms of convergence of vectors with respect to the Euclidean metric. Let 
{x,} be a sequence of vectors in R", t =1, 2, ... This sequence converges 
to a limit point x, if for any e > 0, an integer t, exists such that t> 
implies d(x„ x)<e. This is written: x, or: lim x, = x. A set is closed 
when it contains all its limit points. 
The boundary of a set X is defined as being the set 
Bnd X := Cl X \Int X. 
An element of the boundary of X is called a boundary point of X. A set X 
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is bounded if some e> 0 exist such that Xç B(x, e), for some xe X. A set X 
is said to be compact if it is closed and bounded. 
Let f : X- Y be a multifunction; f is said to be closed, or set-closed, if 
f(A) is closed in R(f) whenever A is a closed set in X. 
f is said to be point-closed if f(x) is closed in R(f) for every xe.X. 
f is said to be graph-closed if the graph off, G (f) is a closed set in X x Y. 
f is said to be open if the set f(A) is open whenever A is an open set in X. 
Examples in two dimensions are given in figures 8.2.1-8.2.3. 
Fig. 8.2.1. f is u.h.c. 
f(x) 
ii 1111111 
Fig. 8.2.2. f1  is set-closed. 
The multifunction f in fig. 8.2.1 is not point-closed, and is therefore 
neither closed nor graph-closed. The inverse f however, in fig. 8.2.2 is 
closed and is therefore also point-closed, but not graph-closed. 
Let f : X-+ Y be a multifunction. f is said to be upper hemi-continuous 
(u.h.c.) iff (A) is a closed set in "J.') whenever A is a closed set in Y. 
f is said to be lower hemi-continuous (1.h.c.) iff -1 (A) is an open set in 
R(f - whenever A is open in Y. 
f is said to be continuous if it is both u.h.c. and I.h.c. 
Examples of an u.h.c. multifunction in two dimensions are given in 
figs. 8.2.1 and 8.2.3. It should be noted that neither inverse is u.h.c. 
(although the inverse of the multifunction in fig. 8.2.3 is graph-closed), 
because f(A) is not closed in R(f) for the unbounded closed set A (see also 
property 8.2.2.2 below). 
Let f: X -■ Y be a function; then the continuity of f is equivalent to 
f being u.h.c. and equivalent tof being 1.h.c. 
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Fig. 8.2.3. f is u.h.c. 	 Fig. 8.2.4. f is 1.h.c. 
Property 8.2.1. (equivalent definitions) 
1. A multifunction : X—) Y is u.h.c. if and only if whenever xe X and 
U Y is open with f(x) U, an open set VgD(f) with xe V exists, 
such that f( V) 5 U. 
2. A multifunction : X—, Y is Lh.c. if and only if whenever xe X, 
yef(x) and U is an open set containing y, an open set V with xe V 
exists such that f(z)nU 0 0 for all ZE V. 
3. A multifunction : X--, Y is graph-closed if and only if whenever 
xeX, ye Y and yOf(x), two open sets U and V with ye U and xe V 
exist such that f(z)r)U = 4) for all ze V. 
4. A multifunction : X-3 Y is Lh.c. if and only if for all xeX: x —> x 
and yEf(x) imply that a sequence {y r} exists such that yr efixt) and 
5. A multifunction : 	Y is graph-closed if and only if for all xeX : 
y, -4 y and yr Ef(xt) imply yef(x). 
The equivalence under 1. and 2. has been shown by Smithson (1972); 
3. has been shown by Berge (1959, p. 111); 4. and 5. are equivalent for-
mulations of 2. and 3. 
Property 8.2.2. (graph-closed vs. u.h.c.) 
Let f : X—> Y be a multifunction. 
1. Iff is u.h.c. and point-closed, then fis graph-closed. 
2. 1f Y is a compact set andf is graph-closed, thenf is u.h.c. 
This property has been shown by Nikaido (1968, p. 66). 
1f one defines upper hemi-continuity of a multifunction by requiring that 
its graph be closed (see Arrow and Hahn, 1971, p. 423), then this defini- 
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tion may contradict the definitions given above and also Berge's or 
Nikaido's definition of upper hemi-continuity at a point. This contradic-
tion, however, is not possible if one defines upper hemi-continuity of a 
multifunction by requiring that the multifunction be graph-closed and 
have a compact range (Debreu, 1959, p. 17). This definition of Debreu is 
equivalent to Berge's definition, which requires that an u.h.c. multifunc-
tion be point — u.h.c. and point — compact (Berge, 1959; p. 109). This 
equivalence follows from property 8.2.2. 
The following properties have been shown by Berge (1963, p. 113, 
69 and 161): 
Property 8.2.3. (continuity preserving operations) 
The composition product, the union and the cartesian product of a 
family of 1.h.c. (u.h.c., resp. point-compact) multifunctions is also 1.h.c. 
(u.h.c., resp. point-compact). The sum of a family of 1.h.c. (resp. u.h.c. 
and point-compact) multifunctions is again 1.h.c. (resp. u.h.c. and point-
compact). 
Property 8.2.4. (Maximum theorem) 
Let cp be a continuous real-valued function in Y and let f: X— Y be a 
point-compact and continuous multifunction such that X= D(f); then 
the real-valued function p (x) := max {cp (y)ty ef(x)} is continuous in X 
and the multifunction g: X— Y, defined by g(x) := {yiyef(x), ç (y) = 
p(x)}, is point-compact and u.h.c. 
Upper hemi-continuity of a multifunction is related to the well-known 
concept of upper semi-continuity of a function, but is not a generalization 
of this latter concept. In order to indicate the relation, the following 
closures of a real valued function can be defined: Let f : X--> Y be a real 
valued function, i.e. Y R. The less-closure of f is said to be the multi-
functionf_ : X R defined by 
f_ (x) := {AeRI 	f(x)}, for all x. 
The more-closure off is said to be the multifunctionf, : X—> R defined by 
f, (x) := {2e RI 	ƒ(x)}, for all x. 
Let f : X—* Y be a real valued function; f is said to be upper semi-conti-
nuous (u.s.c.) on X if its less-closure f_ : X—. R is a graph-closed multi-
function. f is said to be lower semi-continuous (1.s.c.) on X if —f is u.s.c. 
on X. 
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Property 8.2.5. (equivalent definitions for u.s.c.) 
Let f: X -› R be a real valued function. Then the following conditions 
are equivalent: 
1. f is u.s.c. on X; 
2. whenever xe X and E> 0, an open set V g. X with xe Vexists such that 
for all v e V, f(v)< f(x)+ e; 
3. f_ is u.h.c. on X; 
4. fi,. is 1.h.c. on X. 
Fig. 8.2.5. An u.s.c. function with its less-closure 
Proof: Equivalence of (1) and (2) follows from statements given by Berge 
(1959, p. 76) and Rockafellar (1970, p. 51). 
Further (2) implies (3), since whenever xEX and U :=f_(x)+c R 
which is an open set with f_ (x) g U, an open set Vç X with xe V exists 
such that f_ (V)..f. U. (3) follows from property 8.2.1.1. Statement (3) 
implies (1), through property 8.2.2.1, as f_ is point-closed, f being a 
function. Further, by definition (-f) is I.s.c.; since (-D_ = - (f+ ), it 
follows that (2) implies (4), for whenever xe X and e > 0 an open set 
V _f. X with XE V exists such that -f( V)> -f(x)-e. This implies that 
( -f). is I.h.c., because whenever xe X, e > 0, y = -f(x) and 
U := (-f)_(x)+ e, there exists an open set V with xe V such that 
whenever ze V there exists a c5>0 with -f(z)- <5 = -f(x)- e, or 
(-D_ (z)nU & 4, . Via property 8.2.1.2, -(f+ ) is u.h.c. and therefore 
alsof. Finally, (4) implies (1) since for each open set in R, (f+ ) -1 is an 
open set in X, which is a sufficient condition for -1- being 1.s.c. (Berge, 
1959, p. 76) andfbeing u.s.c. 1:1 
An analogous property is valid for 1.s.c. functions. A real valued function 
is continuous if it is both u.s.c. and 1.s.c., or if it is 1.h.c. 
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8.3. SETS AND ALGEBRAIC OPERATIONS IN R" 
The set R" is partially preordered by the following relation in R": let xt 
and yi be the /-th component of the vectors x := (x 1 , x2 , x„) and 
Y := (Yi , Y2, • .. 3, ) in R" and let N be the index set of n-numbers. Then 
x y means that xt y,, for every /e N; 
x .5y means that x y and x y; 
x <y means that xl < yi , for every leN. 
The non-negative orthant, 	is defined by (xeRnix 0). 
Let x and y be different points in R"; then the set {x+1(y— '01 AeR} is 
called a line through x and y. A subset X of R" is said to be an affine set 
if x + (y — x)e X whenever x e X, y e X and A e R (see fig. 8.3.1). 
An affine set X is called a subspace of R" if it is empty or contains the 
origin. A subspace is closed under the operations of addition and scalar 
multiplication, i.e. Ax+ py EX whenever x e X, y e X, A e R and /ie R. 
Let x and y be different points in R"; then the set {x + 2(y — x)I0 51} is 
called a half-line from x through y with direction (y—x). A subset X of 
Rn is said to be a cone with vertex x if x +2,(y — x)e X whenever y e X and 
0 
A cone with vertex 0, i.e. the origin, is just called a cone. A cone is 
closed under the operation of non-negative scalar multiplication, i.e. 
AXE X whenever x e X and A A set X in R" is said to be aureoledif it 
is closed under the operation of multiplication with scalar 2 1, i.e. 
Ax e X whenever xeX and 2 1 (see fig. 8.3.2). 
Let x and y be different points in R"; then the set {x+ (y— x) I 0 5 5 1) 
is called a closed line segment and denoted by Ex, y]. The open line segment 
{x + (y —x)10 <A < 1 } is denoted by (x, y). A subset X of R" is said to be 
convex if x+A(y — x)e X whenever xeX, yeX and 0 5 251. It should 
be noticed that each affme set is a convex set, but that the converse is 
not truc. 
A subset X of R" is said to be starred with vertex x if x+A(y—x)eX 
whenever y e X and 0 15 1. A starred set with vertex x may thus be 
seen as a generalization of a cone with the same vertex. A set Xis convex if 
and only if X is starred with vertex x for every xe X. A subset lof R" with 
vertex 0, i.e. the origin, is called starred. A set X is starred if and only if 
AxeX whenever xeX and 0 5 AS 1 (see fig. 8.3.2). A convex set contain-
ing 0 is always starred. 
155 
A cone which is convex is called a convex cone. A set X is a convex cone 
if and only if it is closed under the operations of addition and non-negative 
scalar multiplication, i.e. Ax+ we X whenever xe X, ye X, A ER, and 
geit + . A cone X is said to be pointed if xeX implies that —x0X, 
whenever x 0 
Fig. 8.3.1. The affine hull of X 	Fig. 8.3.2. The aureole closure 




   
The following closure operations are defined on sets in R". Let X be a 
set in R. The intersection of the class of affine sets containing X is said to 
be the 0D:e hull of X and is denoted by Aff X (see fig. 8.3.1); 
n 	 . 
Aff X = { E ii.,x,ix, E X, Ai E R, E Ai = 1}. 
The intersection of the class of convex sets containing X is said to be the 
convex huil of X, denoted by Conv X; 
n 	 n 
Conv X = { E li xilxi e X, Ai eR, , E Ai = 1}. 
The cone closure of X is defined by 
Cone X := {2.x I xeX, ) 0}. 
The aureole closure of X is defined by 
Aur X := {AxixeX, it 1} . 
The star closure of X is defined by 
Star X := Paci xe X, 0 .. A 5 1} . 
The more closure of X is defined by 
More X:= {y13xeX: x ..),}. 
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The less closure of X is defined by 
Less X := {yl3xeX : y x}. 
The cone closure of X is the smallest cone containing X. A dual operation 
is the cone opening of X which defines the largest cone contained in X; 
this set is called the interior cone of X and denoted by 
Conint X := {x I VA. 0 : e X} . 
An important problem related with unbounded sets is the question how 
they behave in the infinite. It may be intuitively clear that, for some sets 
the interior cone, and for other sets the cone closure, give us information 
about the behavior of an unbounded set in the infinite. The following 
definition (given by Rockafellar, 1970, p. 61) adds more precision to this 
idea. 
Let X be a non-empty convex set. Then X recedes in the direction of y, 
where y 0, if and only if x + Ay e X for every xeX and 0. The direc-
tion of recession y indicates the direction in which the set X is unbounded 
(see fig. 8.3.3). 
The recession cone of X, denoted by 0 + X, is said to be the set of all 
directions of recessions of X, including the origin: 
0 + X := {yeRni 	0, VxeX: x+AyeX}. 
The notation indicates that the recession cone can be considered as the 
limit of a sequence of sets {AA'} when 0 (see property 9.2.1). This 
notation will also prove fruitful in other definitions (see section 9.3). 
It is evident that X is bounded if and only if 0 + X = {0} . 
Fig. 8.3.3. A convex set X and an aureoled convex set Y with their reces-
sion cones, 0 + X, resp. 0 + Y. 
Another definition making the concept of behavior of a set at the infinite 
more precise, has been given by Debreu (1959, p. 22). Let X be any 
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non-empty set; the asymptotic cone of X is defined (and denoted) by: 
Asc X := no Cl Cone {x EX I lx! k 1}. 
If X is convex, then 0 + X = Asc X. The definition of a recession cone, 
rather than that of an asymptotic cone, will be used here. 
Property 8.3.1. (recession cones) 
Let X be a non-empty closed and convex set. Then: 
1. 0 + X = Conint X, if X is starred; 
2. 0 + X = Cl Cone X, if X is aureoled. 
Proof 
1. 0 + X g Conint X. Since X is starred, ()EX. Then ye 0 + X implies that 
VA 0: 0+ AyeX. Thus it follows that yeConint X. 
0 + X 2 Conint X. Suppose that Conint X=0; then X is bounded and 
0 + X = {0} 2 4). Suppose that Conint X is not empty and choose 
yeConint X. Then Aye X. Let xe X and p e(0, 1); from the 
convexity of X it follows that x+ p(2.y—x)eX, for any A 0. Define 
A := ;c 2 and g:= 1/1c, with ic> 1. Then x+icy—xlic EX. If —> co, the 
limit point of x+ Iq is an element of X and so is every convex combination 
of x and this limit point; or x + AyeX, for every 1 0. Therefore ye 0 + X. 
2. 0 + X g Cl Cone X (see fig. 8.3.3). 
Choose ye 0 + X; if yeInt 0 + X, then a z >0 exists such that gyeX, 
or yECone X. If for some ye 0 + X, no positive p exists such that pye X, 
then yeCI Cone X. This follows from convexity of X, as for any 
fie Cone X, x+ Ay e X and x + Ay e X imply that x + Aze X, whenever 
ze[y, y]; therefore every open neighborhood of y has an element in 
Cone X. 
0 + X2 Cl Cone X. Since X is aureoled, AxeX whenever xEX and 
1. Let yECI Cone X; if yeX, then AyeX, for 1 _?21, or y+2yeX, for 
0. If y0 X, then a p >0 exists such that x := y+pyE X. It follows that 
if xeX and 	0, then x + Aye X. Therefore ye 0 + X. 3 
The following algebraic operations on the sets X and Y in a finite real 
Euclidean space are used. 
Let a be a vector in R" ; then the a-translation of X g R" is said to be the 
set 
X+ {a} := {x+aixeX}. 
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Let 2 be a scalar in R; then the scalar multiplication of X by 2 is said to be 
the set. 
AX:= {AxixeX} . 
Let X Rin and Y s R"; then the direct sum of X and Y is said to be the 
set 
XEB Y:= {zeR" ± "13xeX, 3ye Y : z = (x, y)}. 
Let X R" and Y s R"; then partial addition of X and Y relative to the 
subspace Ir is said to be the set (see fig. 8.3.4) 
X # Y:={(z i , z2)ER"13(x l , x2)EX, a(Yi , Y2)EY: 
z i = xi = y i eR"'", z2 = x2 +y2 elr} . 
The operation of partial addition of X and Y has as extremes m = n and 
m = 0. Defined respectively: 
addition: the sum of X and Y is said to be the set 
X+ Y:= {zi 3xeX, 3ye Y: z=x+y} 
intersection: the intersection of X and Y is said to be the set 
Xr-)Y:= {zi3xeX, 3ye Y: z = x = y} 
Fig. 8.3.4. Addition and partial addition relative to Rm 
11" - "1 
xy 
n 27-2-X4Y in Rm 
	 Rm 
Finally, two algebraic operations are defined on convex sets X and Y. As 
they are narrowly related to addition and intersection of sets (see property 
8.3.2), the operations are called convex addition and convex intersection. 
Let X and Y be convex sets in R. Then: 
convex addition of X and Y is defined (and denoted) by: 
X-j-> Y: = tz I 3.xeX, 3ye Y, Ile [0, 1] : z = (1 --,1.)x+,1y} 
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convex intersection l of X and Y is defined (and denoted) by: 
X A Y:= {z13xeX, 3ye Y, Ile[0, 1] : z = (1 - - A) x = ity} 
Fig. 8.3.5. (Convex) addition and intersection of X and Y 
Property 8.3.2. (convex addition and intersection) 
Let X and Y be two convex sets in R. Then 
X-i- Y = Conv (Xu Y). 
Let X and Y be two convex cones containing the origin. Then 
X-i-Y= X+Y, 
XAY=XclY 
The proof of this property can be found in Rockafellar (1970, p. 80 and 
22). The operation 'convex intersection' is called 'inverse addition' by 
Rockafellar and 'dual addition' by Weddepohl (1973). In order to indi-
cate the analogy between operations on sets defined in this section and 
those operations on multifunctions to be defined in section 10.1., the term 
convex intersection is used here. This terminology also indicates the dual 
relation of addition and intersection in Eucledian vector spaces, as 
shown in the properties 9.3.4, 9.3.5, 10.4.6 and 10.4.7. It must be stressed, 
however, that just like addition, convex addition and convex intersection 




X A Y= 
U {(1 — A)X1- AY} 
05.k5 1 
U {(1 - - - 2.)X n .1.Y}. 
os).s1 
   
1 See also section 9.3. 
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Property 8.3.3. (convexity e.a. preserving operations) 
The class of convex sets (resp. subspaces, cones) is closed under the 
operations of intersection, addition (direct, partial or convex), scalar 
multiplication and linear transformation. The class of convex sets (resp. 
affine sets) is also closed under the operation of translation. 
This property has been shown by Berge (1959, p. 142) and Rockafellar 
(1970). 
An affine set M is said to be parallel to an affine set L if a translation 
of M onto L exists. Each non-empty affine set is parallel to a unique 
subspace. The dimension of a non-empty affine set is defined as the dimen-
sion of the subspace parallel to it. The dimension of a convex set is 
defined as the dimension of the affine huil of that set. 
Let X be a convex set in R". The relative interior of X, denoted by Rint X, 
is defined as being the interior of X relative to its affane hull. 
Rint X:= {xe Alf XI 3e > 0 : B(x, e) n Aff X g X) = Int(Aff 1)1. A con-
vex set X is said to be relatively open if Rint X =1, e.g. the open line 
segment (a, b) in R2 . Any convex set X in Rn has the same dimension as 
Cl X or Rint X, as has been shown by Rockafellar (1970). He also proves 
that for any linear transformation A : Ie —> IC, Rint (AX)= A (Rint X) 
and Cl (Al) 2 A (Cl X). 
Let X and Y be convex sets in R". If both are (relatively) open, then 
their sum is open. It is not generally true, however, that the sum of two 
closed sets is closed (see fig. 8.3.6). 
Fig. 8.3.6. An open sum of two closed sets 
It can be shown that if the sum of two closed convex sets does not contain 
a line, then this sum is also closed. If a convex set X contains a subspace, 
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then this subspace is also contained in the recession cone 0 + X. The 
largest subspace contained in 0 + X is called the linearity space of X; its 
dimension is called the lineality of X. It is evident that if X does not 
contain a line, then the linearity space of X is equal to {0} and the lineality 
of X is 0. The linearity space of X is equal to (— 0 + X)n(0 + X). The 
following property is shown by Rockafellar (1970): 
Property 8.3.4. (a closedness criterium) 
Let X be a non-empty closed convex set in R", and let A be a linear trans-
formation from R" into Rm. If for all ze 0 + X, Az = 0 implies that z =0, 
then Al is dosed. 
Let Xi , ie M, be a class of non-empty closed and convex sets in R" such 
that zi e 0 + Xi and E zi = 0 imply that zi is an element of the linearity 
space of X, for ie M. Then Xi is closed, and 0 + Xi) = Eo+ xj. 
It should be noticed that the closedness condition in 8.3.4 is met when 
the sum of the recession cones (c, xi) is a pointed cone. In that case, 
the recession cones are said to be positively semi-independent (Debreu, 
1959). 
As a final remark, it should be emphasized that the closedness condi-
tion in 8.3.4 is sufficient, but not necessary. 
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9. Sets and duality 
9.1. SUPPORTING HYPERPLANES AND SEPARATING HYPERPLANES 
Let p be a function of R" into R; it is well known (see Fleming, 1965, 
p. 9) that p is linear if and only if real numbers d„ d2 , d„ exist such 
that p(x) =Edi xi = dx, for every xeR". The object d will be called a 
covector having components d1 , d2 , d„. Because a linear function p 
and a covector d have the same properties, they will be indicated here by 
the same symbol, such that p (x) = px, with p being identical to d. 
Let P(R", R) denote the set of all linear functions having domain R" 
and values in R, and let the following operations be defined on these 
functi ons: 
(addition) 	 (p+ q)(x):= p(x)+q(x), for every xeR"; 
(scalar multiplication) 	 (Ap)(x):= Ap(x), for every xe R". 
Then P(R", R) is again a real Euclidean n-space (see 8.2), called the dual 
space of R" and denoted by R"*. The dual space R" has the same dimen-
sion as the primal space R. In fact they are isomorphic, and for many 
purposes, do not need to be distinguished, but this isomorphism is 
unnatural from several other points of view (Fleming, p. 287): more 
natural is the resemblance between R"** and R. 
The distinction between primal space and dual space is also important 
in economics, as the primal space is identified with the quantity space and 
the dual space with the price space or valuation space. Therefore, R" and 
R" will always be distinguished, but not Ril and R"**. 
Finally, it must be stressed that all results between elements in R" and 
R" are also valid for elements in R"* and R. 
Linear functions in R" are thus elements (covectors) of the dual space, 
R"*. They can, however, also be visualised or represented in the primal 
space by hyperplanes (see fig. 9.1.1). 
A set in R" is said to be a hyperplane if it is an affine set of dimension 
163 
Fig. 9.1.1. The inverse image of a function p with value a, and the 
covector p 





(n-1). Let peR"* be a non-zero linear function and a eR be a constant. 
Then the set 
H(p; cc):= {xe R"Ipx = a} 
is a hyperplane in R. Conversely, every hyperplane may be represented 
in this way, with p and a being unique up to a common non-zero multiple 
(see Rockafellar, 1970). Whenever a 0 0, it is possible by appropriate 
scaling to choose a unique covector such that the value of the constant is 
equal to 1. Let H(p; a) be given and choose 15 := pla; then H(p; cc) = 
H(ii; 1). Therefore, a hyperplane not containing zero (such as the set in 
fig. 9.1.1), is uniquely represented by 
H(p):= H(p; 1) = {xeR"Ipx = 1} . 
With the hyperplane H(p; a) the sets 
M_(p;a):= {xeR"Ipx <a} and 
M,(p;a):= {xeR"Ipxk a} = M_(—p; —a), 
are associated. These are called the lower closed half-space and the upper 
closed half-space determined by H(p; a). Again, we define (p):= 
M,(p; 1) and M_(p):= M_(p; 1). 
The unique correspondence between hyperplanes and linear functions 
(or covectors) is very fruitful when we take into account a special concept 
of hyperplanes: supporting hyperplanes. The concept of supporting 
hyperplanes may be considered as being a generalization of the concept of 
tangency used in classical analysis, and the corresponding covectors as 
a generafization of the differentials defined in classical analysis. 
A hyperplane H in R" is said to be a supporting hyperplane or a support 
for a set X if X is contained in some closed half-space Mdeterrained by H 
and, whenever V is an open set containing Cl X, V is not contained in M, 
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i.e. X s M and V $ M (see fig. 9.1.2). A hyperplane H is said to be a 
properly-supporting hyperplane for a set X if X is contained in some closed 
half-space M associated with H and H contains a point of X, i.e. g. XM 
and XnH 0 (see H2 and H3 in fig. 9.1.3). 
It should be noted that what is here called properly-supporting, is 
often called supporting. The definition of a supporting hyperplane used 
here also includes the possibility of asymptotic support (see H1 , in fig. 
9.1.2). A hyperplane H is called an asymptotic support for a set X if H does 
not contain a point of X but, whenever V is an open set containing Cl X, 
H contains a point of V, i.e. Cl XnH = 0 and VnH 0. A supporting 
hyperplane for a closed set is thus either a properly supporting hyperplane 
or an asymptotic support. 
Fig. 9.1.2. Supporting hyperplanes for X 
A related concept is the support function which assigns to some linear 
function p the supremum (or least upper bound) of the set of values given 
by p to elements of a convex set X. 
The support function for a convex set X is the function cr„ : 	--> R, 
defined by crx (p):= sup tpx1xeX}. For example: let X be the convex set 
in fig. 9.1.2; then crx (p 3) is equal to the value of p 3 at the boundary point 
x3 of X. It follows that a hyperplane H(p; a) is supporting for a set X if 
and only if crx (p) = a. A hyperplane H(p; a) is properly-supporting for 
a set X if and only if ax (p) = a = max {pxlx E X} . 
Another fruitful property of hyperplanes is based on the fact that a 
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hyperplane separates R into two disjoint open convex sets: the two open 
half-spaces associated with the hyperplane. 
Let X and Y be non-empty sets in R. A hyperplane H is said to 
separate X and Y if X is contained in one of the closed half-spaces asso-
ciated with H and Y is contained in the other, i.e. X g_ M, and Y g M_. 
The hyperplane H is called a proper/y-separating hyperplane if it separates 
X and Y and if neither X nor Y are contained in H. The hyperplane H is 
cafied a strong/y-separating hyperplane if open sets V2 Cl X and 
W2 Cl Y exist such that Vg_M, and W M_. The hyperplane H 
is called a supportingly-separating hyperplane if it separates X and Y 
and if, for all open sets V and W with Cl X g_ V and Cl Y g W, the inter-
section VnW is not empty. If H is a supportingly-separating hyperplane 
for X and Y, then H is a supporting hyperplane for both X and Y (see 
fig. 9.1.3). 
Fig. 9.1.3. A supportingly-separating hyperplane 
A hyperplane H strongly separating X and Y exists if and only if there 
exists a covector p such that sup (px I xe Y) < inf {px I xe X} . There 
are many separation theorems, mostly based on the Hahn-Banach 
theorem. The following is essential in this context (see also Rockafellar, 
1970, p. 97). 
Property 9.1.1. (separation theorem) 
Let X and Y be non-empty convex sets in R". In order that there be a 
hyperplane separating X and Y properly, it is necessary and sufficient 
that Rint X and Rint Y have no point in common. 
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The fact that a hyperplane separates R" into two half-spaces is also used 
to define the following class of hyperplanes associated with a set X. A 
hyperplane is said to be a bounding hyperplane for X, if X is contained in 
some half-space associated with it. It is evident that every supporting 
hyperplane for X is a bounding hyperplane for X. The set of bounding 
hyperplanes for X generates the dual or polar set of X, as is shown in the 
next section. 
9.2. POLAR SETS 
Let X be a set in R". The set of bounding hyperplanes for X may be 
considered as being a dual set of X. For any non-zero constant real 
number a, there exists a unique correspondence between the bounding 
hyperplanes for X and a set of linear functions or covectors in R"*. 
This set is called the polar set of X relative to a: 
or X g. /14, (p; ce)}. 
Since any intersection of closed half-spaces is a closed and convex set, it 
follows that X: = (Conv Cl X):. An equivalent description is: 
X: = {p e R" I L(p ; a) n Rint (Conv X) = . 
As the definition of the polar set X: suggests, the set X„* can be parti-
tioned into two sets, both of which are closed and convex. 
The upper polar set relative to a is defined by 
X:,  
the lower polar set relative to a is defined by 
:= {pe Rn* 1 X g M_ (p; a)}. 
For any non-negative a, the upper polar set contains all covectors 
associated with hyperplanes separating X and {O}; the lower polar set 
contains all covectors associated with hyperplanes bounding for X {0} 
(see fig. 9.2.1). 
If the value of a is not relevant for the problem considered, then a is 
assigned equal to 1 and not mentioned in the symbols and definitions: 
Xt := {p e Rn* I X g M + (p)} 
= {peR"*Ifor all xEX: px1}; 
Xt := {p E R1* I X M _ (p)} 
= {pe R"* I for all xe X: px 1}; 










Fig. 9.2.1. A set X and its polar set X* = XtuX* 
Another polarity operation is defined as follows: let X be a set in R". 
The set of covectors associated with all bounding hyperplanes for X 
which contain zero is said to be the polar cone of X: 
X° := {p e Rn* I X g_ M 4. (p; 0) or X g_ M_ (p; 0)} ; 
X. := {p e R" I for all x e X: px O}; 
X°_ := {p e R" I for all x E X : px 0}. 
The last two sets are respectively called, the upper polar cone and the 
lower polar cone (see fig. 9.2.2). 
Fig. 9.2.2. A set X and its polar cones X °, and X° 
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It is possible to express the polar cone as being a limit of a sequence of 
polar sets. The following definition of such a limit has been given (see 
Berge, 1959, p. 119): 
Let {P„} := {P 1 , P2 , ...} be a sequence of sets in R"*, and let N(p) 
be an open set containing p. The lower limit of the sequence {P„} is 
defined to be the set 
Lim P„:= {p IV N (p), 3n: Vk ,>.„ n, Pk n A r (P) 0}. 
The upper limit of that sequence is said to be the set 
Lim P„ := {p IVN (p), Vn, 3k k_ n: Pk n N (p) 0). 
n co 
Clearly Lim P„ g_ Lim P„. If the lower limit of a sequence equals the 
n—■ co 
	n—.co 
upper limit then this set is called the limit of a sequence of sets and deno- 
ted by Lim P. If the sequence is decreasing or increasing then the 
n co 
sequence admits a limit (which can be empty). 
Property 9.2.1. 
Let X be a set in R. Then 
X°  Lim X:, 	and X°_ = Lim 	. 
ce—.0 
Proof. Let /3 be a scalar 0< /3<1 and k, an integer, be a power of /3.  Let 
P,:= fik X:. As ocX: = X', , the sequence {P„} := (P 1 , P2 , .. .) is a 
subsequence of {X`+ }. 
Further, as P1 g P2 ••• {Pn} and {X::,} are increasing sequences. As 
the lower limit of a sequence is contained in its upper limit, the property 
is proven if 	g Lim P„ Lim P„ 5 	Choose a fieLim P„ and 
assume that fiOX°_,.. Then an open neighborhood N() exists such that 
N(T))nX(4'. =4); it follows that VpeN(fi), 3.eX : p < O. Therefore, given 
any number n, it is true that for all k n, P,nN(3)= {p1VxeX : 
/3k} n N(3) = 0. This contradicts p being an element of Lim 
Choose a fi eLim P.; let the set N(p) be such that Vn, 3k n: 
fik X4".` n N(p) 4). As / 	13l X: 2 13 k X:, it follows that p e Lim P. 
Choose a fieX?, and assume that fiffim P„. Then a neighborhood 
Mi)) exists such that for some fieN(p) it is true that fix = ô>0 when 
xeX, and also such that Vn, 3k n: P,nN(j5)= 4'. Choose ii such that 
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13' <3. Then P,inN(fi)= (1) contradicts the fact that p Or X: n N(fl) = 
P,inN(p), implied by 
A analogous argument can be used for the lower polar sets. El 
Property 9.2.2. (upper polar sets) 
Let l and Y be any set in R. Then: 
1. peBnd X: <=> H(p) is a supporting hyperplane for X and separates 
the sets l and {0} ; 
pe Int X: 	H(p) strongly separates X and {O}; 
2. X =çb 	Oe Cl Conv X; 
3. X: = (Rint X)1. = (Cl X)1. = (Conv X): = (Aur X): ; 
4. X: is a closed, convex and aureoled set, not containing 0; 
5. = 1, when X is a closed, convex and aureoled set not containing 
the origin; 
6. X g_ Y X: 2 Y:; 
7. (XL, Y)1. = 
Proof (see Weddepohl, 1972): 
1. By definition; see fig. 9.2.1 in which 1/3 := H(p3) is a supporting 
hyperplane. 
2. By definition: X and {0} can not be separated by {x ipx = 1}, for 
any p. 
3. Let p be such that VxeX : px 1. Then it is also true that p.37 1 if: 
e Rint X; or leC1 X; or = lAi x i , for x,eX, A i 0 and E2 L =1; or, 
finally, if = 2x, for xeX and A 
4. X: is convex since (1— ))px + Aqx 1, whenever px 1, qx 1, and 
[0, 1], for all xe X. Closedness follows from the contradiction which 
arises when peC1 X: and pOX:; this implies that an leX exists such 
Fig. 9.2.3. 
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that pï< 1 and thus, for some sufficiently small e > 0, a geB(p; e)n X: 
such that gï<1 also. Finally, X: is aureoled and does not contain zero, 
as ,Ipx ._ 1, when for all xe X : px 1 and)._ ._ 1 (see also fig. 9.2.1). 
5. X c X: choose iZeX; then for all peX: : p5c" 1. It follows that 
e {x I VpeX: : px __ 1} -- - X:: . X 2 X: assume that .5-c0 X and let 
Y:= {25?12e [0, 1]). As X is closed, convex, aureoled and does not con-
tam n 0 and Y is closed, convex and does contain 0, there exists a hyperplane 
which strongly separates X and Y (property 9.1.1). Because per: and 
p ï <1, it follows that iitr.r.: (see also fig. 9.2.3). 
Fig. 9.2.4. X .g Y is equivalent to X: Y.:. 
It may be noticed that in fig. 9.2.4 the set Y is not aureoled and therefore, 
although Y Y: 1: , Y Y:: . 
6. If pe Y: then Vye Y : py- 1. As Y 2 X, it is also true that Vye X : 
py.• 1, i.e. pe X: . It follows that Y: X: . 
7. (Xu Y)*.,. X.: n Y: may be deduced from (6) as 
follows: 	X (Xu Y) X: 2 (XU Y)*.i. ; 
also: 	Y (Xu Y) Y: 2 (Xu Y)*.,. ; 
therefore: (X:nY:) 2 (Xu Y).. 
To prove the converse, choose p e (X: r' Y); then px . 1 when xeX and 
px 1 when xe Y. Therefore px. 1 when xe (Xu Y), implying that 
pe(Xu Y): . El 
Property 9.2.3. (lower polar sets) 
Let X and Y be any set in R". Then: 
1. pe Bnd X: .,:- H(p) is a supporting hyperplane for the set Xu (0} ; 
per: 	-t> H(p) is a bounding hyperplane for Xu{0} ; 
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2. X* is bounded <=> Oe Int Conv X; 
3. Xt = (Rint X)*._ = (Cl X)*._ = (Conv X)*_. = (Star X)t` ; 
4. X* is a closed, convex and starred set containing 0; 
5. (X* )* = X, whenever X is a closed and convex set containing the 
origin; 
6. X Y  
7. (Xu Y)*_ = XtnYt . 
The arguments of this proof are analogous to those given above for 
property 9.2.2. Compare also fig. 9.2.5. 
Fig. 9.2.5. Lower polar sets of X and Y, with X Y 
The difference between upper and lower cones is only a matter of signs, 
because r_ = —r,. The properties of polar cones are well known and 
are given here for reference and comparison with similar properties of 
polar sets (see also fig. 9.2.2). 
Property 9.2.4. (polar cones) 
Let X and Y be any set in R. Then 
1. peBnd r_ -#:- H(p, 0) is a supporting subspace for X; 
peXci 	<.> H(p, 0) is a bounding subspace for X; 
2. XI = (ƒ) 	.g* OeInt Conv X; 
3. r_ = (Rint X)_ = (Cl X)? = (Conv X)_ = (Cone X)?; 
4. X° is a closed convex cone; 
5. (r )? = X whenever X is a non-empty closed convex cone; 
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6. X g_ Y  
7. (Xu Y)°1 = r_ n Y(...> . 
In property 9.2.1 it was shown that a polar cone is a limit of a sequence of 
polar sets. It will be demonstrated here that this limit is also equal to 
the recession cone of the polar set, which recession cone is defined for 
convex sets (see 9.3) and indicates the directions in which the set recedes. 
Property 9.2.5. (polar sets and polar cones) 
Let X be any non-empty set in R. Then 
1. Xc.„' = 
2. X?, = Cl Cone (X!„) Xt if X!„ 4); 
3. X. = (Cone X)*._ = 
4. X°_ = Conint (Xt) X.; 
Proof: 
1. r+  O X: = {q1V10,VpeX:: p+ AqeX:}. 
Choose any ger, peX: and A 0; then for all xeX: Aqx.- 0 and 
1. Addition gives (p+ Aq)xl, VxeX, or (p+ Aq)eX:. Thus 
ge 0 + X:. 
0 + X:: choose any ge 0 -1' X:; then V1>0 and Vxe X : 
(p+ Aq)x 1, or (111)px qx (112). Choose 2 arbitrarily large, then 
VxeX : qx 0. It follows that qer 
2. As X: is convex and aureoled, property 8.3.1.2 can be applied, from 
which statement 2 follows. 
3. The equality 	= (Cone X)*_. is shown as follows. 
Choose some per ; then VxeX : 	0. It follows that VA 0: 
0 1. Therefore Vy e Cone X: py 1, implying that p e (Cone X)*_ . 
Choose any pe(Cone X)_ ; then 32 > 0 such that VxEX :px (1/1). 
Choose A arbitrarily large, then VxeX :px 0. It follows that per. 
The equality Xt = 0 + (XII') can be shown by arguments derived 
analogously from those given under (1). 
4. As X. is a closed, starred, convex and non-empty set, property 8.3.1.1 
can be applied; from 3. the proposition follows. 
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9.3. REFLEXIVE SETS 
Polarity operations on sets carry over characteristics of a set X in the 
primal space to a set in the dual space. The information about a set 
transmitted from the prima! space to the dual space is different for each 
polarity operation. For example: the boundedness of a set X is not carried 
over to the polar cone of X. If a polarity operation, applied twice to a set 
X, restores the original set, then we call this set X reflexive under the 
polarity operation. In this section properties of operations on some 
reflexive sets are given 
Let X be a set in 12"; then 
X is called aureole-reflexive if (X:)*„. = X; i.e. if and only if X is a closed, 
convex and aureoled set, not containing 0; 
X is said to be star-rejlexive if (X *)*_ = X; i.e. if and only if X is a closed, 
convex and starred set; 
X is said to be cone-reflexive if (X). 	= x; i.e. if and only if X 
is a closed convex cone. 
The equivalent conditions follow from properties 9.2.2.5, 9.2.3.5 and 
9.2.4.5. 
An important property of star-reflexive sets is the dual relation between 
the interior cone of the primal set and the cone closure of the polar set. 
(See also fig. 9.2.5). 
Property 9.3.1. (duality for cones of star-reflexive sets) 
Let X be a closed and convex set containing zero. Then 
1. (Cone X)t = Conint (X1`) =  
2. (Conint X)t = Cl Cone (X1`) = (0 + X).. 
Proof 
1. The first equation is stated in properties 9.2.5.3 and 9.2.5.4. 
2. Substitute X* for X in the first line. Then 
(Cone X*)* = Conint (X* * ). 
As both (Cl Cone X*) and X are star-reflexive, the lower polarity 
operation gives: 
(C1 Cone Xt) *_ *_ = Cl Cone (Xt) = (Conint X). . 
Considering properties 8.3.1.1 and 1. above, the proposition is proven. D 
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Property 9.3.2. (duality for cones of aureole-reflexive sets) 
Let X be a closed, convex and aureoled set, not containing the origin. 
Then: 
(Xt) = Cl Cone (Xt) = (Cl Cone X)(:_ = 12 = (0 + X)°, . 
Proof 
From property 8.3.1.2, it follows that (Cl Cone X)°, = (0 + 1).; 
from property 9.2.4.3, it follows that (Cl Cone X).°, = X°+ ; and property 
9.3.2 follow from property 9.2.5.1 and 9.2.5.2. 13 
Algebraic operations applied on sets generate new sets in R. The ques-
tion arises whether or not a relation between the polar set of aggregated 
sets and the polar sets of the composing sets exists. It will be shown 
that this question can be answered in the affirmative. 
In order to preserve closure of the convex sum, however, the definition 
given in 8.3 must be slightly refined. The following notation is introduced: 
Let X be any non-empty convex set. Then 
{1111 0 + } : = {2Xu 0 + X1).> 0} . 
The notation 2 0 thus means that AX is taken to be 0+ X, the reces-
sion cone, rather than {0} if 2= 0. 
The operation of convex intersection of two non-empty convex sets 11 
and 12 is defined by: 
11 Al2 := u{(1 --A)Xi nAX2 10 + A 1}. 
This definition replaces the definition given in section 8.3 and preserves 
the closure of the sets. If l and Y are compact, both definitions coincide. 
The operations of addition and intersection of reflexive sets generate more 
reflexive sets; this also holds for the operations of convex addition and 
convex intersection (see property 9.3.3). Examples are given in fig. 9.3.1 
and 9.3.2. These figures also provide examples of property 9.3.4, in 
which, inter alla, it is stated that addition of sets in the primal space is 
equivalent (under weak conditions) to convex intersection of polar sets 
in the dual space. 
The following interpretation may be given: the dual operation to 
addition of sets is addition of the bounding hyperplanes to those sets 
(see sections 9.1 and 9.2). The hyperplanes to be added are parallel sets, 
represented by covectors in the dual space, such as p l and p2 in fig. 9.3.2. 
Therefore that covectorp must be found, for which H(p)= H(p 1) H(p2). 
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Because in the example given in fig. 9.3.2., H(p2)= 21/(0, it follows 
that H(p) = 3H(p 2) = 3/2 H(p2) = H(113 p i) = H(2/3 p2), and that 
p = 1/3 p i =2/3 Pi,  p therefore belongs to the convex intersection of 
X* and Y*• Similar examples can be given for the other operations. 
Fig. 9.3.1. Algebraic operations and polarity 
Property 9.3.3. (operations on reflexive sets) 
Let X and Y be refiexive sets of the same type, i.e. either star-, aureole-, 
or cone-refiexive. Then 
1. X n Y; 
2. X A Y; 
are reflexive sets of the same type. 1f 1+ Y is contained in a pointed 
cone, then 
3. X+ Y; 
4. X Y; 
are also refiexive sets of the same type. 
Proof 
Assume that X and Y are star-refiexive, i.e. that they are closed, convex 
and contain 0. According to section 8.2 and property 8.3.3, the intersec-
tion and convex-intersection of both sets are closed and convex. From 
property 8.3.3 it follows that the sum and convex sum are convex. The 
condition for addition and convex-addition also meets the closedness 
criterion in property 8.3.4. As the origin is evidently an element of all 
sets, property 9.3.3 follows. Analogous arguments can be given for the 
other types of reflexive sets. 13 
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Property,9.3.4. (polar operation and aggregated reflexive sets) 
Let X and Y be either star-reflexive or aureole-reflexive sets and let the 
operation * denote the lower-, resp. upper, polarity operation. Then: 
1. (X+ Y)* = X* A Y*; 
2. (X n Y)* = X* 4- Y*, if Int 0 + (XnY) 0; 
3. (X Y)* = X* n Y*; 
4. (X n' Y)* = X* + Y*, if Int 0 + (XnY) 0; 
5. ()fl* 	= A -1 X*, for A>0. 
Proof. All proofs will be given for aureole-reflexive sets. Analogous argu-
ments can be given for star-reflexive sets (see fig. 9.3.1). 
Fig. 9.3.2. (X+ Y)* =X* A' Y*; addition and convex intersection 
1. (Weddepohl, 1972). Let X and Y be aureole reflexive sets and let 
re(X+ 	Then M+ (r) X+ Y, and the following infima exist: 
:= inf {rx 1 xe X}, p := inf {ry 1 ye Y} and A+ p = inf {r(x+ y)Ixe X, 
yeY} = 1, such that A, p - 0. If 	> 0, then M+ (rIA) 2 X, resp. 
M+ (rIp) Y, implying that (rI))eX:, resp. (r/p)e Y. If A, resp. p, 
is zero, then M + (r; 0) 2 X, resp. M+ (r; 0) Y, implying that re 0 + X: = 
, resp. re 0 + Y: = Y, according to property 9.2.5.1. Therefore 
re(AX:np Y:), for 2jt 0 + and 1+j --=1. 
Conversely, let r = Ap = pq, for pe X:, qe Y: and 2,p 0 + , with 
A+ p= 1. Then for all xe X: px 1, or rx A, and for all ye Y: qy 
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or 	Addition gives r(x+y) I, for all xeX and y e Y, implying 
that re(X+ Y) *, . 
4. As X: and Y. are aureole-reflexive, the sum of X: and Y: is aureole-
reflexive if it is contained in a pointed cone (see property 9.3.3.3). In that 
case we can apply (1) above, from which follows : 
(X: + Y:): = (X) ( Y:)*, = X A Y, implying the statement after 
application of the upper polar operation. The sum (X:+ Y:) is contained 
in Cone (X:) + Cone ( Y:), which is shown to be a pointed cone as 
follows: from properties 9.2.5.2, 8.3.2 and 9.2.4 it can be seen that 
Cone (X:)+ Cone ( Y:) g (X)?, +(Y) (,)_ = 
= (XnY)%; 
[0 + (XnY)r,=(XnY) °, follows from property 9.3.2. Assume that 
3re(CI Cone X:+ Cl Cone Y*) such that r 0 and — re(C1 Cone X: + 
Cl Cone Y:); then Vze (XnY), rz 0 and rz.. 0. This contradicts 
the fact that Int 0 + (XnY)0 4) and t5>0 such that (z + ór)e 0 (XnY), 
implying that r(z + 3r) 0 0. 
2. As X: and Y. are aureole-reflexive and as (X:+ Y:) is contained in a 
pointed cone (see the argument under (4)), in which case (X: Y:) is 
also aureole-reflexive, the application of the polarity operation on 
(X: Y:)*+ = X:: nl': = X n Y, 
results in statement 2 under property 9.3.4. 
3. Since (X Y) = Conv (Xu Y), and according to 9.2.2.3, 
[Conv (Xu Y)]t = (Xo Y)t , 
property 9.3.4.3 follows from property 9.2.2.7. 
5. Choose pe(AX):; then for all yeAX: py 1. Define x := y11; then 
for all xe X : 2px 1, or Ap e X: and p EAT 1 X: . D 
The last property of this section follows directly from properties 8.3.2 and 
9.3.4: 
Property 9.3.5. (polar operation and aggregated cones) 
Let X and Y be closed convex cones. Then: 
1. (X + Y)_ = r_ n Y2; 
2. (X n Y)°_ = X. + Y2, if Int 0 4- (X n Y) 4). 
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9.4. SEPARATION AND INTERSECTION OF SETS 
Let X be an aureole-reflexive set and Y be a star-reflexive set (this denota-
tion will be used throughout this section); suppose that X and Y are 
separated by a hyperplane. The question arises: what behavior do the 
polar sets X: and Y*_. have relative to separation ? 
Apart from boundary cases, the answer is that no hyperplane separating 
Al and Y*._ exists if and only if there does exist a hyperplane strongly 
separating X and Y; and that a hyperplane supportingly separating 
Y X: and *._ exists if and only if there exists a hyperplane supportingly 
separating l and Y (see property 9.4.3). 
This result is restricted by the behavior of certain unbounded sets under 
a polarity operation. It will therefore be required that the sets X and Y 
have no direction of recession in common, i.e. that there does not exist a 
d 0 such that de 0+ Xn Y. A pair of sets (X, Y) is said to have a 
common orientation if they have a direction of recession in common, 
i.e. if Ir' Y= {0}. See fig. 9.4.1. The counterpart of this property 
in the dual space is given by the following theorem: 
Property 9.4.1. (common orientation and polarity) 
Let X be aureole-reflexive and Y be star-reflexive. Then X and Y have a 
common orientation if and only if X*. and Y*_. are separated by a sub-
space (of dimension n— 1). 
Proof 
Let (X, Y) be a pair of sets with common orientation and let some non-zero 
d be an element of (0+ X n 0+ 1'). Then for all xeX and A k 0: x + Ade X. 
Choose any ge X: ; then for all xe X : qx 	is therefore also truc 
that for all xeX, k 0 : g(x+ Ad) h will be shown k 1. that for all 
A k 0 : qAd k 0, or qeM „ (d; 0). Suppose that gd= 13<0 and for some 
x e X : qx = ak- 1. Then a A k 0 exists such that gx+ gAd=a+113<1, 
which contradicts the statement above. Therefore X: g M+ (d; 0). From 
a similar argument it follows that Y* g_ M_ (d; 0). Thus X: and Y* 
are separated by a hyperplane containing zero, H(d; 0). 
Conversely, let H(d; 0) separate Al and /'t such that X: g_ M,(d; 0) 
and Yt M_ (d; 0). Let L:={AdiAeR} be a line with direction d and 
assume that L and X have no common orientation, i.e. L 0+ X = {0}. 
From property 9.3.2 it follows that Cl Cone n. (0+ Xn. It is also 
truc that L°, = M,(d; 0) and ROM = R"*. As L n 0+ X = {0}, by 
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Fig. 9.4.1. A pair of sets (X, Y) with common orientation 
assumption, it follows from property 9.3.5 that [L n 0 + X]°  =L° + 
(0 + X)'+' = M,(d; 0) + Cl Cone X: = R"*. This clearly contradicts the 
fact that X:. M, (d; 0) c R"*. A similar argument can be applied to 
show that L and Y have a common orientation. Therefore X and Y have 
a common orientation. EI 
The following theorem gives the relation between separation of X and 
Yin the primal and dual space without any restriction on X or Y. 
Property 9.4.2. (separation and duality) 
Let X be an aureole-reflexive set and Y be a star-reflexive set. Then: 
1. a hyperplane strongly separating X and Y exists if and only if: 
either (a) there does not exist a hyperplane separating X: and y: 
or (b) if a hyperplane containing zero exists supportingly separating 
X'+̀ and Y* then Rint(X: n Y) 4. 
2. (a) a hyperplane supportingly separating X and Y exists and (b) Rint 
(X n Y)=4) whenever the supportingly separating hyperplane con-
tains zero, if and only if: (a) a hyperplane supportingly separating 
X: and Y*_ exists and (b) Rint (Xt n Y*) = 49 whenever the support-
ingly separating hyperplane contains zero. 
Proof 
1. Let X and Y be strongly separated; then there exists a p such that for 
some open sets V and W is true: M, (p) VX and M_ (p) 2 W Y. 
Choose p 1 such that for g := pp, M , (q) 2 X and M _ (q) 2 Y. This kt 
exists since both V and W are open sets (see fig. 9.4.2). As M, (p) 2 
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M (q) 2 X and M_ (q) M_ (p) 2 Y, the line segment [p, q] is a subset 
of both X: n Yli` and the subspace H: = {reR"III.eR:r = Ap}. 
Suppose that X and Y have a common orientation; according to pro-
perty 9.4.1, X: and Yll` are separated by a subspace, which contains the 
subspace H. Because Rint (X: n Y1') 2 (p, q) # ij), condition (b) is met 
(see fig. 9.4.1). 
Suppose that l and Y have no common orientation (see fig. 9.4.2). Then, 
according to property 9.4.1, no separating subspace for X: and Y1P exists. 
Fig. 9.4.2. A pair of strongly separated sets and its polar sets 
But there is certainly also no separating hyperplane H(z) not containing 
zero. For, assuming that M, (z) X: and M_ (z) Y*, then according 
to property 9.2.3.6 {)z' A 1} .[M,(z)]*+̀ 5 X and {2.z I 0 5 2 5 1} = 
[M_ (z)] g Y, implying that ze(X n Y). This contradicts X and Y being 
strongly separated. 
Conversely, let (a) there not exist a hyperplane separating X: and 
Y*. Then the separation property 9.1.1 states that there exists a 
pe(Rint X: n Rint Y1'); let p be such that M, (p) X. As pe Rint X:, 
a qEX exists such that M, (p) M, (q) 2 X, and an open set V Cl X 
exists such that M (p) 2 V. It also follows that an open set W2 Cl Y 
exists such that M_ (p) 2 W. Therefore H(p) strongly separates X and Y. 
Finally, let (b) a subspace separating X: and Y exist such that Rint 
(X: n Y 21.)# (see fig. 9.4.1). Let r e Rint (X: n Y1") and M, (r) 2 X. 
Then 2< 1 and p> 1 exist such that p = Ar and q = pr, and (p, q) .g 
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Rint (X:n Y_*). Since M.,(r)= M + (p) 2 X and M_(r)=M_ (q) Y, it 
follows that H(r)strongly separates X and Y. 
2. Define the relevant propositions as follows: 
a := a hyperplane strongly separating X and Y exists; 
b:= a hyperplane separating X and Y exists; 
c := if a subspace supportingly separating X and Y exists then Rint 
(XnY)= 4); 
d: = a hyperplane supportingly separating X and Y exists. 
The negation is indicated by a bar, e.g. á, and the proposition for X: and 
Y. by an asterisk, e.g. a*. 
The statement to be proven is: d and c .=> d* and c*. 
The statement (1) says: 	 a b* or ë*; 
from which follows: á b* and c*, 
and 	 b and c •=.. . 
Therefore: 	 á and b and c <.> á* and b* and c*. 
Because it is truc by definition that: d<.>á and b, the statement follows. 
Fig. 9.4.3. Supportingly separating hyperplanes 
If the sets X and Y are slightly restricted, requiring that they do not 
have a common orientation or a common direction of recession, then the 
separation and duality property is reduced to the following (see also 
figs. 9.4.2 and 9.4.3): 
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Property 9.4.3. (separation and duality) 
Let X be an aureole-reflexive set and Y be a star-reflexive set such that 
V X n 0 + Y= {0} and there does not exist a hyperplane containing 
zero supportingly separating X and Y. Then: 
1. A hyperplane strongly separating X and Y exists if, and only if, a 
hyperplane separating X*, and Y*_ does not exist; 
2. A hyperplane supportingly separating X and Y exists if, and only if, 
a hyperplane supportingly separating X: and Y*_ exists. 
Proof 
This property follows directly from property 9.4.2, since the conditions 
(b) under (1) and (2) in that property are ruled out by the restriction that 
there be no subspace separating either X and Y, or X: and Y* (see 
property 9.4.1). El 
The separation properties of sets can equivalently be expressed in inter-
section properties of sets, as is done in what follows: 
Property 9.4.4. (intersection and duality) 
Let X be an aureole-reflexive set and Y be a star-reflexive set such that 
0 + X n 0 Y = {0} and there be no (n-1) dimensional subspace suppor-
tingly separating X and Y. Then: 
1. XnY=4, 	 Rint X: Rint Yt 0 0; 
2. X n Y #0 and X*, Yt (/) and 
Rint 	Rint Y = (1) } {Rint X: Rint Yt = 
If both X and Y have dimension n and do not contain a line, then: 
3. XnY=q5 	-t>. Int (Al: n Yt)00 ; 
4. X n Y 04, and X*
+ 	
4) n Yt 0 and 
Int (X n Y)=4) 	{Int (X: n Yt) =0. 
Proof 
According to the separation property 9.1.1, the non-existence of a 
hyperplane separating X and Y is equivalent to Rint X n Rint Y0 0. 
It can also be shown that a hyperplane strongly separating X and Y 
exists if, and only if, X n Y=4, (see also Weddepohl, 1973): 
Assume that an open set U exists such that for some hyperplane 
H(p) : M + (p) .2 t/ X and M _ (p) 2. Y. Then X n Y =4). 
Conversely, let X n Y be empty; then there exists a hyperplane separa- 
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ting X and Y, and some closed set V: = B( Y; e) such that VnX00 
(see fig. 9.4.4). As 0 + Y = 0 + V and 0 + Xn Y = {0}, it follows that 
O Xn0 + V= 0 + (XnV)= {0}. Therefore XnV is compact and a 
hyperplane H(p) strongly separating (X n V) and Y exists (see Berge, 
1959). 
Let p := min {px I xe X n V} and A:= sup{px I xe Y} ; then H(p; p) 
supports (X n V) and H(p; A) supports Y. As H(p) strongly separates 
(X n V) and Y, 2<1 <p and M_ (p) M. (p12) 2 Y. Therefore a set 
Fig. 9.4.4. The existence of a strongly separating hyperplane 
W := B (Y ; e) c V exists such that M_(p) W and (X n V) W = . 
Since W V, we have WnV =W, from which it follows that XnW =4). 
Because there exists a hyperplane separating X and W and Yc W, 
there exists a hyperplane strongly separating X and Y. 
The statements (1) and (2) are thus equivalent to (1) and (2) of property 
9.4.3. 
When both X and Y have dimension n, then Rint X = Int X and 
Int Xn Int Y= Int (XnY). Finally, if both X and Y do not contain lines, 
then xt. and Y* also have dimension n. Statements (3) and (4) follow (see 
fig. 9.4.3). D 
These results (especially property 9.4.4.3) may be compared with the 
following property which is valid for any set X and Yin R. 
Property 9.4.5. 
Let X and Y be sets in R. Then 
Int (Xn Y)00 X*, 	=4. 
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Proof 
Suppose that a p exists such that for all xeX: px 1 and for all ye Y: 
py _«.. 1. Choose ze Int Xr-, Int Y; then, according to properties 9.2.2.1 and 
9.2.3.1.,pz> 1 and pz <1. 13 
It should be noticed that in the properties in this section the sets X and Y 
can always be substituted by the sets X: and Y. 
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10. Multifunctions and duality 
The concept of a multifunction has been treated in 8.1, and some impor-
tant topological properties of multifunctions were defined and stated in 
8.2. In this chapter properties of multifunctions which depend on the 
linear or algebraic structure of the spaces in which and into which the 
multifunctions are defined will be studied. These spaces are assumed to be 
finite real Eucledian spaces. 
Emphasis is placed on a special class of multifunctions, viz.: convex 
processes (section 10.3), and its subclass, the convex cone-interior pro-
cesses (section 10.4). 
Properties of these processes and of operations on these processes are 
deduced in sections 10.3 and 10.4; properties of two important cases of 
convex cone-interior processes are derived in section 10.5. 
Firstly, however, operations on and some relevant properties of 
arbitrary multifunctions will be defined and stated (sections 10.1 and 
10.2). 
10.1. OPERATIONS ON MULTIFUNCTIONS 
The algebraic operations of combinations on multifunctions are given by 
the following definitions. Let f and g be multifunctions from Ie into R", 
and let x be any element from D (f) n D (g), x i eD( f) and x2eD(g). Then: 
addition off and g is defined by: 
(f+ g) (x) = f(x) + g (x) ; 
inverse addition off and g is defined by: 
(f * g) (x) : = U {f(x 1 )ng(x2)1x 1 + x2 = x}; 
JCI,X2 
conjunction off and g is defined by: 
(f A g) (x):= f(x) n g (x); 
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disjunction off and g is defined by: 
(fv g) (x):=U{f(x,)+ g(x2)Ix i + x2 = x}. 
JCI,X2 
Let f be a multifunction from Ir —> Ir and A be any scalar, then 
scalar multiplication off by A is defined by: 
(Af)(x):= Af(x)= {AyiyEf(x)}. 
Let f:R1 —)Rm and g: 	-+ R" be multifunctions, then 
multiplication (or composition) off and g is defined by: 
(gf) (x):= g[f(x)] =U {g (y) yef(x)}. 
These operations are called linear functional operations and have been 
defined by Rockafellar (1967 and 1970). They are closely related to the 
operations on sets defined in 8.4 (see e.g. property 10.1.1) and can some-
times be ordered (see property 10.2.7). Examples are given in fig. 10.1.1 
and 10.1.2; the operation of addition implies vertical adding, while 
inverse addition implies horizontal adding of the multifunctions since the 
graphs G(f) and G(g) are partially added, according to the operation # 
in fig. 8.3.4. Conjunction and disjunction imply intersection and addition 
of the graphs: 
G(f Ag) = G(f)n G(g); 
G(fv g) = G(f)+ G(g). 
Fig. 10.1.1. Addition (+) and in- Fig. 10.1.2. Disjunction (v) and 
verse addition (#) of multifunctions conjunction (A) of multifunctions 
The four combinatorial operations on multifunctions can thus equi- 
valently be defined through different modes of partial addition of the 
graphs of the multifunctions. A relation between the combinatorial 
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operations on multifunctions and on sets is given by the following pro-
perty: 
Property 10.1.1. (operations on sets, resp. multifunctions) 
Let X and Y be sets in R" and letf and g be multifunctions from R, into 
R" defined by ƒ(2): = AX and g (p): = p Y. Then: 
(f + g)(1) = X+ Y; 
(.1* g)(1) = X (2.1 Y; 
(j g)(1) = X n Y; 
( ƒv g)(1) = X -7- Y. 
Analogously to the convex operations defined on convex sets in section 
8.3, convex operations on multifunctions can be defined on convex 
multifunctions. A multifunction : R'--›R" is said to be convex if its 
graph is a convex set. 
Letf and g be convex multifunctions from /C into R"; let x be any 
element from D (f) n D(g), xle D(f), x2eD(g), and 0 + 	1. Then 
convex addition of and g is defined by: 
(f 4- g)(x):= U {(1--)Mx1)+ Ag (x 2)1 x = (1— A.) x = 2} ; 
.1,x,,x2 
convex inverse addition off and g is defined by: 
( 	g)(x):= U {(1— a)f(x i) n Ag(x2)1 x = (1- A.)x i + 2-x2} ; 
convex conjunction off and g is defined by: 
(J* iex g)(x):= U {(1 — 2.)f(x i) n ag (x2)I x = (1— 2) x = 2} ; 
convex disjunction off and g is defined by: 
( 	g)(x) := U {(1 —)f(x j) + ag(x2)1 x = (1— A) x t + 1x2}. 
These operations are called convex (functional) operations. The relation 
between these convex functional operations and convex operations on 
sets may be deduced from the following equations: 
G(ƒ ik g) = G(j) ;=) G(g); 
G(f,  Z1 g) = G(ƒ)+' G(g). 
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If one defines an operation for convex sets analogous to partial addition 
of sets, say convex partial addition, then convex conjunction and convex 
disjunction may be considered as being extreme cases of convex partial 
addition, and both convex addition and convex inverse addition as inter-
mediate cases. 
These convex functional operations will be shown to play the same role 
in duality theory as do the convex operations on sets (see properties 
9.3.4 and 10.4.6). Convex functional operations also coincide with linear 
functional operations if they are applied to convex proceses the graph 
of which is a cone: 
Property 10.1.2. (convex and linear functional operations) 
Let f and g be convex multifunctions from 121" into R", such that both 






Since G(f) and G(g) are convex cones, they are closed under the opera-
tions of addition and non-negative scalar multiplication (see section 8.3). 
Therefore, if (x, y) E G(f) and A k 0, then (Ax, Ay)e G(f), orf(2.x) = Af(x). 
Since in the convex operations x 1 = x/(1 — )) and x2 = x/().), and since 
the argument above implies that (1 —.)f(x 1 ) = f(x) and Ag(x2)= g(x), 
the definitions of the convex operations coincide with those of the linear 
operati ons. 13 
I turn next to dual operations on a multifunction. These operations can 
be defined pointwise and on the graph of the multifunction. Pointwise 
dual operations are called polarity operations, as the polar set is defined 
for each image set (see section 9.2). 
Let f : 	—■ R" be a multifunctioa. 'Then 
the lower polar multifunction * f : Rm—>12"* is defined by 
f(x) := If(x)r_ , 	for all x ED(f); 
the upper polar multifunction 	le—>r* 	is defined by 
f(x) := [f(x)]*.,. , 	for all x e D(f). 
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Property 10.1.3. (continuity of polar multifunctions) 
Let f: le—q?" be a point-closed and point-convex multifunction such 
that f is either point-starred or point-aureoled; let *f be correspondingly 
*f andtf. Then: 
1. f being u.h.c. implies that *f is 1.h.c; 
2. f beingl.h.c. implies that *f is graph-closed. 
Proof 
1. Let f be point-starred and u.h.c. (by property 8.2.2. f is also graph-
closed). 
Fig. 10.1.3. f point-starred and u.h.c. 
Choose XED (f), pet fix) such that p 0 0, and an open set W containing p 
(see fig. 10.1.3). Since l`f is point-starred and point-convex, W may be 
chosen aureoled without loss of generality (V zeD(ƒ): f(z)(-1W =0 
f(z)n Aur W = 0). 
From property 9.4.2.1 it follows that f(x) and Ir, are strongly separa-
ted. Choose an open set U 2 f(x); sincef is u.h.c., an open set V _9 D(f) 
exists such that for all ze V, f(z) g U, or f(z) and Wt are strongly 
separated (see property 8.2.1.1). Again from property 9.4.2.1, it follows 
that for all ze V, Int (tf(z) n Cl W) 04),  or *_ f(z)r) W 0 4,. 
If pe W was chosen above such that p = 0, then evidently for all ze V, 
Oet f(z)nW. Therefore, by property 8.2.1.2, t f is 1.h.c. 
An analogous argument can be applied in the case of f being point-
aureoled. For this case, Weddepohl (1973, p. 21) has shown that  *+f is 
1.h.c. if f is graph-closed and an e exists such that for all xeD(tf), 
tf(x) n B(0 ; e) = 4). 
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2. Let f be point-starred and 1.h.c. 
Choose xeD(f), ptt f(x) and an open set W containing p, such that 
l'f(x) and W are strongly separated. From property 9.4.2.1, it follows 
thatf(x) and W1`. have interior points in common, orf(x)n Int Hit 0 0. 
Sincef is 1.h.c., there exists an open set V g D(f) such that for all ze V, 
f(Z) n Int W: 0 0. 
Therefore tf(z) n Cl W =d) and tf(z)n W =1), implying that t f is 
graph-closed. 
The case of f being point-aureoled has been proven by Weddepohl 
(1973, p. 21). 13 
Dual operations which are defined on the graph of the multifunction are 
called adjoint operations. It will be shown in 10.3.4 that the adjoint of a 
multifunction is a generalization of the well-known adjoint of a linear 
transformation, which is defined as follows: let f: le—d?" be a linear 
transformation; then the adjoint f* : R"—)R" is defined by qf(x)= 
f*(q)x, for all q and x. 
The adjoint defined below is also a generalization of the adjoint 
defined by Rockafellar (1972) for convex cone processes (see section 
10.3). The analogy between both definitions is of the same nature as the 
analogy between linear and convex operations drawn above. 
Due to the fact that only in the linear case f(— x)= —f(x),it is neces-
sary to distinguish two adjoint operations: 
Let!: Ir-÷R" be a multifunction. Then 
the lower adjoint multifunction f_* : R"—>ir* is defined by: 
f!(q):= {pi Vx, Vyef(x): px qy+1}; 
the upper adjoint multifunctiont: : R" —>12" is defined by 
f. (q):= {p t Vx, Vy ef(x) : px qy- 
It can be easily shown that the adjoint multifunctions can equivalently 
be defined by means of the polar set of the graph: 
(q) = {pi (p, — q)e [G(ƒ)]*_} ; 
f: (q) = {pI(— p, q) e [G (f)]t). 
This method of notation also indicates that the difference between both 
adjoint multifunctions is only a question of signs and is therefore of a 
much simpler nature than the difference between the two polar sets or 
multifunctions. It should be repeated that: 
!f(x) = {q1Vy ef(x): qy 1); 
f(x) = {q1Vyef(x): qy k 1}. 
191 
For two special classes of multifunctions, the relation between the polar 
and adjoint multifunction is derived (see property 10.5.3). 
The various dual and inverse multifunctions are related as follows: 





R" 	 R" f_ 1  
The properties of the operations will be analyzed in section 10.3, et al. 
10.2 PROPERTIES OF MULTIFUNCTIONS 
Let f : R"— >Rh be a multifunction on R" into itself; then xeR" is called a 
fixed point of f if xef(x). 'The following property has been shown by 
Kakutani (1941). 
Property 10.2.1. (Kakutani fixed point theorem) 
Let X be a non-empty, compact and convex subset of R"; if f is a point 
closed, point convex, u.h.c. multifunction from X into X such that 
D(f)= X, thenf has a fixed point. 




This theorem has been extended by Ky Fan (1952) to topological spaces 
other than the Euclidean n-space. The Kakutani fixed point theorem is a 
generalization of a fixed point theorem for functions which has been 
proven by Brouwer (1909): 
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Property 10.2.2. (Brouwer fixed point theorem) 
Let X be a non-empty, compact and convex subset of R"; iff is a conti-
nuous function from X into X, thenf has a fixed point, i.e. an xe X exists 
such that x =f(x). 
A multifunction f: le-->Rn is said to be convex if its graph is a convex 
set. A multifunctionf : Ril"->R'" with a convex effective domain is convex 
if and only if for all x and y in D (f) and ).e[0, 1], 
[ (1 - A) f(x) + 2ƒ(y)]gf((1- ).)x+ Ay). 
A multifunction f: Bill-J?" is said to be quasi-convex if its inverse 
multifunction f : R"-> k" is point-convex. A multifunction f : -› R" 
with a convex effective domain is quasi-convex if and only if for all x and 
y in D (f) and 2e[0, 1], 
[f(x)nf(y)] .gf((1- A) x + )y). 
Both propertjes have been shown by Jacobson (1970); quasi-convex 
multifunctions are represented in fig. 10.1.1. 
Let f: D- R1 be a real valued function with D le. The function f is 
said to be concave if its less closure f_ : D-R' is a convex multi-
function, i.e. if G(f_) is a convex set. The function f is concave if and 
only if for all x and y in D and ..%e[0, 1], 
[(1 - f(x) + ,11(y)] f((1 - .1)x+ Ay). 
The functionf is said to be convex if -f is concave. 
The functionfis said to be quasi-concave if its less closuref_ is a quasi-
convex multifunction, i.e. if (f_) - is point-convex. The function f is 
quasi-concave if and only if for all x and y in D and .e[0, 1], 
min {f(x), f(y)} f((1 - x + Ay). 
The functionf is said to be quasi-convex if -f is quasi-concave. 
Letf and g be real valued functions. Wand g are quasi-concave, the alge-
braic operations are defined as follows (compare figs. 10.1.1 and 10.1.2): 
(f + g) (x) := f(x)+ g (x); 
(f g) (x) : = sup {min {f(xi ), g (x2)} I x = x i + x2 } ; 
(f A g) (x) := min {f(x), g (x)} ; 
(f v g) (x) := sup {f(x i ) +f(x2) x = x 1 +x2 }. 
A multifunction : le-->R" is said to be quasi-concave if its inverse mul- 
tifunction is point-concave, i.e. if D(f)V-1 (y) is convex for all yeR(f). 
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An example of a quasi-concave multifunction is the preference mul-
tifunction C defined in section 3.8. 
It can be shown that a multifunctionf : R"- >I?" with a convex effective 
domain is quasi-concave if and only if for all x and y in D(f) and 2. in 
[0, 1]: 
[f(x)U.ƒ(y)] 2 ./((1- - A)x+ AY)- 
Choosing x, y from D(f)V-1 (z) implies that zstf(x)uf(y), or 
[(1 - il)x+ Ay] E D (f)V - 1 (z), for any )e[0, 1]; therefore f ' is point-
concave. Conversely, suppose that for some A, there exists a zef((1 - ,1)x 
+2y) and zftf(x)of(y). Then [(1 -2)x + .1.y]0 D (f)V ' (z) and x, y E 
D(J)\J' '(z). This contradicts the convexity of D (f)\f -1 (z). 
Comparison with the operations on multifunctions (defined in section 
10.1) makes it clear that for quasi-concave functions max (or sup) is 
substituted for union, and min (or inf) is substituted for intersection. 
In most cases, the inclusion sign g used for multifunctions replaces the 
inequality sign .. used for functions. An exception is formed by the 
(quasi-) convex (resp. concave) function defined above, for which the 
inequality sign is the opposite of the inclusion sign for (quasi-) convex 
(resp. concave) multifunctions. The definition of a concave function, 
however, in too widely accepted for me to change its name here into 
a convex function. The definitions in this book follow the definition that 
a convex multifunction has a convex graph. 
Letf: R"'->R" be a multifunction. Thenf is said to be starred iff is point- 
starred andf is point-aureoled ;j" is said to be aureoled iff -1 is starred. 
These definitions imply that D(f) is an aureoled set whenever f is 
starred (see fig. 10.2.3) and that R(f) is a starred set if fis aureoled (see 
fig. 10.2.2). 
Let j": R7 n- ›R" be a multifunction. Then j" is said to be homothetic 
if for all x„ x2 ED(f), a p> 0 exists such thatf(x i) = pf(x2). 
The following property follows from property 9.3.4.5: 
Property 10.2.3. (homotheticity and duality) 
A starred (resp. aureoled) multifunction f : le ->R" is homothetic if and 
only if its polar multifunction tf: Ie -->R" is homothetic. 
If, for example, for some x 1 , x2 e D (fl:fix i) = lif(x2 ), then p *f(x l) = 
tf(x2). It should be noticed that the union of the boundaries of the image 
sets does not need to be equal to R(f), as is shown in fig. 10.2.2. 
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Fig. 10.2.2. An aureoled homothetic multifunction, f: R.,..->R 2+ , and the 
boundaries of its image sets in R 2 . 
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Let f: 	 R" be a multifunction such that D(f)is a cone. Thenf is said 
to be homogeneous of degree k if for all non-zero xe D (f) and .>O: 
f(Ax)= 
f is said to be linear homogeneous iff is homogeneous of degree 1. 
Property 10.2.4. (homogeneity of inverses and polars) 
Let f 	— Ir be a multifunction. 
1. f is homogeneous of degree k if and only if 
f -1 is homogeneous of degree 1/k; 
2. Iff is starred (resp. aureoled) then: 
f is homogeneous of degree k if and only if *f is homogeneous of 
degree —k. 
Proof 
1. G (f) = {(2.x, »52)1 yef(x)} = {(.11 x, Ay)lyef(x), 1:= lik), as by defi-
nitionf is homogeneous ; from: 
G(f 	= {(y, x)1(x, y)e G (f)} = {(2y, 21 x)I xef - 1 (y), 1= lik} 
the statement follows. 
2. From property 9.3.4.5 it follows that [Akf(x)]* =  
the statement follows from the definition of *f (see also fig. 10.2.3 and 
property 10.5.1.5). Ej 
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Fig. 10.2.3. A starred homogeneous multifunction of degree 2, and ijs 
polar multtfunction, homogeneous of degree —2. 
Let ƒ: lr—>R" be a multifunction and let x and y be elements of D(f). 
Thenƒ is said to be super additive if 
f(x)+f(y) fix +Y); 
ƒ is said to be sub additive if 
f(x)+f(y) .f(X Y) • 
As a convex cone is closed under the operations of addition and non-
negative scalar multiplication, the condition that a multifunction be super 
additive and linear homogeneous is equivalent to the graph of the multi-
function being a convex cone. 
Let ƒ: Rrn R" be a multifunction and let x 1 and x2 be any pair of ele-
ments of D(f), and yi , y2 any pair of elements of R(f). If 
xi 15_ x2 	implies 	f(x1 ) .ƒ.(x2) 
and y, :5_ y2 	implies 	-1 (y1) 2ƒ' (y2), then f  is said to be a 
monotone increasing multifunction. A multifunction is said to be monotone 
decreasing if its inverse is a monotone increasing multifunction. 
Monotone multifunctions are characterized by the fact that the image 
sets contain all elements greater (resp. smaller) than any given element 
in the set according to the partial order relation (compare fig. 10.2.4 
and 10.2.5). 
Property 10.2.5. (monotone multifunctions) 
Let ƒ: Ir-+ I?" be a multifunction. Then the following statements under 1, 
resp. 2, are equivalent: 
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1. a. je is monotone increasing; 
b. ƒ(Less x) = J._ (x)= f(x); 
c. Less {( — x, y)iyef(x)} = {( — x, y) I y ef(x)}. 
2. a. ƒ is monotone decreasing; 
b. ƒ(More x) .---ƒ, (x) =ƒ(x); 
c. More {( — x, y) I y eƒ(x)} = {( — x, y) j y eƒ(x)}. 
Proof 
1. b. ƒ(Less x) = v {ƒ(z) j z <__ x} = u { f(z)lf(z) g_ f(x)} = f(x). 
yi y2 .ƒ -1 (yi) 2ƒ -1 (y2) is equivalent to 
Y1 5 Y2 efix) .J'ie.f(x), or .ƒ.-. (x) g..f(x); 
since_f_ is a closure off, ƒ_. 2 f; thereforef_ =ƒ. 
Le.  
— 2 —xandp -y}. 
Since — -2 —x, or 5-c k x implies ƒ(2) 2ƒ(x) and as p yef(x) implies 
37 Ej-(x), it follows that ( — 2, De {( — x, y) I y ef(x)} . 
The inverse inclusion, 2 , is implied by the fact that a less closure 
always contains the closed set. 
2. Similar arguments can be appfied to monotone decreasing multi-
functions (see fig. 10.2.5). Ei 
Fig. 10.2.4. A monotone increasing Fig. 10.2.5. A monotone decreas-
multifunction 	 ing multifunction 
A multifunction f: Rn.,1 -+ R",. is said to be a non-negative monotone 
multifunction if fis monotone increasing or decreasing, D(f) is a cone in 
1ZZ and R (f) is a cone in R' 4.. Non-negative monotone multifunctions 
play an important part in economie theory (see chapters 3 and 4). 
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Property 10.2.6. (non-negative monotone multifunctions) 
Let f : R—>R".i. be a non-negative monotone multifunction. 
Iff is monotone increasing, thenf is starred. 
Iff is monotone decreasing, thenf is aureoled. 
Proof 
Let f be monotone increasing; then for all y„ y2 eR(f), )7, y2 implies 
f -1 (y i ) 2f-1 (y 2 ). Choose xef -1 (y2), then 0 <Yi 1< y2 implies y i ef(x), 
or [0, y2 ] Thus f(x) is point starred. Conversely, choose some 
)7eD(f) and some 37 effic). If f 1()  is not an aureoled set, then a 
2 >1 exists such that 2.Z is not an element of f (7), or yOf(AS). As 
and "</1.57, it follows by definition that J7 ef(5?) gf(1.Z). This 
contradicts 	ƒ) not being aureoled. 
A similar reasoning can be applied to show the second implication. El 
The algebraic operations of combinations can be rather simply ordered 
if the multifunctions are non-negative monotone. The following property 
can be easily verified from the definitions (see also figs. 10.1.1 and 10.1.2): 
Property 10.2.7. (algebraic operations on monotone multifunctions) 
Let f and g be non-negative monotone multifunctions from R7 into 
If they are monotone increasing, then: 
(f g) (in g) _(fv g) (1+9); 
if they are monotone decreasing, then: 
(f g) 2 (f A g) 2 (fv g) 2 (f+ g). 
10.3. CONVEX PROCESSES 
Let f : Rm—>R" be a multifunction; f is said to be a convex process if its 
graph, G(f), is a closed and convex set (see fig. 10.3.1). Any convex 
process f: Rm—>R" determines uniquely a closed and convex set, i.e. 
its graph, in 
On the other hand, it is possible to determine a unique convex process 
from a given closed and convex set if a bisection of the Euclidean space 
in which the set is contained is also given. A bisection of a real Euclidean 
n-space is said to be an ordered pair of non-zero subspaces (R', R") such 
that their direct sum is equal to the real Euclidean n-space, i.e. 
Ri ED R"' = R". 
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Fig. 10.3.1. A convex process f and its inverse f -1 
1f, for example, the closed and convex set F:= G(f) in fig. 10.3.1 is 
given and le is bisected in (X, Y), resp. the x-axis and the y-axis, then 
the convex process f: X-> Y is defined by f(x):= {y1(x, y)EF}. The 
bisection of R 2 in (Y, X) generates the convex process g (y) = 
{XI (x, y)EF}, which is equal to the inverse off, i.e. g =f 1 .  
Property 10.3.1. (convex processes) 
Let f: -› R" be a convex process. Then: 
1. for all x, yeD(f) and 2.E[0, 1]: 
(1 - f(x) + 2f(y) f((1- 2)x + )y); 
2. f is point-convex; 
3. f is point-closed; 
4. f is lower hemi-continuous; 
5. f1  is a convex process; 
6. f: and fl* are convex processes. 
Proof 
1. Equivalent tof being convex (see 10.2). 
2. The intersection of two convex sets is convex (see 8.3.3). 
3. The intersection of two closed sets is closed (see 8.2). 
4. Let W be an open convex set in R(f ). 
If V: =f -1 (W) = {x1f(x)nW 00} is open in D(f), then f is 1.h.c. 
Assume that V is not open (see fig. 10.3.2): then there exists an eBnd 
Vr V. Since f is a convex process, V is a convex set and an open con-
vex set M exists such that 5c" eC1 M, and for each xeM : f(x) W=4  
(otherwise xe V and V would be open). 
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Fig. 10.3.2. A multifunction which is not Lh.c. 
For some ô>0 and 9e Wnf(Tc), the set N := {ye WI ly—ƒ1<ó} is an 
open and convex set such that for each xeM: f(x)nN =0. Choose 
any ze M and yef(z); then a Ae(0, 1) exists such that ). ly—yi<ó, or 
9 +.1(y )7) e N. Since M is convex, +1(z — .R) e M; this implies that 
f(t- + 2 (z — 5)) n N = 4 , thus contradicting the convexity off, by which 
f(,)7 +1(z — 50) 2 f(Fc) + 2.(f(z)— fM), which latter set contains 
y+.1(y—DeN. 
5. G (f ')= {(y, x)iyef(x)} is a closed and convex set. 
6. G (fI') = {(g, p)I(p, — g)e [G (f )]*_} is closed and convex (from pro-
perty 9.2.3.4). The same is true for G (f:) (see property 9.2.2.4). Compare 
also fig. 10.3.3. CI 
It must be emphasized that a convex process need not be upper semi 
continuous. This can be verified from the following counter example: 
Consider the functionj : 	defined by 
x =j(/, k):= (/ -2 +1c -2) - ". 
This function belongs to the class of constant elasticity of substitution-
production functions developed by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas and 
Solow (1961). The function J  is linear homogeneous and concave. The 
non-negative less closure of fis the multifunctionf : defined by 
f(I, k): = {xlx 5(1' + 2) - "}. 
The inverse off is the multifunction g:12 ± ->R 24. defined by 
g (x): = {(I, k)lx g (I' + 2) - "} = f 
As G(g) is closed and convex, g is a convex process; in fact, g is a convex 
cone process. 
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Fig. 10.3.3. Duality operations related lof 
Next, take a closed set A := {(1, k)10 1, 0 k 	in R(g), as shown 
in fig. 10.3.4. The image of A is equal to g - '(A)=f(A)= {xeR.,.1 
x (1 -2 +1) -0 . 5 } = [0, 1). Since g -1 (A) is not closed, g is not u.h.c. 
Fig. 10.3.4. A convex process which is not u.h.c. 
k 
• f/ /, 
AriZ":1-ffor ..r.47491fefl—r 
Let J. : 	—› .1?" be a convex process: thenf is said to be a convex cone 
process if G(f) is a cone (see fig. 10.3.5);ƒ is said to be a convex polyhedral 
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process if G(f) is a polyhedral cone, i.e. if G(f) can be expressed as the 
intersection of a finite collection of closed half-spaces. 
Property 10.3.2. (convex cone processes) 
Let f : "—)R" be a convex cone process. Then: 
1. fis superadditive, i.e. for any x, ye D(f) : 
f(x+Y) 2.1.(x)+1.(Y); 
2. f is Linear homogeneous, i.e. for any xeD(f) and >0, 
ƒ(2-x) = 1.f(x); 
3. 0 ef(0); 
4• f1  is a convex cone process; 
5. f* andf: are convex cone processes; 
6. f(0) is the recession cone of f(x) for all xeD(f). 
Proof 
Conditions (1), (2) and (3) are necessary and sufficient for G(f) to be a 
convex cone (see 8.3); e.g. (a, x)eG(f) and (b, y)eG(f) imply that 
(a + b, x+y)eG(f). Condition (4) follows from G(f - 1 ) = {(y, x)I(x, y)e 
G(f)}. Condition (5) follows from property 9.2.5.3, implying that 
[G(f)1 t =[G(f)] °_, which is a closed convex cone. 
Condition (6) follows from property 8.3.1 which states that Conint 
G(f) equals the recession cone. As Conint G(f)= G(f), f(0)= 
G(f)n{(0, y) y ER"} determines the set of directions parallel to R" in 
which G(f) is unbounded. Thus f(0) is the recession cone of f(x) = 
{y1(x, y)e G(f)} for every xeD(f). El 
The two following convex cone processes can be associated with any 
convex process f : RP"-->R". The cone closure of f is said to be the multi-
functionf, : le—*R" defined by 
fc(x) = {y1 (x, y)e Cone G (f)} ; 
the cone opening off is said to be the multifunction ft, : R"-÷R" defined by 
ƒ„(x): = {y I (x, y) e Conint G(f)}. 
As both Cone G(f) and Conint G(f), if non-empty, are closed and con-
vex cones with vertex 0, the multifunctions fc and f, are convex cone 
processes (see fig. 10.3.5). 
Convex polyhedral processes belong to a class of convex cone processes 
for which many important properties have been derived. A well known 
example is the von Neuman process f: R"—>R" defined for two matrices 
A and B byf(x): = {y I 3zeR7 : 0 x Az and 0 y Bz}. 
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Fig. 10.3.5. Convex cone processes: the cone closure Land the cone open-
ing fe of the process f in fig. 10.3.1. 
f dx ) 
   
    
These convex polyhedral processes have been studied by Rockafellar 
(1972) who has proven the following property: 
Property 10.3.3. (convex polyhedral processes) 
Let f and g be two convex polyhedral processes from K" into R", and 
h a convex polyhedral process from Ri into 
1. Then the processes Af,f+g,f Ag,fv g and fh are all convex polyhedral 
processes; 
2. let f*  be defined by f *(q):= {p1Vx, Vyef(x): px gy}; then: 
(f. ± g)* = 	± g* ; 	 (f h)* = h* f * ; 
	
^g)* = f* v g* ; (fv g)* = f* A g* ; 
(Af)* = .11*, for ).> 0. 
This property is not valid for arbitrary convex cone processes, because 
operations on those processes do not always preserve closedness of the 
graphs of the processes. In the next section a special class of convex 
processes will be defined, viz., the convex cone-interior process, which 
has properties analogous to those of a convex polyhedral process and 
which is a generalization of that process.. 
A multifunction f: Rm .Rn  is said to be a superlinear process if it is a 
convex cone process such that f(0) = {0}. The theory of superlinear 
processes may be considered as a generalization of the theory of non-
negative matrices. Spectral properties and optimal trajectories for convex 
polyhedral processes have been studied by Rockafellar (1972) and for 
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superlinear processes by Makarov and Rubinov (1970). These dynamic 
properties will not be treated in this study. 
Property 10.3.4. (Inverse and adjoint processes) 
Let f : 121"->R" be a convex process. Then: 
1. (ft)*, = 	= f; 
2. (.ƒ.2`) -1 = 	i r+ ; 
(fit) -1 = 
Proof 
1. The graph of fl` is equal to G(f.:)= [(q, p)I(p, -q)e[G(f)]*_}; 
the lower polar set of this graph equals [G(f_*)]*_ = {(y, x) I (x, -y)e 
G(f)}, as G(f) is refiexive under this operation (see property 9.2.2.4). 
This set generates the adjoint process of f!(q), which by definition is 
equal to (r)*,(x) = {y1(-y, x)e[G(f!)]*_}. For any x, the set (f.t)*,. (x) 
reduces to {y1(x, y) e G (f)} = f(x). 
A similar argument is valid for (f.r.)*_. 
2. By definition (see 10.1), G(f_*)= [(q, p)j(p, -q)e[G(f)]*_}. The 
inverse (ft) -1 gives G[(f2 .̀) -1]= [(p, q)I(p, -q)e[G(f) ]*_}. Conversely, 
G(f -1 )= {(y, j(x, 	G(ƒ)} 	and 	G[Cf')*+]= [(p, q)I(-q, p)e 
[G(f ')]*_} = {(p, q)I(p, -q)e[G(f)]} = G[(ft) -1 ]. 
A similar argument is valid for the other equation. D 
Property 10.3.4 indicates in addition that both the adjoint operation and 
the inverse operation are `orientation reversing'; this can also be seen 
from figures 10.3.1 and 10.3.3. 
Property 10.3.5. (adjoints) 
Let f : le'->R" be a convex process and let f: and f * from R"* into le* 
be the adjoint processes off, i.e., for all q and x: 
f!(q)• x < q. f(x)+1; 
f.:(q)• x k q • f(x)-1. 
If G(f) is a cone, i.e. if f is a convex cone process, then, for all q and x: 
f _* (q)• x < q- f(x) 
f:(q)• x k_ q • f(x), 
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and if G(f) is a subspace with f(0) bounded, i.e. if f is a linear process, 
then, for all q and x: 
J.: (q) • x = 	(q) • x = q • f(x). 
Proof 
According to property 9.2.5.3, [G(f)]°_ = [Cone G(ƒ)]*_ Therefore, if 
G(f) is a cone then px + qy 1 implies px+ qy 0, for all (p, q)e[G(ƒ)]*_, 
or px 5_ (— q)y + 1 implies px If G(f) is a subspace, then 
yef(x) implies — yef(— x). Thus f* (q) = {plpx qy and px qy; for 
all yef(x) and x}. El 
When ir is a linear transformation, J" may be represented by a matrix A; 
the adjoint processf* is then equal to A*, the transpose of matrix A, and 
(A* q)x = q(Ax). Thereforef * may be considered as a generalization of the 
adjoint in linear algebra. This also explains the change of sign in the 
definitions given on page 191 of the adjoint multifunctions. 
The duality theorem in (non-)linear programming can be generalized 
by means of the adjoint process. The elements of the adjoint process can 
be seen as vectors of Lagrange-multipliers corresponding to the con-
straints generated by a convex polyhedral process. 
Let f : le—> IC be a starred convex process. The primal problem is to 
find a vector yeffl) such that 43, is maximized. The dual problem is to 
find a vector pijl (g) such that p is minimized. The following property 
can be demonstrated: 
Property 10.3.6. (duality theorem) 
Let the function : f(i) x fir (g)—)R', defined by p (y, : = ij y + p5e have 
a saddle point (y, p), i.e. 
Ii(Y,/3) 	11 (7, P) 	it(f , p). 
Then 3  solves the primal problem, 	solves the dual problem and 
4ƒ, = p5e +1. 
Proof 
fi(y, p) :5_ 	, p) is equivalent to 
max p(y, j5)= p (j",  fi)= , + )55Z. Since p5"c is constant, y is the solution 
y f(x) 
to the prima! problem. 
Moreover, z (ƒ, p) pij,  p) is equivalent to 
min p(9, p) = p(ƒ, /5), which implies the solution of the dual problem. 
per,(4) 
From the definition off() it follows that p:x. = qy -1. EI 
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A similar property is valid when the primal problem is minimization of a 
linear function over an aureoled constraint set (this is the dual problem 
above). It is evident that ijy = 	WI- is a convex cone process. Hl- is also 
a polyhedral process and defined by ƒ(c): = {ye R1,1 Ay 	then the 
relevant dual set of constraints is equal tof*  (4) = {p e R".,1 A* p k 4). 
10.4. CONVEX CONE-INTERIOR PROCESSES 
The class of convex processes as a whole is not closed under the algebraic 
operations defmed in section 10.1, and this is also the case for the sub-
class of convex cone processes. It has been shown, however, that the 
sub-class of convex polyhedral processes is closed under all algebraic 
operations defined in section 10.1 (see property 10.3.3). In this section a 
convex process will be defined which is indeed closed under all algebraic 
operations defined in section 10.1, but which need not be a convex cone 
process, i.e. linear homogeneity and super additivity are not required. 
In some cases, one may convert a convex set or a convex process into a 
convex cone, resp. a convex cone process by adding one, resp. two dimen-
sions to the spaces in which they are defined, but this conversion to 
theory cannot be again reduced to the convex case if combina-
torial operations, such as addition, and duality operations are involved. 
Conversion to cones may be sensible when multiplying a process with 
itself to study trajectories of that process, but not if aggregation of pro-
cesses is also involved. 
Let ƒ: R' "-q?" be a convex process;f is said to be a convex cone-interior 
process if R(f) and R(f -1) are cones and if ƒ(0) = ƒ,(0) and f -1 (0) = 
fc -1 (4 
Since ƒc is the cone closure of a convex process f  (see section 10.3), 
ƒc (0) is a cone and ƒ(0) is necessarily a cone. This definition implies that 
the graph of a convex cone-interior process is a closed, convex and un-
bounded set containing the origin on its boundary; it also implies that the 
projection of the graph 011 R", resp. R", is a cone. The conditions forƒ(0) 
and f -1 (0) in the definition are necessary in order to guarantee that the 
range and domain of the adjoint processes are cones (see property 
10.4.1.2). Examples of convex cone-interior processes are given in figs. 
10.4.1 and 10.5.2, which may be compared with fig. 10.3.1, 10.3.3, or 
10.4.2, not giving a convex cone-interior process. 
The behavior of a convex cone-interior process f  in the immediate 
neighborhood of the origin is characterized by ƒc, the cone closure off. 
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Fig. 10.4.1. A convex cone-interior process f and its adjoints f,* and f * 
The behavior off in the infinite is characterized byfi„ the cone opening of 
f, which by definition is not empty. If the behavior of a convex process 
near the origin and in the infinite is identical, then the cone opening and 
cone closure of the process coincide and the process reduces to a convex 
cone process, which behaves superlinearly. 
It may be noticed that the behavior of a convex process near the origin 
determines the behavior at the infinite of the adjoint process, and vice 
versa. This important duality property follows from property 10.4.1, 
from which it can be deduced that the cone closure of a convex process 
determines the cone opening of the adjoint process, and the cone opening 
of a convex process determines the cone closure of the adjoint process. 
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Property 10.4.1. (duality for cone closures and cone openings) 
Let/. : 	>1?" be a convex cone-interior process and letf: : 	R" be 
its upper adjoint process. Then: 
1. [G (ƒ0)]*_ = [Conint G(ƒ)]*_ = Cl Cone [G (Dr. = 
[G (f)] = [Cl Cone G(f )]*_ = Conint [G(f)]*_ = G[(— f:); 
2. R(ƒ) = R(f0) 	(f. ' 	= (f.) ' 
RUin = R[(.1.+)0] •> f -1 (D) f 1 (0). 
Proof 
I. By definition G(J) = {(q, p)I(—p, q)e [G (f)]}; therefore 
= {(p, q)I(p, q)e[G(ƒ)]*_} = [G (ƒ)]*._ 
The first line of the statement follows from the definitions of fc and J:) , 
and from property 9.3.1.2; the second line results when one applies the 
polar operation to property 9.3.1.2. 
2. Assume that R(f) 0 R(1-0); then a hyperplane H(0, exists such that 
the half-space M. q) 2 G(f0) and M_ (0, 4) G (f) (see fig. 10.4.2). 
From the definition of a lower polar set and from (1) above, it follows 
that (0, 4) e [G(.4)]*_ = G[( — fr)»]; also (0, 4)0[G(ƒ)] *.1= 
Therefore Eur:V 1 (0) and 40(f:) -1 (0), from which it can be seen that 
(ƒ:-`) -1 (0) 0 (f+); 1 (0). 
The converse statement follows by reversing the reasoning. The second 
equivalence follows from a similar reasoning, in which the second line 
under 1 is used. 
Fig. 10.4.2. R(f) # R(f0) <=> (f 1.̀ ) - 1 (0) # (f)' 
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Property 10.4.2. (convex cone-interior processes) 
Let f : le-->R" be a convex cone-interior process. Then: 
1. f -1 is a convex cone-interior process; 
2. f: and f* are convex cone-interior processes; 
3. 1'0 (0) is the recession cone off(x), for every x; 
4. je is a convex cone process if and only iff =f, =f0 ; 
5. f is a linear process if and only iff =f =f0, D(f)= Ir and f(0) = {0}. 
Proof 
1. f1  is a convex process (see property 10.3.1.5); the other conditions 
are met by definition. 
2. f: and f":.! are convex processes (see property 10.3.1.6). From their 
definitions it follows that R(f) is a cone if and only if RUI') is a cone, 
and that j".*(0) = (f.r),(0) if and only iff!(0) = (f*), (0). The same is true 
for the inverses. 
Therefore, the statement follows from property 10.4.1.2, if it can be 
shown that R(f) is a cone is equivalent to R(f)= R(L): 
Assume that R(f) is not a cone; since G(f0) is a cone and R(fo)= Proj 2 
G(f„) is a cone, R(f) 0 R(ƒ,). 
Conversely, suppose that R(f) 0 R(fo). Since G(4) g G(f) and 
G(L) is non-empty, G(f) contains zero. According to property 8.3.1.1, 
Conint G(f) equals the recession cone of G(f), 0 + G(f). As R(f.)= 
Proj 2 G(fo)= Proj 2 [0 + G(f)], the existence of an element yeR(f) such 
that ystR(f„) implies that a Â>0 exists such that 40 R(f). Therefore 
R(f) is not a cone. It follows that R(f) is a cone if and only if R(f) = 
R(jp). 
3. According to property 8.3.1.1, G(ƒ,)= 0 + G (f ). The set of directions 
parallel to R" in which Gif)  is unbounded is equal to G (4) n {(0, y)I 
ye R"} =f,(0), which is thus the recession cone of {y1(x, y)e G(f)} = 
f(x), for every xeD(f). 
4. Let fbe a convex cone process, then G(f) is a cone and from property 
8.3.1.1 it follows that Gif) = Conint G(f)= Cl Cone Gif),  implying that 
f =f„ =1;.. It can be easily seen that the conditions of a convex cone-
interior process have been fulfilled (see property 10.3.2.4). Let f be a 
convex cone-interior process and ƒ=f0=f. Then G(f) is a cone, 
implying that fis a convex cone process. 
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5. Let f be a linear process, then G(f) is a subspace that meets the given 
conditions of a convex cone-interior process. 
Let f be a convex cone-interior process; f=f, =fc implies that f is a 
convex cone process. D(f)= k" and the superadditivity of f imply that 
f(x)+f(—x) f(x — x) =f(0), which is equal to {0}. It follows that for 
every x, f(x) consists of a single element and f( — x) = —f(x). Thereforef 
is closed under the operations of addition and scalar multiplication, i.e. f 
is a linear process. D 
It may be noticed from (2) above that a convex process f: Ri"—>R" is a 
convex cone-interior process if and only if D(f), R(f), D(f) and 
R(f) are all cones. 
In order to apply algebraic operations on convex cone-interior pro-
cesses, it is necessary that they have the same orientation. Two convex 
cone-interior processes f1 and f2 from R'" into R" are said to have the 
same orientation if, for all z i e 0 + G(f1 ) and z2 e 0+ G(f2), z1 +z2 = 0 
implies that z 1 = 0 and z2 = 0 and if Int 0 + [G(f1 )nG(f2)] (P. If two 
processes have the same orientation, their images cannot be unbounded in 
opposite directions (see fig. 10.4.3). 
Fig. 10.4.3. Two processes, not hoving the same orientation 
Property 10.4.3. (combinatorial operations) 
Let f1 and f2 be convex cone-interior processes from R'" to R" having the 
same orientation. Then the following processes are also convex cone-
interior processes: 
f1 + f2 ; 	#ƒ2; 
f ƒ2; 	.ft v 1.2 ; 
f1, for any scalar A. 
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Proof 
Addition: The set G(f„ +f2) may be constructed from G(f1 ) and G(f2) as 
follows. Define the sets K, and K2 in le x R"' x R" by 
:= {(x 1 , 0, Yi)1(xl Y i)e GUM ; 
K2 := {(0, x2 , Y2) I (X2 5 Y2) G(f:2)}• 
Both sets are closed and convex. As f, and ƒ2 have the same orientation, 
K1 + K2 does not contain lines, or has zero lineality, and is therefore 
closed (see property 8.3.4). The sum of convex sets is also convex (see 
property 8.3.3). 
Consider K : = {Kl + K2} n {(x l , x2 , z)I x, = x2 }: K is closed and 
convex. The image of K under the projection (x 1 , x2 , z)—>(x, , z), 
Proj 1 , 3 K, is closed: one can associate with every element (5c- 1 , i)e 
{(x1 , z) I Ve > 0, B[(x l , z), e] n Proj i , 3 K 0 = Cl Proj 1 , 3 K, an element 
eK, because = .)72 and Proj 2 K = D(f2) = R(f2 -1 ) is a cone. 
Thus Cl Proj, , 3 K = Proj 1 , 3 K. The projection of a convex set is also 
convex. Therefore, Proj, , 3 K = {(x, , y -I-y2) I (x 1 , yje G(f1 ) and (x1 , y2)e 
G(f2)} = G(f„ +f2) is a closed and convex set, implying that (f, +f2) is a 
convex process. Moreover D (f, +f2) = D (fi ) n D(J) is a cone, as is 
R(f, +f2) = Proj3 K = R (f R (f 2), according to property 8.3.3. 
Finally, as the partial addition of Cone G(J) and Cone G(f2) is a 
convex cone, (from property 8.3.3), and as (f1 +f2) is point-closed, 
(from property 10.3.1.3), and as by definition, f1 (0) = (ƒ1),( 0) 
and f2 (0) = (f2),(0), it follows that (f, +f2)(0) = ((f1)c + (ƒ2)á (0) = 
+.f2)c(0). This is also truc for the inverse since, according to property 
10.3.1.5, (f, +f2) '  also a convex process. It follows then that (f, +1.2) 
is a convex cone-interior process. 
Inverse addition: An analogous reasoning can be used to construct the 
set G(f, 41f2) from the sets G(f1 ) and G(f2). In this case the sets K, and 
K2 are defined in ie x R" x R. 
Conjunction: G(f, f2) = G(f1 )r G(f2). It can be seen that G(f, Af2 ) 
is a closed and convex set, hence f1 Af2 is a convex process. Moreover, 
D (f, f2) = D (fi) n D (f2) and R(f, Af2)= R(f1 ) n R (f2) are cones. 
Finally, as Cone G(f,)n Cone G(f2)= Cone[G(Mn G(f2)] it follows 
from the definition of a cone closure of a convex process that 
(f, Af2)(0) = ((f,), (f2),) (0) = f2),.(0). This is valid again for the 
inverse; hence it follows that (f, Af2) is a convex cone-interior process. 
Disjunction: G(f, v f2) = G(f1)+ G(f2). As f, and f2 have the same 
orientation, G(f, vf2) is a closed and convex set; therefore f, vf2 is a 
convex process. The other conditions can be analogously derived from 
the above reasoning. 
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Scalar multiplication: For a given 1, the set G(Afi) = {(x, 1y)1(x, y)E 
G(fi )} is closed and convex because G(J) is closed and convex. There-
fore Af, is a convex process. The other conditions are expressed in cones, 
which are invariant under scalar multiplication. El 
Property 10.4.4. (composition) 
Let .f, : R'-.R"' and f2: R'"-3R" be convex cone-interior processes; then 
the productf2f1 is also a convex cone-interior process. 
Proof 
The set G(ƒ2ƒ1 ) may be constructed from G(f1 ) and G(f2) as follows: 
define the sets K, and K2 in Ri xlexR"'xR" by 
Kt := {(x1, yt, 0, 0) lYi EL (x1)} ; 
K2 : = {(09 09 Y2 9 2.2) I Z2 EL (Y2)}• 
The sum K1 + K2 is closed since for all k i e 0 + Kl and k2 e 0 + K2 , 
ki + k2 = 0 implies kl =0 and k2 =0; closure follows from property 
8.3.4. The sum is also convex. 
Consider K:= (Kl + K2)(1 {(x, Yt, Y2, z)1 Y1 = Y2} ; K is closed and 
convex. The image of K under the projection (x, Yi , Y2, z)->(x, z), 
Proj 1 ,4 K, is closed and convex. Closure follows from the fact that one 
can associate with every limit point (7c, 2) of a sequence (x„ zi)eProj 1 ,4 K, 
an element (£, 9, 9, i)e K, because a certain y, exists such that y,efi (x,) 
and zt ef2 (y,) and both R(fI) and D(ƒ2) are cones. As Proj 1 ,4 = 
{ (x, z) I 3y efi (x) : z ef2 (y)} = G(ƒ2ƒ1), the multifunctionf2f1 is a convex 
process. Moreover, as R(ƒ2) is a cone, R(f2f1 ) is a cone; as D(J'I ) is a 
cone, D(f2A) is a cone. 
Finally, as f2(0) = (1'2),(0) and both fl (0) and f2f; (0) are cones, it 
follows thatf2 fi  (0) = [ (f2)c VIM (0) = (ƒ2ƒ1 ),(0). The same holds for the 
inverse off2A . It follows that (f2fi) is a convex cone-interior process. C] 
Property 10.4.5. (inverse operations) 
Let f, and ƒ2 be convex cone-interior processes from R"' into R" having 
the same orientation. Then the inverse operation has the following 
properties: 
1. (.ƒ.1 +f2)-1 = fr 1 # f2- 1 ; 
2. Ui *f2)- ' = f1 1 + f2- 1 ; 
3. UI A ./.2) - 1 = fr 1  Af; 
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4. (fi v f2) - i = fl- 1 v f2-1 ; 
5. (2f) -1 (y) = f -1 (y/A), for some A > 0. 
Proof 
1. GRA +12) 1 1= {(y, x)I y Efi (x) +f2 (x)} 
= {(y, x) j 3 (x, y i ) e Wi), 3 (x, Y2)E G(f2) : Y = Yi +Y2} 
= {(y, x) I 3y„ y2 : xe.fr 1 (Yi)nƒ2-1 (Y2) and y = Yi +Y2} 
= G(1.1 %f;'). . fi 1 ).
2. The reverse argument can be applied. 
3. G[(fi Af2) -1 ]= {(Y, x) I (x, y)e G(fi ) n G(12)} 
= G(f i-1 ) n G(1. 1 1 ) = G(f 1 Af1 1 ). 
4. GRA v f2) -11= {(,Y, x)I(x, y)e Wi) + G(.1.2)} 
= G(f n+ G(f 1 1 ) = G(.f i' l vf1 1 )- 
5. {x I x e (V) 1 (y)} =- tx I (x, y) e G (Af )} = {x I (x, y I A) e G (f)} 
= {xl xef - 1 (yl A)}. 13 
Property 10.4.5.2 indicates why the operation # is called 'inverse addi-
tion'. From properties 10.4.2 and 10.4.3 it follows that the above multi-
functions are also convex cone-interior processes. 
Property 10.4.6. (adjoint operations) 
Let fl andƒ2 be convex cone-interior processes from Ir into I? having the 
same orientation. Let * indicate either the upper adjoint or the lower 
adjoint operation. Then: 
1. (ƒ1 +h)* 2 ft + f: ; 
2. (./.1 *h)* 2 ft # f: ; 
3. Ch Af = ft \°/ f: ; 
4 - (f1 v f2)* _ f*  X f: ; 
5. (Af)* (q) = f * (4), for ). > 0. 
It can be proven that the inclusions expressed in 1. and 2. can be replaced 
by equalities, but this will not be attempted here. 
Proof 
The property is demonstrated for the upper adjoint operator; a similar 
argument can be applied to prove the proposition for the lower adjoint 
operator, except that some signs should then be reversed. 
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1. GR.f1 -Ef2)+1= {(9,P)1( -P, 9)E[G(ft -I-I2)]t} 
= {(9,P)1V(xi, Yi)e G(f2), V(x2, Y2)E G(f2): x=x1  = x2, Y =y  +Y2  and 
-px + qy 1} 
U (q, p)I3q i , q2 , 	p2 : q = (1 -1,)q, = 1q2 , p = (1 -1)p i + Ap2 , 
[0,1] 
V(x„ yi)eG(fI), V(x2 ,  Y2)EG(f2): --2)91Y1 -(1 -2)p x1 (1-2) 
and 192Y2 - 2/32 X2 5_ A} 
= 	{(q, P)1 391 92 	P2: q = (1 - 2)q, = 42, p = (1-1)p i + 11)2 , 
V(x2, 	G(f2): 	xi +qiYi 1 and 
V(x2 , Y2)EG(f2): -P2 X2 + (123'2 .5 1} 
= 	{(q, p) I Rq i , q2 , p i , p2 : q = (1-1)q, = Ag2 , p = (1 - .1.)p + 1132 , 
Pi 	+ (91), P2 ef (92)} 
= U {q, P)I 391, 92: P = ( 1 - 2).ƒ1+ (91) + Af i+ (92) and 
q = (1- 2)q, = 1q2 } = G(fr 
2. G[(A #f2) *+] = {(9, p)I( - p , g) e [G (. f ƒ2 )] *_} 
= {(g,p)IV (x i YI)e 	V(x2, Y2)€ G(f2) 
x = x i +x2 , y = = Y2 and -px+qy 1} 
V (x, Y i)e G(fi),V (x2, Y2)éG(f2): 
(1 - 2)913'1 - (1 - A)p i x, :5_ (1 -1) and 2923'2 - AP2 x2 
= 	{(q, p)13g,, q2 , p, , p2 : q = (1 -1)g,+ Ag2 , p = (1- 2.)P = AP2, 
Pief t (yi) and P2Eft+ (92)} 
3. G[(fi Af2)+]= {(q, P)I( -  P, 9)E[G(f1 Af2 )]*_} 
= {(9, P)I( - P, q)E[G (ƒ 1) n G(f2)1 *-} 
= ((q, p)1(- p, g)e[GUAt 4. [G(ƒ2)] *-}, from property 9.3.4.2, 
= G(ft+)L' G(ft+ ) = G(ƒt + 11+). (See section 10.1) 
4. G[(f2 vf2)*+] = {(q, P)I ( -P, 9)E[G(f1v.1.2)] *_} 
= {(9, P)I (- P, 9)E[G(A)+ G (f2)1 *-} 
= {(9, P)I( - P, q)E[G(A)]t [G(f2)]t}, from property 9.3.4.1, 
= G(f;k + ) G(ft.,.)= G(fr + X ft+). (See section (10.1.) 
5. G[(2ƒ)!,] = {(q, p)1(- p, g)e[G (1f)]*. 
= {(q, p)1V(x, y)EG(ƒ): -px+g(2y) _5,1} 
= {(q, p)1(- p, Ag)e[G(f)]} • D 
From properties 10.4.1, 10.4.2 and 10.4.3 it follows that the class of 
convex cone-interior processes is also closed under the convex algebraic 
operations defined in section 10.1. 
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Property 10.4.7. (adjoint operations) 
Letf1 and 1'2 be convex cone processes from R" into 121" having the same 
orientation. Let * indicate either the upper or the lower adjoint operation. 
Then: 
1. Ui +1.2)* 2 f;11 + f: ; 
2. (./.1 ƒ2)* 2 f' 	; 
3- ( f.1 ƒ2)* =f v 	; 
4- (f1 v f2)* = f;" Ah* ; 
5 . (AD* = 
Proof 
This property follows from the fact that the graphs are cones and that the 
operations in property 10.4.6 can be reduced in accordance with property 
10.1.2. Compare this result with that for sets in section 9.3 (properties 
9.3.4 and 9.3.5), and with the result for Rockafellar's (1972) definition 
of an adjoint in property 10.3.3. 13 
10.5. CONVEX STAR PROCESSES AND 
CONVEX AUREOLE PROCESSES 
For most applications a convex cone-interior process is a too general 
model and must therefore be confined to a starred or aureoled process, 
as defined in section 10.2. If a convex cone-interior process is starred, it is 
said to be a convex star process; if it is aureoled, it is called a convex 
aureole process (see fig. 10.5.1). 
Fig. 10.5.1. A convex aureole process f and its convex star process f* 
In economic theory, many production models or consumption models 
are based on convex star or aureole processes (see chapters 3 and 4 of 
this book). Some properties of these processes are given below. 
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Property 10.5.1. (convex star processes) 
Let f : R"' —› IC be a convex star process. Then: 
1. f(x)=f(Star x) = Star f(x); 
2. f. (0) f(x) gf(Ax) Af(x), for A> 1; 
3. f1  is a convex aureole process; 
4. f: is a convex aureole process; 
5. *f is a point-starred and graph-closed multifunction. 
Proof 
1. f(x) f(Star x) = U {f(Ax)I 0 5_ A 51 ): 
Suppose that some 7 ef(Xx), with 0 < < 1, is not an element off(x). Then 
Xxef -1 (j-7) and xOf -1 (9). This contradicts f1  being point-aureoled 
(see section 10.2), by which x = l 1 (Xx)Ef -1 (y), as X-1 > 1. 
It is evident that f(x) ./(Star x), hence f(x) =f(Star x). 
f(x) = Star [f(x)] follows from f being point-starred. 
2. G(4) is the recession cone of G(f), from the definition of the cone 
opening f. (see section 10.3) and property 8.3.1.1. As G(f0) G(f) and 
Oef(0), it follows that f.(0) 	gf(x). 
Further,f(x) g.f(Ax), for A 1, follows fromf 1 being point-aureoled. 
Finally, f(1x) 1ƒ(X), for A k: 1. Choose any yef(Ax); since (lx, y)E 
G(f) and (0, 0)e G(f), it follows from the convexity of G(f) that 
(x, y/A) E G(f), or yeAf(x). 
3. By definition. 
4. Let pef: (q); then Vx, Vyef(x) : px qy — 1. Since -1 (y) is point-
aureoled, it follows that for all A 1: p(Ax)= (1p)x qy — 1. Therefore 
(Ap)ef:(g) and f: is point-aureoled. An analogous argument shows that 
(fr) -1 is point-starred; thereforef: is aureoled. 
The lower adjoint processf: is also aureoled, but is not relevant in the 
case of a convex star process (see fig. 10.5.2). 
5. *_ f being point-starred follows from the definition (section 10.1) and 
property 9.2.3.4 (see also fig. 10.2.3). That t f is graph-closed follows from 
properties 10.1.3.2 and 10.3.1.4. El 
This result for convex star processes can also be obtained for convex 
aureole processes (property 10.5.2). The proofs are similar to those given 
above. 
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Property 10.5.2. (convex aureole processes) 
Let .'": 121" —■ R" be a convex aureole process. Then: 
1. f(x) =f(Aur x) = Aurf(x); 
2. f0 (0) 2f(x) D. f(2x) 2 21(x), for Akl; 
3. f1  is a convex star process; 
4. f* is a convex star process; 
5. :fis a point-aureoled and graph-closed multifunction. 
The class of convex star and convex aureoled processes is closed under 
all operations for which the class of convex cone-interior processes is 
closed (see section 10.4). 
It should also be noticed that non-negative monotone processes are 
either starred or aureoled, according to property 10.2.6. These kinds of 
processes are frequently used. 
Finally, for a convex star or a convex aureole process a relation can be 
established between its polar multifunction and its adjoint process. This 
is shown in the following property. 
Property 10.5.3. (adjoint and polar multifunctions) 
Let f : le —› 1?" be a convex star process. Then: 
f,t(q)= (-) {(qy —1) :(f -1 ) (y)lqy> 1}, for any qeR"; 
.f(x) = donv U {(px+1) -1 (1r) -1 (p)Ipx> —1}, for some xeir. 
P 
Let f: R" —> R" be a convex aureole process. Then: 
l' f (q) = n gqy +1) *(1- ') (y)lqy> —1}, for some qeR"; 
3' 
: . I.(X) = Conv U {(px— 1) -1 (ƒ11`) -1 (p)Ipx>1}, for some xe ie. 
P 
Proof (see fig. 10.5.2) 
f(q) = {pl Vx, Vyef(x) : px k qy — 1} 
={pl tly, Vxef -1 (y) :px > qy- 1} 
= n {p I Vxef -1 (y) : px qy — 1}. 
1 
Given some q, the following three cases can be distinguished: 
a. qy — 1 = 0, implying that for such a y: 
{p I Vxef -1 (y) : px a> qy — 1} = {p I tixef -1 (y) : px ..> 0} = [f -1 (y)],.. 
b. qy — 1 <0, implying that (see properties 9.2.3.3 and 9.2.5.3): 
{pItIxef -1 (y) : (— p)x _<(1— qy)} = 
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= {p I Vx e Starf -1 (y) : ( — p)x(1—qy)} 
= {p VxeConef (y) : (—p)x <0} 
= — Cf - (Y)] °- = 	(3')] °+. 
c. qy — 1 > 0; then {p l ■ixef -1 (y) : px (gy— 1)} 
= (qy — 1) {pitixef -1 (y) : px 	=  
According to property 9.2.1, 
Lim U-1 (y)r„- =  
qy-.1 
Because j. is starred, f -1 is aureoled and, from property 9.2.5.2, 
-1 (y)]*,. g. V -1 (y)n. Together this implies that: 
f: (q) = n (qy — 1) {pl Vx ef -1 (y): px k 1}, for qy > 1 
= (?) {(qy —1)t(f')(y)l qy > 1}. 
If j" is starred, then j"*. is aureoled (see property 10.5.1.4). The upper 
polar multifunction is equal to: 
= En (gy-1):(J- i)(y)]*+, 
From properties 9.3.4.5 and 9.2.2.5: 
+(g)(q) = Conv U [(4Y — 1 ) - (7 1 )(Y)r+ = 
= Conv 13.) [(qy — 1) -  tf-  1 (y)], 
Substitute j(x) forf: (q), both being aureoled, to get 
:j(x) = Conv U Rpx — 1) -1 (f!) -1 (p)], 
P 
for qy > 1. 
for qy > 1. 
for px > 1. 
Similar argruments can be put forward when fis aureoled. [11 
Iff is a non-negative convex cone process, then the property outlined 
above can be simplified. It has been shown (Ruys, 1972) that for the 
convex polyhedral process : R's+ -› R, defined by f(x):= {ylAy x}, 
in which matrix A is regular and has a dominant diagonal, the following 
relation between the adjoint and the polar multifunction is valid: 
f 1! (q) 	= n {:cf-i) (y) n R qy = 1 and y 0]; 
= (") {_tf(x) n R".,* I px = 1 and x 0}. 
In this problem, the adjoint f.(4) = {pe gr IA* p q} determines the 
set of constraints in a linear programming problem which is the dual 
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q 
js ' l - i(v) 
P 
P 
Fig. 10.5.2. A convex star process, f, and its adjoint process, f:; *J" 
is the upper polar process of the convex aureole process f'. 
problem of: max {4.3, I yef()7)}. This property of adjoints has been pointed 
out above in a more general context (see the duality theorem 10.3.6). 
A diagram relating the various adjoint, polar and inverse multifunc-
tions can be found in section 10.1. 
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Summary 
The classical model of General Equilibrium, as given by Walras, treats an 
economy in which a number of consumers and producers are present, 
each having their own preferences and production-capacities. In this 
economy, decentralization of decisions is made possible by allotting to 
each participant his own choice-set (determined by his income, for 
example) from which he chooses a subjective best element. It bas been 
shown that, under certain conditions, an allocation can then be realized 
which holds an equilibrium between possibilities and wishes for all 
participants, and which satisfies some optimality conditions. The classical 
model, however, is meant only for an exchange economy with private 
goods, i.e. commodities which are used exclusively by one participant 
and which involve no external effects for the other participants. Although 
it is possible to also introduce public goods (used by all participants 
simultaneously) into the model, serious problems arise in connection with 
the formation of decisions. 
In this study an attempt is made to solve this problem and to propose 
an organization of individual decisions in a distribution economy which 
satisfies the equilibrium conditions mentioned above. The proposal is 
made here to separate decisions on the level of private goods from deci-
sions on the level of public goods, by introducing two standards of value. 
Each participant is allotted an income for private goods and a choice-set 
of valuation-prices for public goods, from which he can choose an element 
indicating priorities between several public goods. An equilibrium is 
said to be obtained if the so-determined valuations, summed over the 
individuals, are proportional to the costs of providing that bundle of 
public goods, and if the proportion between the share of income bestowed 
on private goods and the share of income bestowed on public goods 
causes no dis-equilibrium in the production sector. Such an equilibrium 
is called a two-level price equilibrium. The organization can be extended 
to several levels, so that local public goods can also be considered. 
The method used is made possible by applying a duality transformation 
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on the economy, which expresses all relations characterizing a participant 
in terms of prices, rather than in terms of quantities. This duality opera-
tion (which is perfectly satisfactory only in a convex environment) func-
tions as a translator expressing information in quantities in terms of 
information in prices. Given the character of public goods, the individual 
participant must make a choice in terms of valuation-prices, and collec-
tively a decision is made about the quantities. The mirror image is present 
in the case of the allocation of private goods. 
Extensive attention is therefore devoted in this study to the properties 
and effects of duality operations. In the second part of the book, these 
transformations are treated in connection with sets, and a generalization 
is given of these operations applied to multifunctions. The effects of these 
on algebraic operations, such as addition, are investigated, and algebraic 
operations for sets and multifunctions in the dual space are defined, 
permitting aggregation also in the price space. 
The economy in the price space derived via such a duality transforma-
tion is not essentially different from the economy in the quantity space. 
Each is a representation of the other. If, however, both systems exist 
without being related by a completely deterministic duality operation 
and a dynamic interpretation is given to the transformation, then an 
endogenous process of development can be explained for the whole of 
systems and relations which constitute an economy. 
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Samenvatting 
Het klassieke model van Algemeen Evenwicht, zoals weergegeven door 
Walras, gaat uit van een ruil-economie waarin een aantal consumenten 
en producenten werkzaam is, ieder met eigen preferenties en productie-
capaciteiten. In deze economie wordt decentralisatie van beslissingen 
mogelijk gemaakt doordat elke deelnemer een eigen keuze-verzameling 
heeft (bepaald door bijvoorbeeld zijn inkomen) waaruit hij naar eigen 
dunk een beste element kiest. Het is bewezen dat aldus, onder bepaalde 
voorwaarden, een allocatie gerealiseerd kan worden die voor alle deel-
nemers een evenwicht inhoudt tussen wensen en mogelijkheden, en die 
aan enige optimaliteitsvoorwaarden voldoet. Het klassieke model is 
echter alleen bedoeld voor een ruil-economie met private goederen, 
d.w.z. goederen welke exclusief door één deelnemer gebruikt worden en 
welke geen externe effecten op andere deelnemers veroorzaken. Welis-
waar is het mogelijk om ook publieke goederen (die door alle deelnemers 
tegelijk gebruikt worden) in het model in te voeren, maar dan ontstaan 
problemen met betrekking tot de besluitvorming. 
Deze studie biedt hiervoor een oplossing en stelt een organisatie van 
individuele beslissingen in een verdelings-economie voor, waarin ook aan 
bovenbedoelde evenwichtsvoorwaarden voldaan wordt. Hiertoe wordt 
voorgesteld om de beslissingen op het nivo van de private goederen te 
scheiden van de beslissingen op het nivo van de publieke goederen, door 
twee waarde-standaarden te introduceren. Elke deelnemer krijgt een 
inkomen voor private goederen en een keuze-verzameling van waar-
deringsprijzen voor publieke goederen toegewezen, waaruit hij een ele-
ment kan kiezen dat het best zijn prioriteiten tussen de verschillende 
publieke goederen aangeeft. Een evenwicht wordt per definitie bereikt 
als de aldus bepaalde waarderingen, gesommeerd over de individuen, 
proportioneel zijn aan de kosten van voortbrenging van het pakket van 
publieke goederen, en als de verhouding tussen het inkomensaandeel op 
privaat nivo en het inkomensaandeel op publiek nivo geen onevenwich-
tigheid veroorzaakt in de productiesector. Een dergelijk evenwicht 
wordt een twee-nivo prijs evenwicht genoemd. Deze organisatie kan ook 
tot meerdere nivo's worden uitgebreid, waardoor ook lokale publieke 
goederen in de economie betrokken kunnen worden. 
De gebruikte methode wordt mogelijk gemaakt door een duale afbeel-
ding te maken van de economie, waardoor de relaties die een deelnemer 
karakteriseren, worden uitgedrukt in termen van prijzen in plaats van in 
termen van hoeveelheden. Deze dualiteits-operatie (welke overigens 
alleen volledig voldoet in een convexe omgeving) fungeert dus als vertaler 
van informatie. Gezien het karakter van publieke goederen dient aan elk 
individu een keuze-verzameling gegeven te worden in termen van waar-
deringsprijzen, terwijl gemeenschappelijk een beslissing genomen wordt 
omtrent de hoeveelheden. Dit is dus het spiegelbeeld van een allocatie 
van private goederen. 
Uitgebreid aandacht wordt daarom gegeven in deze studie aan de eigen-
schappen en effecten van dualiteits-operaties. Deze worden in het tweede 
deel van het boek behandeld, waarin ook een generalisering gegeven wordt 
van een dualiteits-operatie op multifuncties. De effecten ervan op alge-
braïsche operaties, zoals optellen, worden onderzocht en er worden 
definities van deze operaties in de duale ruimte gegeven, waardoor ook 
aggregatie in de prijzen-ruimte mogelijk wordt. 
De aldus afgeleide economie in de prijzen-ruimte is wezenlijk niet 
verschillend van de economie die in de hoeveelheden-ruimte gedefiniëerd 
is. De een is een representatie van de ander. Wanneer echter beide syste-
men bestaan zonder door een volstrekt deterministische dualiteits-relatie 
verbonden te zijn, en een dynamische interpretatie gegeven wordt aan 
deze transformatie, dan kan een endogeen ontwikkelingsproces ver-
klaard worden voor het geheel van systemen en relaties die een economie 
uitmaken. 
Stellingen 
1. In de weergave van het model van Walras door Schouten wordt 
ten onrechte het aanbod van productiefactoren onafhankelijk van de 
beloning van productiefactoren gesteld. 
(Exacte economie, Leiden, 1957) 
2. Een aantal uitspraken van de econoom Kolnaar over de bisschop-
pelijke vastenbrief 1973, zoals weergegeven in De Tijd van 
23 april 1973, behoeft meer nuances om ook voor een econoom met 
een andere politieke overtuiging dan Kolnaar aanvaardbaar te zijn. 
3. Wanneer een economische organisatie met zelfbestuur van bedrijven 
wordt voorgesteld (zoals bijvoorbeeld door Mandel), dan dient 
systematisch rekening te worden gehouden met de preferenties van 
de groep mensen die niet in het arbeidsproces zijn opgenomen. 
4. Algemeen-evenwichts modellen hebben niet de pretentie een op-
lossing te geven voor het probleem van een rechtvaardige inkomens-
verdeling. 
5. Veel aandacht is door economen besteed aan de welvaartverhogende 
effecten van productiviteitsverbeteringen. Deze effecten kunnen 
echter ook verkregen worden door de consumptiecapaciteiten van 
consumenten te verbeteren, bijvoorbeeld door te leren een beter 
gebruik te maken van de reeds aangeboden mogelijkheden. 
6. Een onderscheid dient gemaakt te worden tussen „ voortbrenging van 
publieke goederen" en „voortbrenging van goederen door de over-
heid". Indien de overheid private goederen voortbrengt met ver-
liezen (dus middels belastinggelden), dan wordt veelal particuliere 
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voortbrenging van deze goederen zonder verliezen onmogelijk 
gemaakt. Een dergelijke handelwijze van de overheid kan ver-
strekkende nadelige gevolgen hebben. 
7. De toenemende betekenis van (lokaal) publieke goederen voor be-
drijven zal deze bedrijven dwingen om zich steeds meer met de 
politiek bezig te houden. De politieke lichamen zijn op dit moment 
niet in staat om de naar voren gebrachte verlangens en de effecten 
ervan te beoordelen, noch om de belangen van producenten en 
consumenten af te wegen. 
8. Het beschouwen van de tegenstelling kapitalist-arbeider als de enig 
fundamentele tegenstelling in de economische orde (welke opvatting 
overigens niet door Marx gehuldigd is), maakt het onderkennen van 
nieuwe tegenstellingen moeilijk, ... zeker als men zelf tot de nieuwe 
adel behoort. 
9. Een zuiver socialistisch economisch systeem vraagt om een ideologie 
van de deelnemers welke veel meer met de katholieke leer overeen-
komt, dan de ideologie waarop een zuiver kapitalistisch economisch 
systeem gebaseerd is. Voor de Katholieke Hogeschool heeft dit 
echter geen consequenties. 
10. De meeste consumenten besteden aanmerkelijk meer tijd aan het 
verwerven van private goederen, dan aan het verkrijgen van de 
gewenste publieke goederen. Het gedrag van de kiezers en de relatie 
tussen kiezers en gekozenen vormt hiervoor een aanwijzing. 
11. Een hoog wetenschappelijke standaard binnen een faculteit is niet 
voldoende gewaarborgd door het verlenen van bijzondere rechts-
posities; het is zelfs goed mogelijk dat de negatieve effecten van deze 
maatregel de positieve effecten overtreffen. Omdat een hoog weten-
schappelijke standaard een publiek economisch goed is voor ten-
minste het wetenschappelijk corps van een faculteit, zal de individuele 
bijdrage van een lid van dit corps (zoals zijn bereidheid om andere 
leden te corrigeren) minimaal zijn, wanneer niet een impliciet of 
expliciet systeem van afspraken deze bijdrage regelt. 
12. Alleen door betrekkelijkheid kan iemand of iets bestaan. 
26 juni 1974 	 P. H. M. Ruys 
Stellingen behorende bij : P. H. M. Ruys, Public goods and decentralization, 1974. 
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